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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL INACTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
SEPTEMBER 2021
TYLER HANSEN, B.A., LUTHER COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Pollin
This dissertation contributes three essays exploring the political economy of global
inaction on climate change.
Chapter 1 asks whether climate stabilization means the end of capitalism. Two
influential perspectives within environmental political economy—the “degrowth”
perspective from ecological economics and the “revolution” perspective from ecological
Marxism—answer in the affirmative. If they are right, climate policy programs within
capitalism, like the Green New Deal, are non-solutions. I evaluate their arguments,
concluding that while environmental sustainability in general likely requires moving
beyond capitalism, climate stabilization in particular does not. Given the urgency of the
climate crisis, I conclude the chapter by outlining a theoretical framework for identifying
and analyzing political economic obstacles to climate stabilization within capitalism.
Chapter 2 examines the economic underpinnings of the fossil fuel industry’s
resistance to climate stabilization. I estimate the magnitude of wealth losses from stranded
assets (i.e., the devaluation of fossil fuel reserves and capital goods) that fossil fuel firms
will incur under 2 °C and 1.5 °C climate stabilization scenarios, and how these losses are
distributed across the industry. I also compare profitability between fossil fuel and
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renewable energy firms for the period 2010-2019. Potential wealth losses amount to $1315 trillion, impacting low-cost and high-cost producers alike. Three quarters fall on
governments. Additionally, fossil fuel firms remain significantly more profitable than
renewable energy firms. These results imply a strong economic incentive for industry to
continue on the path of resistance. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on how to
overcome the industry’s resistance.
Chapter 3, coauthored with Robert Pollin, evaluates one strategy for overcoming
fossil fuel industry resistance: divestment. We consider whether the fossil fuel divestment
movement has succeeded in inflicting financial damage on fossil fuel firms. We present
descriptive data on the level of divested fossil fuel stocks and bonds and econometric
analysis of the impact of divestment events on fossil fuel firms’ stock market prices. We
find that divestment campaigns have not been successful in inflicting significant financial
damage on fossil fuel firms, even though the movement has been successful in mobilizing
activism and public opinion against them.
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CHAPTER 1
DOES CLIMATE STABILIZATION MEAN THE END OF CAPITALISM?:
EVALUATING RADICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF GLOBAL INACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

1.1 Introduction
On June 23, 1988, NASA scientist James Hansen testified before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hansen confirmed the existence of humaninduced global warming with 99% confidence and warned of the disastrous consequences
of business-as-usual, e.g., sea level rise, heat waves, and droughts. The day after Hansen’s
testimony, the front-page of the New York Times read, “Global Warming Has Begun,
Expert Tells Senate.” They quote James Hansen saying, “It is time to stop waffling so
much” (Shabecoff 1988).
Since 1988, humanity has emitted more fossil carbon than in the prior two centuries
going back to the dawn of the fossil fuel era, and emissions continue to rise (Global Carbon
Project 2020).1 Global warming has been deemed, officially, a “climate emergency” by
more than 11,000 climate scientists (Ripple et al. 2020). Yet, government and business
leaders continue to “waffle.” This continued inaction, despite decades of scientific
warnings, increases in warming-induced catastrophes, and the existence of economically
and technically feasible solutions, suggests that it is a systemic problem. Because the
climate crisis stems from economic activities (e.g., the production, distribution, and
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Periodic drops in emissions occur only in recession years, such as 2020.
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consumption of energy and food), the chief system of concern is capitalism, the
predominant economic system the world over.
This leads to a simple question: does climate stabilization, understood as limiting
global warming to 1.5-2 °C above preindustrial levels, require dismantling and replacing
capitalism entirely? The implications of this question are profound. If the answer is “yes,”
then the climate movement must merge with the anti-capitalist movement, and large-scale
climate policy programs like the Green New Deal become false solutions. The challenge
of climate stabilization becomes considerably more difficult, bordering on impossible
given the short timeframe for achieving the 1.5-2 °C target. Two prominent perspectives
among environmental scholars and activists argue in the affirmative—climate stabilization
does indeed require dismantling and replacing capitalism in the near-future. These include
the degrowth perspective, which stems from ecological economics, and what I term the
“revolution” perspective, which stems from ecological Marxism and political ecology.
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the arguments that form the basis of
their claims. For example, degrowth proponents argue that the required pace of CO2
emissions reductions is too great without shrinking the GDP. Revolution proponents claim
that capital accumulation, i.e., the perpetual cycle of wealth-expansion that defines
capitalism, renders planet-wide environmental improvement impossible. I review their
theoretical claims and empirical evidence, and weigh them against alternative theories and
evidence. I find that while they are convincing in their claims that long-term, general
environmental sustainability will likely require moving beyond capitalism, they falter on
the question of climate stabilization in particular. That is, achieving the 1.5-2 °C target
does not require dismantling capitalism, and allocating activist, advocacy, and research
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efforts towards dismantling capitalism will not make climate stabilization any easier. The
degrowth and revolution perspectives—regarding climate change specifically—may
actually prove detrimental to climate stabilization efforts.
A secondary purpose of this essay is to outline an alternative theoretical framework
for identifying and analyzing the political economic obstacles to climate stabilization. My
framework treats capitalism in general as a short- to medium-term constraint, i.e., in the
timeframe for solving the climate crisis. That is, I assume that capital accumulation and
economic growth will continue to form the basis of capitalist economies. However,
capitalism is also varied; it comes in many different forms. Thus, my framework treats the
economic, political, and cultural institutions that constitute historically-specific capitalist
economies as malleable. Indeed, climate stabilization will likely require significant
institutional change. For example, dismantling the anti-interventionist conception of
government that characterizes the neoliberal form of capitalism. Long-term, as noted
above, capitalism itself is malleable, and will likely have to be challenged to bring about
general environmental sustainability. My theoretical framework also incorporates climate
stabilization pathways, e.g., alternative climate stabilization policy programs, and
coalitional analysis, i.e., discerning coalitions of opposition and support for each pathway.
I illustrate the framework by considering two potential climate stabilization policy
programs in the U.S.: the moderate Green New Deal and the radical Green New Deal.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 1.2.1-1.2.3 introduce and evaluate the
degrowth and revolution perspectives; Section 1.2.4 summarizes and assesses the structural
change implied by the degrowth and revolution perspectives; Section 1.2.5 considers the
implications of the degrowth and revolution perspectives for the Green New Deal in the
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U.S.; Section 1.3 outlines my alternative theoretical framework; and Section 1.4 provides
some concluding considerations.

1.2 Evaluating the Degrowth and Revolution Perspectives
I begin by introducing the degrowth and revolution perspectives and evaluating
their claims. Most importantly, they claim that climate stabilization requires dismantling
capitalism. I evaluate this claim in Sections 1.2.1-1.2.3. A secondary claim is that, even if
the first claim does not hold, dismantling capitalism would make climate stabilization
easier. I evaluate this claim in Section 1.2.4 by walking through what economic degrowth
and a social and ecological revolution would actually entail.
My methodological approach is to evaluate the arguments made by the leading
degrowth and revolution proponents based on number of citations in Google Scholar. I also
consider recent publications from the leading figures for each perspective, which inevitably
have fewer citations. The degrowth publications I review have accumulated 11,014
citations, and the revolution publications 6,438 citations.2 More than 90% of these citations
come from Jackson (2009; 2016), Victor (2008; 2019), Schneider et al. (2010), and Kallis
(2011) for the degrowth perspective, and from Moore (2015), Patel and Moore (2017),
Foster et al. (2011), Clark and York (2005), and Malm (2016) for the revolution
perspective.3

2

As of June 11, 2021, using Google Scholar.
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Jackson (2016) is the second edition of Jackson (2009); Victor (2019) is the second edition of
Victor (2008); Patel and Moore (2017) is very similar to Moore (2015), but is written for a more general
audience; and Clark and York (2005) is the basis of Chapter 5 of Foster et al. (2011). I focus my evaluation
on the most updated editions of these publications, with the exception of Patel and Moore (2017), as Moore
(2015) includes more detail.
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1.2.1 Degrowth
Schneider et al. (2010) define degrowth broadly as “an equitable downscaling of
production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological
conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term” (511). Degrowth
proponents argue that environmental sustainability requires a reduction in material
throughput, i.e., the mass of physical matter extracted from the environment and pollution
emitted back into the environment, and that a reduction in material throughput requires a
reduction in GDP.
They also go one step further, however, and apply this logic to climate change in
particular. They argue that averting the climate crisis, i.e., limiting warming to 1.5-2 °C
above pre-industrial levels, requires economic degrowth. For example, Giacomo D’Alisa
and Giorgos Kallis (2020)—two leading degrowth proponents—state that ecological
economists have “proved the impossibility of addressing climate change if growth were to
continue” (1).4 This statement, which comes in the second paragraph of their paper, made
it through the peer review process in Ecological Economics, the leading academic journal
for the transdisciplinary field of ecological economics. Indeed, all of the degrowth
proponents considered in this paper make similar claims, though they usually stop short of
using the controversial word “proved.”
Degrowth proponents make two general arguments. The first consists of five parts:
(1) Historically, the largest CO2 decoupling rate ever achieved was 3% per year. This
occurred in the midst of the oil embargo crisis of the 1970s. (2) In recent years, the

4

Specifically, they cite the work of Tim Jackson, arguably the leading degrowth proponent. I
consider Jackson’s work in detail in the next section.
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decoupling rate has averaged less than 1% per year. (3) The required annual decoupling
rate for climate stabilization is in the range of 12% to 14%. (4) The gap between historical
and required decoupling rates are very likely too large to accomplish in a growth-based
economy. (5) Therefore, degrowth is required for climate stabilization. The second
argument states that climate stabilization will inevitably lead to economic degrowth,
because renewable energy is incapable of supporting economic growth. As I will show,
both arguments falter on closer examination.
1.2.1.1 The Arithmetic of Degrowth
I begin with Tim Jackson’s 2016 book, Prosperity Without Growth, which is the
most widely cited publication of the degrowth literature, totaling nearly 7,000 citations as
of June 2021.5 The first edition of this book, Jackson (2009), is what “proved” that climate
stabilization requires GDP degrowth, according to D’Alisa and Kallis (2020). Jackson’s
main argument comes in the fifth chapter, titled, “The Myth of Decoupling.” There are two
types of decoupling: relative decoupling and absolute decoupling. Relative decoupling
occurs when a society reduces the emissions intensity of GDP (i.e., emissions per dollar of
GDP). Absolute decoupling occurs when the rate of relative decoupling outpaces the rate
of GDP growth, so that emissions fall in absolute terms. Stabilizing the climate requires
absolute decoupling. Jackson argues that, while absolute decoupling is possible,
“sufficient” absolute decoupling (i.e., decoupling fast enough to stabilize the climate) is
not, unless the global GDP shrinks.6

5

Includes the earlier edition of the book, Jackson (2009).
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The term “sufficient” is used in Jackson and Victor (2019, 950).
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To answer this question of sufficient absolute decoupling, Jackson carries out a
simple arithmetic exercise, that he calls “the arithmetic of growth.” He concludes that the
required level of decoupling is not possible without degrowth. His analysis, while simple,
is highly influential. In this section, I replicate Jackson’s analysis, and extend it to include
degrowth scenarios. My analysis shows that, even if degrowth proponents are right that
sufficient absolute decoupling is impossible, degrowth is not a viable solution, thus
challenging claim (5) from above.
Jackson starts from the well-known IPAT equation, tailored to the climate crisis:
(𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×

𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎

×

(𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
𝐺𝐷𝑃

(1.1A)

Taking the natural logarithm and derivative with respect to time of both sides of Equation
(1.1), Jackson gets the following:
𝛥 (𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
(𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)

=

𝛥 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

+

𝛥 (𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)
(𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)

+

𝛥 (𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)
(𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)

(1.2A)

In other words, the rate of change of CO2 emissions can be approximated as the sum of the
rates of change of population, GDP/capita, and CO2 emissions intensity (i.e., CO2
emissions per dollar of GDP).7
Using this model, Jackson calculates the annual decoupling rate (i.e., the percent
decrease in CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP) necessary to meet a set of four CO2 reduction
targets, ranging from a 90% reduction by 2050 to a 95% reduction by 2035. For example,
if CO2 emissions are required to fall by 4% from 2021 to 2022, and the economy grows by
2%, then the decoupling rate is about 6%.8 Jackson assumes an annual population growth

7

Technically, this equation only holds for infinitesimal changes. However, as Jackson notes, this
equation does a pretty good job approximating larger changes as well.
8

Technically, 5.9%.
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rate of 0.8% and an annual GDP growth rate of 2.1%, consistent with historical trends.
Because the model uses constant annual percentages for rates of growth and decay, carbon
emissions can approach zero but will never fully reach zero (hence, the 90% and 95%
reduction targets, rather than 100%). I return to this issue in the next section. For now, I
will use Jackson’s model as is, updating it to reflect the current year (emission reductions
begin in 2022).
The results of the replication are summarized in the first column (excluding labels)
of Table 1.1. The annual decoupling rate ranges from 9.6%-21.0% across the four emission
targets. In order to approximate the IPCC’s (2018b) 1.5 °C emissions path, which requires
reducing CO2 emissions by 45% by 2030 and 100% by 2050, I take the average of
Jackson’s two middle targets (95% reduction by 2050 and 90% reduction by 2035). The
result is shown in the last row: 14.4%. In other words, assuming GDP growth of 2.1% per
year, to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels,
humanity must decouple CO2 emission from GDP at a rate of 14.4% per year. This is
consistent with Jackson and Victor (2019) and Hickel (2020), both of which say that a 14%
per year decoupling rate is needed. According to Jackson (2016) and degrowth proponents
in general, decoupling rates of this magnitude are simply not feasible. I explore this further
in the next section. For now, though, I will assume degrowth proponents are right. The
question, then, is whether degrowth offers a viable solution. Degrowth proponents
unequivocally say “yes”, but they do not provide any evidence to back this up. Thus, I
extend Jackson’s analysis to include degrowth scenarios, and consider their implications
for both CO2 emissions and GDP.

8

The last four columns display results for no-growth and degrowth scenarios,
characterized by annual GDP growth rates of 0%, -0.5%, -1%, and -5%. The required
decoupling rates decrease by a margin approximately equal to the difference in growth
rates. For example, to achieve the 1.5 °C target, annual decoupling would have to reach
12.6% in the zero-growth scenario, 11.6% in the -1% degrowth scenario, and 7.9% in the
-5% degrowth scenario. According to degrowth proponents, anything above 3% or 4% is
impossible (Jackson 2016; Hickel and Kallis 2019). Thus, the only scenario that comes
close to being viable, according to degrowth proponents, is the -5% degrowth scenario.
That is, the global economy would have to shrink by at least 5% every single year until the
climate has stabilized. And even then, we would miss the 1.5 °C target.
This leads to another question: how would this impact the global economy? Table
1.2 displays the size of the global economy in 2050 for each scenario. Relative to 2021, the
global economy would shrink by one quarter under -1% annual degrowth, and nearly 80%
under -5% annual degrowth. However, degrowth proponents are adamant that degrowth is
only for developed economies. Developed economies shrink and developing economies
grow until incomes per capita converge. Table 1.3 considers what this would look like for
the ten largest economies in the world, which account for two thirds of global GDP. Seven
are developed economies (the U.S., Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Canada)
and three are developing economies (China, India, and Brazil). I show GDP and percent
change in GDP for each country in 2050 under three scenarios: 0% annual GDP
growth, -1% annual GDP growth, and -5% annual GDP growth. For each scenario, I
assume per capita incomes converge in 2050.
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In the zero-growth scenario, the U.S. economy shrinks by three quarters, the Italian
economy by half, and the other developed economies by 60%-70%. China would have to
stop growing in just seven years. Despite these drastic reductions in income, climate
benefits would be minimal. Only the -5% degrowth scenario comes close to achieving
decoupling rates that degrowth proponents consider to be feasible (discussed further in
Section 1.2.1.3). If the global economy shrinks by 5% per year, global GDP per capita
would be $2,700, similar to countries like Honduras, Lebanon, and Palestine. This is
consistent with what leading degrowth proponent Peter Victor advocates in a widely cited
2012 paper.9 In this scenario, developed economies would shrink by 92% to 96%. China
and Brazil’s economies would shrink by 74% and 69%, respectively. In other words, in
order for degrowth to play a major role in stabilizing the climate, most economic activity
in developed and developing economies alike will have to stop. Implementing these kinds
of income reductions is politically impossible and economically undesirable. It also
contradicts degrowth proponents’ claims that developing economies, like China and Brazil,
should be able to continue growing.
In considering the implications of his analysis, Jackson (2016) states, “The speed
at which resource and emission efficiencies have to improve if we are to meet carbon
targets are at best heroic, if the economy is growing relentlessly” (Ch. 5).10 It is true that
the required CO2 emissions reductions to achieve the 1.5-2 °C target are quite large and
unprecedented. However, it does not follow that the best option moving forward is
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Victor (2012) argues that a sustainable GDP per capita would be $3,815.
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Several of the books that I cite, such as Jackson (2016), are in the EPUB format, which does not
include set page numbers. Following the Chicago Manual of Style’s recommendation, I use chapter
numbers in these cases.
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degrowth. In extending Jackson’s arithmetic analysis, I show even if the global economy
could end growth, or implement degrowth, the required CO2 intensity reductions remain
large and unprecedented. This is because, all else equal, reducing the size of the economy
by, say, 14%—implied in the -0.5% degrowth scenario—CO2 emissions decrease
proportionately, by approximately 14%. To have a major impact on required coupling rates
to achieve the 1.5 °C scenario, degrowth would have to reach some 5% per year. The
macroeconomic implications of this can only be described as civilizational collapse, the
exact thing we are trying to avoid by solving the climate crisis. So, if degrowth proponents
are right—i.e., that sufficient absolute decoupling is impossible in the current system—
then we need alternative solutions. I evaluate this claim in the next section.
1.2.1.2 Structural Problems with the IPAT Model
Thus far, I have considered Jackson’s (2016) IPAT model on its own terms. In this
section, I show that the model itself suffers from two structural problems.
Geometric vs. Arithmetic Decay
As noted earlier, Jackson (2016) calls his simple modelling exercise “the arithmetic
of growth.” He uses the term “arithmetic” to denote simplicity. However, his model of CO2
emissions is actually one of geometric decay, not arithmetic decay. I am not suggesting
that he should change the name of that section. However, it turns out that arithmetic decay
is more appropriate.
Under geometric decay, CO2 emissions decline by a fixed ratio each year:
𝐶𝑂2𝑡 = 𝐶𝑂2𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐺)

(1.3)

That is, emissions for each year are determined by multiplying the previous year’s
emissions by one minus the annual percent decrease in emissions (G), where G is a constant
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between zero and one. Under arithmetic decay, emissions are modeled by subtracting a
constant level of emissions each year:
𝐶𝑂2𝑡 = 𝐶𝑂2𝑡−1 − 𝐴

(1.4)

Emissions for year t are determined by subtracting the annual absolute change in emissions
(A) from the previous year, where A is a constant greater than zero.
Figure 1.1 compares the two models. The geometric model achieves a 95%
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050 (equivalent to one of the scenarios considered in Table
1.1). The arithmetic model, following the IPCC’s (2018b) 1.5 °C emissions path, achieves
a 45% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030 and 100% by 2050. In the geometric model,
the emissions path is steep at first, then flattens out. The largest emissions reduction occurs
in the first year (2022), and the smallest in the last year (2050). As a result, the emissions
reductions are actually larger than necessary until the final few years. In the arithmetic
model, the emissions reduction level is constant from year to year in absolute terms, with
the caveat that this level changes in 2031 (this due to the 2030 emissions target). In addition
to being consistent with the IPCC’s recommended emissions path for 1.5 °C, it is more
practical. It simply does not make sense that society would achieve its largest emissions
reduction in year one, and then less with each subsequent year.
Another outcome of the geometric model is that it inflates the average decoupling
rate. Table 1.4 reports the decoupling rates for the arithmetic model under different GDP
growth rates, for both the 1.5 °C and 2 °C warming targets. The 2 °C target requires
achieving a 25% reduction in CO2 by 2030, and 100% by 2070. Relative to Table 1.1,
which reports decoupling rates for the geometric model, these values appear significantly
more manageable. This is due entirely to the way the model is setup. Under geometric
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decay, because the emission reductions get smaller and smaller over time, a larger
decoupling rate is needed. In the arithmetic model, the decoupling rate starts smaller and
grows over time, so that it is 100% in the final period. In absolute terms, however, this
100% rate is identical to the emissions reduction in every other year.
Despite the problems with the geometric model, the entirety of the degrowth
literature reviewed for this paper uses it. The result is inflated decoupling rates. Jackson
and Victor (2019) and Hickel (2020), for example, define sufficient absolute decoupling as
a decoupling rate of 14% per year. These inflated decoupling rates are then used, in part,
to argue that climate stabilization requires degrowth.
Energy Efficiency Improvements
The second structural problem in the IPAT model is that it masks the potential of
energy efficiency improvements. The final term of Equation (1.1A)—the CO2 intensity of
GDP—should be further decomposed into the energy intensity of GDP (energy/GDP)
multiplied by the CO2 intensity of energy (CO2/energy). The updated model is shown in
Equations (1.1B) and (1.2B):
(𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×
𝛥 (𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
(𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)

=

𝛥 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

+

𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎

×

Energy

𝛥 (𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)
(𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)

𝐺𝐷𝑃

+

𝐶𝑂

2
× 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

𝛥 (Energy/𝐺𝐷𝑃)
(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦/𝐺𝐷𝑃)

(1.1B)
+

𝛥 (𝐶𝑂2 /𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦)
(𝐶𝑂2 /Energy)

(1.2B)
The energy intensity of GDP represents energy efficiency. Improving energy
efficiency alone—that is, reducing the level of energy required per dollar of GDP—can
reduce energy consumption by about 30%, and save consumers money in the process
(National Academy of Sciences 2010). Most energy efficiency measures also pay for
themselves in 3-5 years (Pollin 2015). Additionally, transitioning energy systems away
13

from fossil fuels will decrease the amount of energy wasted, especially in transportation.
While gasoline-burning vehicles are only 20% efficient (i.e., they waste 80% of energy
generated), electric vehicles are over 90% efficient (Prentiss 2015).
Societies, then, can reduce energy production and consumption significantly
without reducing the GDP in two ways: (1) decreasing the amount of energy necessary to
produce and use goods and services (e.g., replacing incandescent lighting with LED
lighting and improving the insulation of buildings); and (2) reducing the substantial amount
of energy wasted in fossil fuel-based energy production. The potential for low-cost and
cost-saving energy efficiency improvements, thus, is substantial. The implication is that a
significant portion of fossil fuels can be phased out without actually being replaced, making
it easier to achieve higher decoupling rates.
1.2.1.3 Sufficient Absolute Decoupling
The key to the argument that climate stabilization requires degrowth is the claim
that required decoupling rates are higher than achievable decoupling rates. In the most
widely cited degrowth paper since 2020, Hickel and Kallis (2020) double-down on this
claim. They do this by attempting to quantify the maximum achievable CO2 decoupling
rate, which they conclude is in the range of 3-4%. If true, then even arithmetic decay-based
decoupling rates are too large. Hickel and Kallis come to this conclusion by consulting
three climate models—Schandl et al. (2016), IPCC (2000), and Climate Interactive (n.d.).
The most optimistic climate stabilization scenarios in these models use decoupling rates of
3%, 3.3%, and 4%. According to Hickel and Kallis, these figures must define the maximum
range of decoupling rates. However, they never actually explain why decoupling rates
beyond 4% are impossible.
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They quote Holz et al. (2018), who state that without widespread use of negative
emission technologies, the decoupling rates necessary to achieve the 1.5-2 °C target are
“well outside what is currently deemed achievable, based on historical evidence and
standard modelling” (8). However, given that no country has attempted a major climate
stabilization policy program like the Green New Deal, historical evidence is a poor
indicator of what is possible. Similarly, standard modelling tends to be biased towards the
status quo. Hickel and Kallis respond to this critique as follows:
One may insist that green growth hasn’t occurred because it has not been tried, the
fact that it hasn’t been empirically observed till now then becoming irrelevant. We
follow instead a more precautionary approach and argue that policy should be made
on the basis of robust empirical evidence, rather than on the basis of speculative
theoretical possibilities, particularly given the severity of the crisis that is at stake
(483).
There are two problems with this response. First, they do not present “robust
empirical evidence” that decoupling rates beyond 4% are impossible. Second, following
their own logic, economic degrowth would also be rendered impossible. A sustained
program of economic degrowth has never been attempted, and there does not exist any
“robust empirical evidence” that it could work. As I argue in Section 1.2.4 below,
implementing a sustained degrowth policy program in the short- to medium-term stretches
the bounds of feasibility to a far greater extent than high decoupling rates.
A better approach to understanding the feasibility of sufficient absolute decoupling
is to ask the following: (1) what level of economic resources is required to achieve the 1.5-
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2 °C target? And (2) can society feasibly mobilize that level of resources in the short- to
medium-term?
According to Robert Pollin (2015; 2019b), the level of economic resources required
is actually relatively small—in the range of 1.5-2.5% of global GDP per year.11 Using a
bottom-up approach, Pollin (2015) estimates the costs of a climate stabilization program
consistent with a two-thirds chance of limiting global warming to 2 °C. He assumes global
economic growth of 3.4% per year, accounts for rising energy demand, and uses the best
available data on lifetime costs of energy efficiency and renewable energy. To achieve the
2 °C target, humanity would have to spend 1.5-2% of global GDP per year. Pollin (2019b)
updated this figure for the 1.5 °C target, which requires 2-2.5% of global GDP per year.
Consistent with the energy efficiency analysis in Section 1.2.1.3, the low costs and high
technical potential of energy efficiency measures are key to Pollin’s overall results, i.e.,
that the economic costs of climate stabilization are reasonable. Pollin’s results are further
supported by Jacobson et al. (2019), who find that overall climate stabilization costs are
around 2% of global GDP per year.12
Mobilizing 1.5-2.5% of global GDP per year is an enormous challenge, but also
achievable. Pollin (2018; 2019a; 2019b) critiques the degrowth perspective on exactly
these grounds, and several degrowth proponents have responded (Mastini et al. 2021; Schor
and Jorgenson 2019a; 2019b; Kallis 2019). One would expect the degrowth proponents to
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For more details on his methods and analysis, see Pollin et al. (2014) and Pollin et al. (2015).
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Jacobson et al. (2019) estimate that achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 will cost $73 trillion.
Assuming global GDP grows at 2.1% per year—the average historical rate according to Jackson (2016)—
this amounts to 2.0% of GDP per year from 2021-2050.
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attempt to dispute Pollin’s 1.5-2.5% cost figure. Interestingly, they do not, which gives it
further credibility.
1.2.1.4 Is Degrowth Inevitable?: Evaluating the EROI
The previous three sections focused mainly on the feasibility of decoupling. As
noted in the introduction to Section 1.2.1, degrowth proponents make one other key
argument: that climate stabilization will inevitably lead to degrowth. They argue that clean
energy is not capable of supporting continual economic growth in the way that fossil fuels
have. This claim, if true, has monumental implications. Not only would developed
economies have to stop growing, but developing economies as well, as they too must
transition to clean energy. China and India, for example, are the world’s first and third
largest greenhouse gas emitters. Table 1.3 in Section 1.2.1.1 shows how degrowth
scenarios would lead to draconian income cuts in the world’s ten largest economies. In this
section, I evaluate the degrowth inevitability argument, concluding that it is deeply flawed
and does not hold under scrutiny.
Their argument is based on the energy return on energy invested (EROI) concept,
defined as “the ratio of the amount of usable energy delivered from a particular energy
resource to the amount of usable energy used to obtain that energy resource” (Mastini et
al. 2021, 3). The basic argument of degrowth proponents is that renewable energy sources
tend to have lower EROI values than fossil fuel sources. This lower EROI forces societies
to allocate more productive resources towards energy production, reducing the resources
available for other economic activities (Mastini et al. 2021; Hall 2017; Jackson 2016; Kallis
2011). According to Mastini et al. (2021), the EROIs of clean energy sources are low
enough to claim that GDP growth would no longer be possible. Jackson (2016) makes a
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similar claim. Mastini et al. (2021) make their case by citing Capellán-Pérez et al. (2018),
a conference paper that attempts to quantify the EROI for the global energy system in the
year 2050, assuming renewable energy sources make up 50% of the energy portfolio. They
calculate the EROI at 3:1, which is far lower than the 11:1 ratio deemed necessary for a
growing U.S. economy by Fizaine and Court (2016).
The EROI argument fails on two counts: (1) the EROI concept turns out to be a
poor indicator of whether renewable energy resources can support economic growth, and
(2) even if we ignore the first reason, the EROIs of wind and solar—the most important
renewable resources in transitioning off fossil fuels—are sufficient to support growth.
Jason Deign (2021), a freelance clean energy journalist, provides the bulk of
evidence for the first issue. Originally, the EROI was used to better understand fossil fuel
resources. As societies use up conventional fossil fuel resources, production requires ever
greater levels of unconventional, hard-to-extract resources. Theoretically, if the world
continues to rely on fossil fuel resources, there will come a point at which the energy
required for extraction outweighs the energy returned for end-use. Given the centrality of
energy to power modern civilization, this would impact economic growth.
This leads to the first limitation of EROI for evaluating renewable energy. Unlike
fossil energy, renewable energy is practically limitless. Use of solar, wind, hydro, and
geothermal energy today does not diminish these energy resources tomorrow, or in 100
years. Until the sun reaches the end of its life, a prospect that is likely billions of years
away, solar and wind energy have the potential to fuel civilization many times over.13
Given the abundant nature of renewable energy, a low EROI is not actually a problem, as
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E.g., see Prentiss (2015)

18

long as costs of production are low. As discussed below, renewable energy resources are
already at average cost parity with fossil fuel-based energy. Even Charles Hall, the
originator and most ardent supporter of the EROI concept, admitted to Deign (2021) that
“EROIs make a little more sense for a finite fossil fuel resource, like an oil field.”
It is important to note that capturing wind and solar energy does require extraction
of rare earth metals and minerals for solar panels and wind turbines. Several reports suggest
that business-as-usual metal and mineral sourcing will create supply-side problems for
decarbonization (IEA 2021; van Exter et al. 2018; Valero et al. 2018). However, they also
show that the problem is fixable with good policy. Enough reserves do exist to support
decarbonization. In the short-term, economies must ramp-up production of these metals
and minerals. Long-term, primary metal and mineral production can be replaced via
recycling. There is also room for technological advances to lower the level of resources
needed.
Another major flaw of the EROI is that it is inherently difficult to measure. While
energy output is fairly straight-forward—for example, electricity generation can be
measured directly—measuring energy inputs involves defining what is and is not energy
(labor, for example—an arguably essential energy source—is generally excluded);
measuring the direct energy used, as well as the energy used to produce all the other inputs;
and converting them to a common denominator. These difficulties are described in detail
by Inman (2013). As a result, EROI measurements for the same technology vary widely.
For example, Kubiszewski (2010) carry-out a meta-analysis on EROI measurements for
wind energy. Their study covers 119 estimates from 50 analyses published between 1977
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and 2006. Estimates range from 1.0 to 125.8. Excluding estimates prior to 2000, the
estimates still range from 4.7 to 125.8 and cover everything in-between.
Palmer and Floyd (2017) explore the wide variation—what they term
“divergence”—in EROI estimates of solar PV systems. They find six causes for
divergence: “life-cycle assessment methodology, age of the primary data, PV cell
technology, treatment of intermittency, equivalence of investment and output energy
forms, and assumptions about real-world performance” (1). They conclude that EROI
measurements “must be considered with specific reference to the details of the particular
study context” (1).
Given the difficulties of consistently measuring the EROI of specific technologies,
which result in wide variation in published estimates, the EROI should not be used to make
broad claims about clean energy and economic growth. Indeed, it is difficult to give much
weight to a low EROI estimate (3:1) of an unpublished conference paper (Capellán-Pérez
et al. 2018) for the entire energy system in the year 2050. Similarly, Fizaine and Court’s
(2016) claim that EROIs lower than 11:1 preclude economic growth cannot be trusted.
Deign (2021) also interviewed Michael Liebreich, founder of Bloomberg New
Energy Finance, and Euan Mearns, originator of the “Net Energy Cliff” concept. The Net
Energy Cliff is widely cited and praised in the EROI literature. Mearns, however, has
turned on the EROI concept, agreeing with Liebreich that the EROI is not useful for
understanding renewable energy resources. Both point to the failure of EROI to consider
the time it takes to produce energy. Fossil fuel-based energy, for example, requires ample
time for extraction and transport of fuels. Solar and wind power, on the other hand, produce
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energy whenever the sun shines and wind blows. Thus, even if renewable energy sources
require more energy inputs, they can produce energy more quickly.
A final problem with the EROI is that it fails to account for fossil fuel co-pollutants,
i.e., non-carbon pollution from fossil fuel combustion. According to Vohra et al. (2021),
co-pollutants caused 9-10 million premature deaths per year, globally, between 2012 and
2018. This is over twice as many as had been previously estimated (Cohen et al. 2017;
WHO 2018). Countless others suffer debilitating morbidities, such as asthma. A clean
energy transition would save tens of millions of lives, and—in relation to the EROI—
would free up massive amounts of societal resources currently being allocated towards
healthcare and sick leave.
A more useful approach to understanding the level of resources required to produce
energy from various sources is levelized costs, i.e., total lifetime costs of producing one
unit of energy, including labor, raw materials, and capital goods. Based on levelized cost
data, solar, wind, and geothermal electricity generation are significantly cheaper than coal
generation and already cost-competitive with natural gas generation (EIA 2021; IRENA
2020). Even if renewable energy sources have lower EROIs, if they are abundant and
cheaper than fossil fuels, there is no reason to think they will require more societal
resources or that they would not be able to support economic growth. The cost approach is
also capable of considering pollution, albeit imperfectly, through the social cost of carbon
and co-pollutant cost of carbon.14
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The climate and co-pollutant costs of emitting one more ton of carbon dioxide. See, for
example, Dedoussi et al. (2019).
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One potential issue is intermittency—solar panels and wind turbines cannot provide
a constant flow of energy. However, these problems have been known for decades, and
solutions exist. For example, costs of battery storage and offshore wind energy—a much
less intermittent resource with the potential to supply global electricity demand in 2040
eleven times over—are quickly decreasing (EIA 2020c; IEA 2020a). Intermittency could
also be ameliorated by continuing to use a very small amount of conventional natural gas
generation in combination with negative emissions technologies.
Hall (2017) is a defense of the EROI concept. He attempts to address several
arguments that have been used to discredit the EROI. One such argument is that, “what
really matters is not EROI, but cost” (637). His response is unconvincing: “That may be
true” he says, adding, “but [a recent paper] found that for US oil and gas, costs and EROI
are statistically inverse” (637). In other words, he defends the EROI by saying it is
inversely related to cost. He does not argue against the claim that cost is more important
than EROI. In Feign (2021), Hall further undermines his argument by noting that, “Fracked
oil wells have had a decent EROI—12:1 or more—when analyzed, but basically were a
financial failure.” He adds, “I am not sure why.”
Given the major flaws described above, it is difficult to see any use for the EROI
with respect to clean energy resources. Even if EROI did still matter, according to Hall
(2017), “most new ‘renewable’ fuels have a relatively low EROI except perhaps for
photovoltaics (PV) and wind” (636). Stated differently: renewable energy sources tend to
have low EROI values, except the two most important ones that are expected to play the
biggest role in the clean energy transition.
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1.2.2 Revolution
There are two main theoretical frameworks that underpin the “revolution”
perspective. The most prominent is the “metabolic rift” framework, which comes out of
the Monopoly Capitalism school of Marxism.15 Three leading scholars of this
framework—sociologists John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, and Richard York—lay out
their perspective in a collection of essays published in 2011, titled, The Ecological Rift:
Capitalism’s War on the Earth. They argue consistently throughout their book, as well as
in their broader research agendas, that “nothing less than an ecological revolution—a
fundamental reordering of relations of production and reproduction to generate a more
sustainable society—is required to prevent a planetary disaster” (Ch. 4). Andreas Malm is
another leading radical environmentalist, who can be placed in the metabolic rift
framework.16 Malm (2015) states that hoping for a revolution prior to solving climate
change is “laughable” (Ch. 15), but in his more recent works he is clear that only
revolutionary

struggle—specifically,

“ecological

Leninism”—can

avert

climate

catastrophe (Malm 2018; 2020a).
The second framework is Jason Moore’s world-ecology, which he lays out in
Capitalism and the Web of Life (Moore 2015). The metabolic rift and world ecology
frameworks have vehement disagreements on ecological Marxist theory, but they agree
that revolution is necessary to solve the climate crisis. For example, Moore (2015) states,

This is also often called the “Monthly Review” school, referring to the socialist magazine of the
same name, edited by ecological Marxist John Bellamy Foster.
15

16

See Ch. 6 of Malm (2020b)
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“There is no conceivable way that capitalism can address climate change in any meaningful
way” (267).
In this section, I describe and evaluate their arguments. In general, both frameworks
rely too heavily on a simplified, theoretical model of capitalism. They combine their
theoretical arguments with anecdotes and examples, sometimes inaccurate, that fit their
theories. Similar to the degrowth perspective, then, the revolution perspective lacks
adequate evidence to support its claims.
1.2.2.1 The Metabolic Rift
Theory
Foster et al. (2011) conceptualize capitalism as a “grow-or-die system” organized
around the process of capital accumulation, i.e., the self-reinforcing cycle of wealth
expansion, for the capitalist class—those who control society’s productive resources,
including built-capital, natural resources, and labor power (Foster et al. 2011,
Introduction). They quote Karl Marx in the Grundrisse to characterize capital, i.e., money
and assets in the cycle of wealth expansion, as “the endless and limitless drive to go beyond
its limiting barriers. Every boundary is and has to be a [mere] barrier for it. Else it would
cease to be capital—money as self-reproductive” (Introduction). The process of endless
capital accumulation is fueled by competition, “which ensures that each firm must grow
and reinvest its ‘earnings’ (surplus) in order to survive” (Ch. 4). The combination of capital
accumulation and competition creates the macroeconomic growth imperative. Indeed,
when capitalist economies go into recession, or even stagnate, they are considered to be in
crisis. Capitalists lose wealth and ordinary people suffer unemployment and general
economic insecurity.
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Foster et al. argue that the system of capitalism prioritizes accumulation of
exchange-values, i.e., money and commodities with market-value, over wealth, defined as
use-values—the degree of usefulness of a produced or natural resource. They go through
an interesting history of how the concept of use-value was extricated from the discipline of
economics in the transition from classical to neoclassical. To summarize the modern
concept of economic value, they quote John Stuart Mill:
Things for which nothing could be obtained in exchange, however useful or
necessary they may be, are not wealth in the sense in which the term is used in
Political Economy. Air, for example, though the most absolute of necessaries, bears
no price in the market, because it can be obtained gratuitously: to accumulate a
stock of it would yield no profit or advantage to any one; and the laws of its
production and distribution are the subject of a very different study from Political
Economy (Ch. 1).
Foster et al. take this one step further. Not only is use-value ignored, but the process
of capital accumulation of exchange-values in capitalism necessitates the degradation of
use-values, such as polluted air and water, infertile soil, and over-filled carbon sinks. This
inverse relationship between exchange-value and use-value is known as the Lauderdale
Paradox, named after its originator James Maitland, the eighth Earl of Lauderdale.
To describe the society-environment relationship under capitalism, they use and
extend Marx’s theory of the “metabolic rift.” The theory consists of three key concepts:
social metabolism, universal metabolism of nature, and metabolic rift. Social metabolism
refers to “the complex, dynamic interchange between human beings and earth” (Ch. 2). It
encompasses all human activities involved in extracting and manipulating natural resources
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and emitting wastes. The universal metabolism of nature (also called the “natural
metabolism”) incorporates all the natural processes and cycles that exist in extra-human
nature and allow for the continual regeneration of the conditions of life. For example, the
soil nutrient cycle creates the conditions of agriculture. Due to the capital accumulation
imperative and Lauderdale Paradox described above, the social metabolism under
capitalism produces “metabolic rifts,” i.e., ruptures in the universal metabolism of nature
(Ch. 2).
A capitalist who chooses to invest in the long-term regenerative needs of nature—
e.g., ensuring that logging and beef production do not deplete the world’s forests, or
voluntarily sequestering CO2 and methane emissions from fossil fuel production—will be
outcompeted by those who ignore, or shift these costs to others. Natural resources, thus,
are treated as “free gifts”—a term, as they show, that is used in several foundational
neoclassical economics textbooks (Ch. 1). Ignoring the regenerative needs of nature
increases profits in the short- to medium-term. However, in the long-term, these metabolic
rifts undermine the conditions of human existence. By that time, however, it will be too
late. The metabolic rift framework can be used to describe any ecological crisis that stems
from economic activity. However, they focus mostly on climate change, as it is the most
urgent and potentially catastrophic environmental crisis humanity faces. They do not hold
back on the severity of business-as-usual: “There is a high probability, if we do not quickly
change course, of a terminal crisis—a death of the whole period of human dominance of
the planet” (Ch. 18).
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Finally, they argue for social and ecological revolution—dismantling and replacing
capitalism with an ecological sustainably and socially just society. The very existence of
capitalism, they argue, precludes climate stabilization:
Given the logic of capital and its basic operations, the rift in the carbon cycle and
global climate change are intrinsically tied to capitalism. In fact, the continued
existence of capitalism guarantees the continuation of these events. ‘Short of human
extinction,’ [Paul] Burkett stresses, ‘there is no sense in which capitalism can be
relied upon to permanently ‘break down’ under the weight of its depletion and
degradation of natural wealth’ (Ch. 5).
Preventing “planetary ecocide,” they argue, “requires the progressive dismantling
of the regime of capital, and the construction brick by brick of a new organic social and
ecological system in its place.” This process must begin “immediately” (Ch. 17).
Evidence
Given that environmental degradation in general stems from economic
development, it is not a stretch to argue that the predominant economic system in the world,
capitalism, is at the root of these crises. Using Marxian theory, Foster et al. (2011) do
exactly that: show how the workings of capitalism cause “metabolic rifts” like climate
change. It is also not hard to make the case that capitalism, a growth-based economic
system that can be defined by its prioritization of profit-making above all else (i.e., greed),
is inconsistent with environmental sustainability. The evidence for this is vast.
Environmental degradation has tended to worsen throughout the history of capitalism, and
especially since the end of World War II—a period termed “The Great Acceleration” due
to the rapidly deteriorating environment. What is more challenging, however, is providing
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convincing evidence that capitalism must be dismantled and replaced in order to solve the
climate crisis in particular. Certainly, Foster et al. understand the enormity of this
challenge. They attempt to overcome it with anecdotes and examples that are consistent
with their theory. A summary of their claims and my responses are below.
1. Claim: They use the Jevon’s Paradox to claim that efficiency gains will always be
outdone by economic growth. Here is their claim: “An economic system devoted
to profits, accumulation, and economic expansion without end will tend to use any
efficiency gains or cost reductions to expand the overall scale of production.” (Ch.
7).
Response: Foster et al. admit that the rebound effect is relatively small at the microlevel, ranging from 10-30%. Purchasing a more fuel-efficient car, for example, does
not lead to a substantial increase in the number of miles driven. However, they
argue that at the macro-level, if an economy increases energy efficiency, the cost
savings will go towards other economic activities that expand the economy, and
thus increase energy consumption. In other words, they agree with degrowth
proponents that an increasing GDP necessarily leads to increases in energy use. I
show why this is not true in Section 1.2.1.2. As a case-in-point, one can also
compare the U.S. and Germany. Germany has made great strides in improving
energy efficiency in recent years. Based on the Jevon’s Paradox, this should simply
lead to faster economic growth and more energy use. Yet, Germany’s economy has
not grown any faster than the U.S. economy, and its CO2 emissions per capita is
about half that of the U.S., and continues to decline steadily (World Bank 2021a;
2021b).
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2. Claim: “The development of a substitute for a natural resource is sometimes
associated with an increase in consumption of that resource.” They label this the
“Paperless Office Paradox,” (Ch. 8) referring to the fact that computers and the
internet led to more use of paper. They then apply this to energy, giving the example
of how the rise of fossil fuels, meant to replace biomass, actually ended up
increasing biomass. The same thing could happen with clean energy.
Response: One of the coauthors of Foster et al. (2011) actually published an article
in Nature Climate Change the following year, showing exactly that: renewable
energy had only displaced one tenth of fossil fuels (York 2012). However, this
could easily be fixed with an effective climate policy program. The program must
invest massively in clean energy, while also phasing out fossil fuels through, e.g.,
a hard cap on emissions combined with clean energy standards. The latter part will
ensure the phase-out of fossil fuels.
3. Claim: Climate solutions offered within capitalism generally amount to shifting
the problem elsewhere. They give the examples of nuclear power, which lead to
radioactive waste; agrofuels, which lead to soil degradation and might actually
increase carbon emissions; and geoengineering solutions—injecting sulfur particles
into the stratosphere to reduce albedo and replacing a quarter of forests with
genetically-engineered carbon-eating trees.
Response: It is true that there are unrealistic solutions on offer, but that does not
preclude realistic solutions, which are also on offer. See Section 1.2.1.2, where I
discuss the work of Robert Pollin and colleagues, who show that a Green New Deal
without nuclear, dirty biofuels, large-scale hydropower, or geoengineering is both
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technically and economically feasible. Without action soon, some negative
emissions technologies may be necessary. Some of these technologies, however,
do show promise (Hanna et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2018).
4. Claim: Nicholas Stern (2007) proposes an emissions path that is consistent with 3
°C. This is the best that can be expected from mainstream economics, which is
unwilling to challenge capitalism.
Response: Stern’s (2007) recommended emissions path was based on having a
50% chance of limiting warming to 2 °C above preindustrial levels. One can
certainly argue that a two-thirds chance would have been better. However, Stern
(2007) is just one example. There have been many examples of more ambitious
climate stabilization programs in the years since, e.g., Pollin (2015).
Theoretical blinders
The inadequacy of evidence does not, on its own, preclude the possibility that the
revolution perspective is correct. Foster et al. (2011) also, however, present theoretical
blinders. Most importantly, the Marxist model of capitalism, while extremely useful in
understanding important aspects of the system—capital accumulation, exploitation of
workers, unsustainable economic development, and class struggle, among others—is only
a model. It is not identical to real-existing capitalist economies, which are versatile and
resilient, and include economies as varied as U.S. neoliberalism, Scandinavian social
democracy, and Chinese state bureaucracy. In general, a system driven by capital
accumulation tends to degrade the natural environment. However, environmental
improvement can and has occurred in capitalist economies. For example, phasing out
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to end ozone depletion, drastically reducing particulate
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pollution through the Acid Rain program in the U.S., and—for 21 countries—beginning
the process of absolute decoupling. Below, I present evidence that undermines the
revolution perspective.
While most real economies can be generally characterized as capitalist, driven by
capital accumulation, no economy is purely capitalist. That is, real economies are mixed
systems, exhibiting multiple different economic paradigms. For example, one could argue
that a government-funded universal healthcare system is impossible in a capitalist
economy. Providing free or low-cost healthcare, paid for through taxes, goes against the
“logic of capital.” Yet, the U.S. is the only developed capitalist country that does NOT
offer universal healthcare (and they do offer it to older residents). While universal
healthcare in the U.S. seemed politically impossible just five years ago, today over half of
House Democrats support it (Diamond 2021). In a similar way, capitalist governments
could offer universal clean energy and sustainably-produced food. Combined, energy and
food production in the U.S. account for 10% of the GDP, about two thirds the size of the
healthcare sector.
While government-funded energy and food is desirable for many (present company
included), it may not actually be necessary. The economics of clean energy in particular
has rapidly changed over the past 15 years. Both the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) find that
wind, solar, and geothermal electricity generation are, on average, cheaper than coal-based
generation and competitive with natural gas-based generation (EIA 2021; IRENA 2020).
A clean energy transition is certainly antithetical to the interests of fossil fuel capital, it is
not antithetical to the “logic of capital” in general. There is now a clean energy industry
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with clean energy capitalists. The competitiveness of clean energy does not mean that
capitalism, left to its own devices, will solve the climate crisis. Such notions are
ludicrous—governments in capitalist economies have always played an outsized and
necessary role to stimulate innovation and major socio-technical transitions (Mazzucato
2014; Ruttan 2006). But it does undermine the revolution perspective.
The story of Ørsted, the largest offshore wind developer in the world, is instructive
here. Ørsted was formerly named Dong Energy, where “Dong” was an acronym for
“Danish Oil and Gas Company,” and it served as Denmark’s state-owned oil and gas
company. In 2009, Dong unveiled its 85/15 vision. At the time, Dong was 85% black (fossil
fuels) and 15% green, and accounted for one third of Denmark’s CO2 emissions. Within a
generation—about 30 years—they would flip the ratio around: 85% green and 15% black.
Unexpectedly, the transformation occurred much faster than expected. By 2017, Dong had
sold off the last of its North Sea oil and gas assets (it also changed its name to Ørsted)
(Reguly 2019). As of 2019, 85% of Ørsted’s energy production came from renewables and
it controlled nearly one third of the global offshore wind market. By 2025, 99% of its
operations will be carbon neutral (Reguly 2019; Ørsted 2020). While the original impetus
to transition to clean energy was climate-related, the unexpected increase in speed of the
transformation was for purely economic reasons. Dong suffered major economic losses in
its oil and gas operations in 2012 and 2015, while their offshore wind operations turned
out to be quite lucrative (Reguly 2019).
One indicator of Ørsted’s financial success is its stock price growth. In June 2016,
it held an initial public offering—the second largest of the year (Reguly 2019). By February
2019, its share price had doubled, and as of June 2021 it has nearly quadrupled (Ørsted
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2021). While Ørsted is technically state-owned, it operates more like a private firm. Private
investors own nearly half of its stocks, and it does not rely on Danish tax dollars to thrive.
Ørsted can be viewed as an example of a fossil fuel firm that not only transitioned to clean
energy production, but found greater success in doing so.
Another counter-example to the revolution perspective is the case of stratospheric
ozone depletion. Like climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion is one of the nine
planetary boundaries. The problem was discovered in the early 1970s, and averted after the
signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987—a global agreement to phase-out
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the main cause of the crisis. Particularly interesting are the
actions of chemical company DuPont. DuPont was the largest producer of CFCs,
controlling 50% of the U.S. market and 25% of the global market. Early on, they denied
and challenged the science, much like the tobacco and fossil fuel industries. However, in
1986, DuPont came out in favor of the Montreal Protocol. Other chemical companies then
followed suit. DuPont’s support was crucial for bringing about the success of the agreement
(Maxwell and Briscoe 1997; Haas 1992). Maxwell and Briscoe (1997) lay out three reasons
that DuPont ultimately came out in support of international regulation:
1. The public was heavily in favor of regulating after seeing evidence of the ozone
hole. Supporting the Protocol strengthened its social standing among
environmentalists and government officials.
2. DuPont believed there was a good chance the EPA would have passed stringent
domestic policies on CFCs, which would have given global competitors an
advantage.
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3. Most importantly, DuPont determined that supporting the Protocol and phasing
out CFCs were in its economic interests. They had developed and patented
alternatives to CFCs, which they believed would be more profitable with an
orderly phase-out of CFCs. The alternatives were five to ten times more
expensive, but DuPont believed its customers could weather the price increase.
Thus, it was not that DuPont had a change in heart, choosing not to be a capitalist
firm for the sake of the world. Rather, it was the combination of public pressure, the threat
of domestic regulation, and the likelihood of profiting off CFC-alternatives that convinced
them to support the Montreal Protocol, and thereby help avert a potentially catastrophic
environmental crisis. Of course, the climate crisis is bigger than the ozone crisis, and fossil
fuels are more central to the economy than CFCs. Nonetheless, the case of DuPont provides
a useful example—possibly even model—for addressing the resistance of the fossil fuel
industry, which is one of the main obstacles to climate stabilization. Averting the ozone
crisis did not require, in the words of Foster et al. (2011), “a radical confrontation with the
logic of capital” (Ch. 16).
1.2.2.2 World-Ecology
Jason Moore is the founder of the world-ecology school of ecological Marxism.
The staple of world-ecology is that it claims to analyze human society not as something
apart from nature, but within nature. However, the goal here is to evaluate Moore’s
approach to the question of whether climate stabilization is possible within capitalism.
Despite their differences, Moore agrees with Foster that capitalism is a system driven by
the process of capital accumulation and inevitably leads to environmental degradation.
From here, Moore departs the usual radical environmentalist logic. Rather than arguing
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that the actions necessary to solve climate change are inconsistent with capital
accumulation, he states, “Global warming poses a fundamental threat not only to humanity,
but, more immediately and directly, to capitalism itself” (278). Moore understands the
novelty of his argument, and attributes it to his world-ecology framework:
This inverts the usual line of radical critique, which overstates the resilience of
capitalism in the face of these changes—an overstatement that derives from a view
of capitalism as a social system that acts upon nature, rather than a world-ecology
that develops through the web of life (278).
Moore predicts that humanity has about two decades before climate change inevitably
leads to capitalism’s collapse.
Moore’s argument is unusual, but also influential. The book in which he makes this
argument, Capitalism and the Web of Life, has accumulated more than 2,500 citations.
Moore bases his argument on his theory of the “Four Cheaps,” which states that a
functioning capitalist system requires access to cheap food, labor-power, energy, and raw
materials. The capitalism collapse argument can be summarized as follows:
1. Climate change makes growing food harder, leading to reduced food supply and
higher food prices.
2. Wage workers and the unpaid care workers they support (e.g., stay-at-home
parents) need food to live and work, so higher food prices will force wages up.
3. Profit-making requires cheap labor, so higher wages will render profit-making
impossible.
4. Capitalism is a system based on endless profit-making, so the impossibility of
profit-making will collapse capitalism.
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A further implication of Moore’s logic, which he fails to consider, is that ecosocialism—the preferred political economic system of revolution proponents—would also
likely be rendered impossible. In general terms, eco-socialism promotes long-term
ecological sustainability and human well-being, and equitable distributions of wealth and
political power (Löwy 2015).17 An eco-socialist society, like any society, requires adequate
supplies of food and other resources to support its population. People must be able to
produce a surplus so that there is enough to go around. In capitalism, that surplus is
controlled by private capitalists in the form of profits. In an eco-socialist society, it would
be controlled by democratic processes that involve everyone in a workplace, community,
or all of society. If climate change damages the food supply to the point of causing the
collapse of capitalism, why would we expect it to be able to support eco-socialism? This
becomes even harder to imagine when accounting for the necessary rebuilding after
capitalism’s collapse, and the necessary climate stabilization measures to avert further
climate catastrophe. Moore’s theory, then, borders on climate nihilism.
The key to Moore’s capitalism collapse argument is the claim that climate change
will increase food prices so much that capitalism accumulation becomes impossible. He
provides no evidence to back up his claim, and gives no indication as to how high food
prices would have to increase to lead to the collapse of capitalism. His argument is further
undermined by the IPCC’s 2019 Special Report on Climate Change and Land, which
includes a chapter on climate change and food security. Under a business-as-usual scenario
(i.e., a temperature rise of 3-4 °C by 2100), cereal prices would be expected to increase by
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1% to 29% in 2050, with a central value of 7%. For animal-sourced foods, the expected
price increase is about half that of cereals. They did not have data on expected price
changes for fruits and vegetables, but stated that yield impacts would be similar to those of
cereals. These fairly modest price increases in 2050, which are for a business-as-usual
scenario, seem extremely unlikely to cause capitalism to collapse. Food price increases in
a 1.5-2 °C scenario would be far lower, and Moore does not provide any evidence to
suggest that such a scenario is out of reach with aggressive climate policies. The IPCC
(2019) also points to strategies that would ameliorate the food price increases. For example,
reducing the 25-30% of food that is lost or wasted every year.
Moore (2015) also points out that current agricultural practices actually exacerbate
climate change and degrade soil. He assumes that transitioning to sustainable agricultural
practices would go against the profit-imperative. Evidence, however, overwhelmingly
rejects this assumption as well. Sustainable agricultural practices, on average, increase
yields and profits.18
Overall, Moore fails to provide empirical evidence to support his claims, and the
evidence that does exist on future food prices and sustainable agriculture contradicts his
claims. As a result, the capitalism collapse theory is highly unlikely to come to fruition.
1.2.3 Four Additional Arguments
There are four additional arguments made by degrowth and revolution proponents
that are worth responding to. (1) Climate change is not the only crisis; (2) The costs of
climate stabilization will cancel out economic growth; (3) Sufficient absolute decoupling
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has not happened in the past, and thus is unlikely to happen in the future; and (4) Developed
economies must reach net-zero emissions by 2030.
First, practically all degrowth and revolution proponents point out that climate
change is not the only environmental crisis. It is just one of the “nine planetary boundaries.”
The planetary boundaries framework was developed by Earth systems scientists in the late
2000s (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015). Each boundary represents a natural
process or cycle on which humans depend. Together, they define “a safe operating space
for humanity for human societies to develop and thrive” (Steffen et al. 2015, 1).
“Transgressing a boundary,” according to Will Steffen, lead author of the 2015 update to
the framework, “increases the risk that human activities could inadvertently drive the Earth
system into a much less hospitable state, damaging efforts to reduce poverty and leading
to a deterioration of human wellbeing” (Stockholm 2015). As of 2015, four boundaries
have been crossed: climate change, biodiversity loss, biogeochemical flows (i.e., the
phosphorous and nitrogen cycles), and land-system change. Climate change and
biodiversity loss are considered “core boundaries.” Transgressing one of these boundaries
for too long (humanity has transgressed both), “has the potential on its own to drive the
Earth system into a new state” (Steffen et al. 2015, 1).
Revolution and degrowth proponents argue that even if solving climate change is
possible within capitalism, doing so will not solve these other crises, and leaving capitalism
intact will only create more crises in the future. At the same time, they focus mostly on
climate change in their own work. This makes sense—climate change is the most urgent
and potentially catastrophic of the environmental crises facing humanity. In addition,
climate change overlaps with other crises. Solving climate change will also make
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substantial progress towards solving ocean acidification and slowing the sixth mass
extinction (Steffen et al. 2015; Cahill et al. 2013). Thus, humanity should focus
disproportionate efforts on the climate crisis in particular. While the planetary boundaries
framework does not support the claim that climate stabilization in particular requires
moving beyond capitalism, it does support the claim that capitalism has a strong tendency
towards environmental degradation in general, which outpaces any counter-tendencies.
That is, thinking longer-term, to achieve general sustainability, societies will likely have to
dismantle and replace capitalism.
Second, the costs of climate stabilization are sometimes treated as pure costs. That
is, stabilizing the climate will bring about only climate benefits, not economic benefits, and
thus will negatively impact economic growth. Both Victor (2012) and Jackson (2016)
express this view. However, investments in climate mitigation should be viewed as
investments. These investments are substantial—in the range of 2-2.5% of GDP per year
to achieve the 1.5 °C target (Pollin 2019b; Jacobson et al. 2019). But they can be expected
to generate millions of jobs, create a more efficient energy system, stimulate a new wave
of technological innovation, and save millions of lives every year from reduced air
pollution. Jacobson et al. (2019), for example, estimates that a 100% clean energy transition
will reduce private energy costs from $18 trillion to $7 trillion per year. In addition, a
substantial portion of clean energy investments will be matched by a decline in fossil fuel
investments.
Third, degrowth proponents regularly cite the fact that sufficient absolute
decoupling has not occurred, and use it to support their claim that it cannot occur (e.g.,
Kallis 2011; Jackson 2016; Schor and Jorgenson 2019a, 2019b). The modelling and
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evidence presented in Sections 1.2.1.2 and 1.2.1.3 disputes these claims, showing that a
global climate stabilization program amounting to 1.5-2.5% of global GDP per year can
achieve sufficient absolute decoupling.
Finally, revolution and degrowth proponents tend to use extreme climate
projections, especially for developed economies. For example, Jackson and Victor (2019)
and Kallis (2020) argue that developed economies must achieve net-zero emission by 2030.
The logic behind this claim is that developing economies should be allowed to continue
increasing emissions for years to come. Schor and Jorgenson (2019a) and Malm (2014)
cite a 2012 paper by Kevin Anderson suggesting that for a 50% chance of limiting warming
to 2 °C, net-zero emissions must be achieved globally between 2035 and 2045. Foster et
al. (2011) quote climate scientist James Hansen, who claims, “the only resolution [to
climate change] is for humans to move to a fundamentally different energy system within
a decade.” Foster et al. then claim, “this raises the question of more revolutionary social
change as an ecological as well as social necessity” (Ch. 6). The IPCC (2018b), widely
considered the gold standard for climate science research, disputes these claims. According
to the IPCC, for an even chance of limiting warming to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels,
humanity must achieve net-zero carbon emissions around 2050. For 2 °C, this is pushed
back to 2070. Developed economies should certainly be more ambitious, but rather than
allowing developing economies to continue to develop on dirty energy, a better approach
is to provide them with the necessary resources to develop on clean energy. Finally, even
if it turns out that Kevin Anderson is right, attempting to achieve degrowth or a revolution
would only add to the challenge. This is shown in the next section.
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1.2.4 Structural Change
Revolution proponents are clear about the need to abolish capitalism. Degrowth
proponents focus less on capitalism and more on economic growth, but most still
understand that capitalism is a growth-based system that is inconsistent with degrowth. For
example, Jackson (2016) states, “The capitalist model appears to have no easy route
towards a steady state position. Its natural dynamics seem to push it towards one of two
states: expansion or collapse” (Ch. 4). Hickel (2020) states more explicitly that “we must
take steps to evolve beyond capitalism” (Ch. 6).
Moving beyond capitalism is an enormous task. As evidence, one only needs to
realize that the world is still predominantly capitalist, surviving centuries of attempted
revolutions. Nonetheless, both degrowth and revolution proponents argue that their
approaches will make climate stabilization easier. According to Foster (2017), “There are
better and faster ways of addressing the climate crisis through revolutions in social relations
themselves.” Any non-revolutionary strategy “represents a failure of nerve.” According to
Victor (2012), “A slower rate of economic growth requires a slower and, arguably, more
manageable rate of transformation of the economy and society” (208). Hickel (2020)
argues similarly: “The less energy we use, the easier it is to achieve a rapid transition to
renewables” (Ch. 5). If they are right, then whether or not degrowth or revolution is
necessary is a moot point. In this section, I examine degrowth and revolution proponents’
proposed action plans, i.e., what societies should do right now to address climate change,
to understand the implied structural change of their plans. In doing so, I demonstrate that
their plans would in fact make climate stabilization far more difficult.
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Degrowth Perspective
Tim Jackson (2016) lays out four pillars of the “economy of tomorrow”, i.e., an
economy based on degrowth, in Chapter 8 of Prosperity without Growth.
1. Enterprise as service
2. Work as participation
3. Investment as commitment
4. Money as social good
The common theme throughout all four pillars is a transformation from profit-based
to well-being-based economic activities. For example, “the goal of enterprise must be to
provide the capabilities for people to flourish…without destroying the ecological assets on
which our future prosperity depends.” Employment, too, must be re-constructed so as to
serve the workers themselves, increasing their “wellbeing and fulfillment.” To actualize
these four pillars and make degrowth a reality, Jackson lays out four policy areas, which
are to be implemented by a “progressive state”: “establishing limits, countering
consumerism, tackling inequality and ‘fixing’ economics” (Ch. 9).
In other words, Jackson is calling for an entirely new economic system. As
discussed in Section 1.2.1.1, degrowth is a poor strategy for reducing emissions. Thus, in
addition to radically transforming economies so that they are based on equitable degrowth,
societies would still have to rapidly decarbonize energy, transportation, and agriculture.
Victor (2019) and Hickel (2020) each lay out similar degrowth programs. As noted above,
degrowth proponents generally understand that what they are calling for is not capitalist.
However, they do not dwell on that point, and they do not consider the political

42

implications of moving beyond capitalism. I consider these in more detail in evaluating the
revolution perspective.
Revolution Perspective
As noted in Section 1.2.2, John Bellamy Foster et al. (2011) argue that the
continuing existence of capitalism precludes climate stabilization. In Foster’s (2021) most
recent publication—the preface to the Persian edition of his book, The Ecological
Revolution—he states the following:
No one who takes the Earth System emergency seriously today doubts that the
changes required are revolutionary in scale. Nor is this simply a question of a
technological revolution. What is needed is an ecological revolution in the sense
defined by environmental historian Carolyn Merchant, as consisting of ‘major
transformations in human relations with nonhuman nature,’ associated with
‘contradictions that develop between a society’s mode of production and its
ecology, and between its modes of production and reproduction’ (Foster 2021).
This leads to the following questions: what does the ecological revolution actually
entail? And more specifically, what does it entail in the near term? As far as I know, none
of the authors of Foster et al. (2011) have published a concrete program for ecological
revolution, answering these questions. The closest thing to it is a 2017 Monthly Review
article by John Bellamy Foster, titled, “The Long Ecological Revolution.” He states that,
“A long and continuing ecological revolution is needed—one that will necessarily occur in
stages, over decades and centuries.” However, due to the urgency of climate change and
other crises, “this transformation requires immediate reversals in the regime of
accumulation.” In fact, it must “commence now with a worldwide movement toward
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ecosocialism—one capable from its inception of setting limits on capital.” He calls for
“revolutionary conservation” and a “revolutionary phase-out of carbon emissions.”
Similarly, Foster et al. (2011) state that any short-term actions must “go against the internal
logic of [capitalism]” (Ch. 2).
This leads to another question: what constitutes “revolutionary conservation” and
a “revolutionary phase-out of carbon emissions?” He does not say in the 2017 article.
However, Foster et al. (2011) do offer support for three near-term policies: a carbon tax
and dividend,19 a moratorium on new coal-fired power stations, and a contraction and
convergence policy (i.e., high-emitting countries decrease emissions and low-emitting
countries increase emissions until they converge at a specified level). They then claim that
implementation of these policies would require a revolution:
In reality, the radical proposals discussed above, although ostensibly transition
strategies, present the issue of revolutionary change. Their implementation would
require a popular revolt against the system itself. A movement (or movements)
powerful enough to implement such changes on the necessary scale might well be
powerful enough to implement a full-scale social-ecological revolution.
In terms of the first two policies, it is unclear how they would incite a revolution.
A de facto moratorium on new coal-fired power stations is already in effect, as use of coal
for power in the U.S. has been on the decline since its peak in 2007 (EIA 2020b). The
government could go further, e.g., phasing out use of coal in a decade. However, doing so
is not anti-capitalist per se. Coal capital would certainly lose, but oil/gas and renewable
energy capital would benefit. Carbon pricing is arguably the most widely discussed and
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used climate policy instrument that exists. The dividend has also increased in popularity,
and is currently used in cap-and-trade programs in California and British Columbia as well
as Alaska’s Permanent Fund (which is for oil revenues).20 More generally, pollution
pricing is a common tool for dealing with environmental degradation in capitalist
economies. In terms of the third policy, implementation may be difficult, but it is also
unnecessary. A better approach would be for developed countries to share technologies and
provide grants and low-cost financing to developing countries so that they could also
decrease CO2 emissions.
Malm (2018) lays out a similar, but more extensive, action plan (quoted here in
full):
1. Enforce a complete moratorium on all new facilities for extracting coal, oil, or
natural gas.
2. Close down all power-plants running on such fuels.
3. Draw 100% of electricity from non-fossil sources, primarily wind and solar.
4. Terminate the expansion of air, sea, and road travel; convert road and sea travel to
electricity and wind; ration remaining air travel to ensure a fair distribution until it
can be completely replaced with other means of transport.
5. Expand mass transit systems on all scales, from subways to intercontinental highspeed trains.
6. Limit the shipping and flying of food and systematically promote local supplies.
7. End the burning of tropical forests and initiate massive programmes for
reforestation.
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8. Refurbish old buildings with insulation and require all new ones to generate their
own zero-carbon power.
9. Dismantle the meat industry and move human protein requirements towards
vegetable sources.
10. Pour public investment into the development and diffusion of the most efficient and
sustainable renewable energy technologies, as well as technologies for carbon
dioxide removal.
Malm then states, “That would be a start—nothing more—yet it would probably
amount to a revolution.” Again, it is unclear why. Six of these steps—(1), (2), (3), (7), (8),
and (10)—can be summarized as a 100% transition from dirty to clean energy production,
raising energy efficiency levels as much as is possible, and investing in further research
and development of zero- and negative-emissions technologies. Energy efficiency
measures generally pay themselves back in three to five years, and a clean energy transition
is very much feasible—even beneficial—economically (Pollin 2015; Jacobson et al. 2019).
The other four steps could be reformulated as decarbonizing both transportation
and meat production. Within those four steps, two things seem particularly difficult in
capitalism (or any system): reducing air travel and moving everyone to a vegetarian diet.
However, they are also unnecessary. Air travel, for example, amounts to about 5% of global
CO2 emissions. Low-carbon jet fuels already exist and will likely become more feasible at
scale in the coming decades (Prentiss 2015; Ripsin 2021). Negative emissions technologies
have also made great strides technologically and may prove useful here.21 In terms of meatbased emissions, over 60% comes from cows. Some combination of reducing beef and
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dairy consumption and using more sustainable production practices should suffice (Troy
et al. 2016). All of this can be accomplished in the Green New Deal framework, which
certainly challenges the neoliberal form of capitalism, but not capitalism in general.
While the programs laid out by Foster et al. (2011) and Malm (2018) do not seem
to be revolutionary, they also are not meant to be final solutions. Foster et al. (2011) and
Moore (2015) are explicit that climate stabilization requires a revolution. Malm (2018)
implies that a revolution is necessary by saying that his program would only be “a start,”
and that it would likely result in “a revolution.” He also calls for “war communism” and
“ecological Leninism” in Malm (2020a). Thus, the question remains: what would an
ecological revolution entail? At the most general level, an ecological revolution means
dismantling capitalism completely and replacing it with an ecologically sustainable and
socially just society. Below, I make some inferences based on how the revolution
proponents define capitalism.
A revolution would entail halting capital accumulation, the central process of
capitalism. The wealth of the capitalist class—those who own most of society’s productive
resources—would be appropriated, and society’s surplus would be controlled collectively
by either (1) the workers who produced it, (2) the community in which it was produced, or
(3) the entire society. Wealth and income caps would be required to prevent further capital
accumulation of individuals and groups.
Private wealth is protected by property laws and law enforcement. These laws
would have to be changed, which would require control of political institutions. In a
democracy like the U.S., control of these institutions can come through elections or by
directly taking power, i.e., a coup d’état—removing current elected (and unelected)
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officials from their positions of power. Both cases would require a mass anti-capitalist
movement. Revolutionaries, including Foster and Malm, tend to frown upon the electoral
approach, which is a longer-term reformist approach.22 Thus, I will assume that they are in
favor of building a mass anti-capitalist movement and directly taking power. To be
successful, they would have to take control of the military, which would otherwise put an
end to the attempted revolution.
In the event that a revolution is successful, the revolutionaries would then have to
re-build the economic, political, and legal institutions that make up organized human
society. There would be counter-revolution attempts by the former political and economic
elites and their supporters, and likely by external forces (i.e., other countries). In the U.S.,
for example, they would have to deal with Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and the 74 million
people who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 election. They would also have to establish
relationships with international trading partners to ensure that they can sufficiently provide
for the entire population. Finally, they would have to implement policies to reduce CO2
emissions in line with the 1.5-2 °C warming target, and create enforcement mechanisms to
deal with those who do not follow the policies, e.g., fossil fuel producers and counterrevolutionaries.
Given the scale and timeframe for addressing climate change, the revolution
approach is extremely unlikely to find success. Moreover, its short-term strategy, i.e., what
to do before a revolution, is unnecessarily restrictive—it rejects all policies that do not go
against the “logic of capital.” Thus, like the degrowth approach, the revolution approach
would make climate stabilization exceedingly difficult.
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The Climate Change Counter-Movement
A final consideration is the climate change counter-movement, i.e., the coalition of
individuals and groups who oppose action on climate change. Both the degrowth and
revolution perspectives are anti-capitalist. If the climate movement were to become anticapitalist, the climate change counter-movement would grow substantially in both size and
power. It would include not only fossil fuel interests and market fundamentalists, but the
capitalist class in general, including clean energy capital. On the other side, the climate
movement would lose clean energy capital and other non-fossil fuel capital, as well as those
who support climate stabilization but are not anti-capitalist.
To be sure, anti-capitalist sentiment has grown, at least in the U.S., encompassing
about half of young people aged 18 to 29 (Elkins 2018). It is important to note, however,
that many of those who are in favor of socialism likely conceptualize it in the way Bernie
Sanders does, i.e., as social democracy—a regulated form of capitalism where the
government plays a relatively large role in ameliorating poverty and inequality, e.g., by
providing free healthcare and higher education. In contrast, more than 60% of young people
in the U.S. are not only concerned about climate change, but support climate activism
(Ballew et al. 2020).
At the global level, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the
University of Oxford recently conducted the world’s largest global survey of opinions on
climate change. They found that nearly two thirds of the 1.2 million people surveyed
believe climate change is a global emergency. Of the two-thirds, nearly 60% said “the
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world should do everything necessary and urgently in response,” and just 10% said the
world is doing enough already (UNDP 2021).23
Following the approaches of the revolution and degrowth perspectives, thus, would
likely reduce the climate movement’s widespread support. When combined with the farreaching structural changes implied by each approach, as discussed above, it becomes clear
that neither would make climate stabilization easier. On the contrary, following either the
revolution or the degrowth approach would make climate stabilization nearly impossible.
1.2.5 Degrowth, Revolution, and the Green New Deal
The Green New Deal in the U.S. was popularized in 2018 when Alexandria OcasioCortez and Ed Markey released the Green New Deal resolution (HR 109), and it continues
to dominate climate policy discussions. In general terms, the Green New Deal is a policy
program aimed at stabilizing the climate, creating significantly more jobs than will be lost,
and prioritizing social justice in the process. The last aspect is known as the “just transition”
and generally includes generous transitional support for fossil fuel industry-dependent
workers and communities and prioritizing the interests of low-income and minority
communities (Pollin and Callaci 2019).
The Green New Deal is widely popular among environmentalists and the general
public, and enjoys ample empirical support (Pollin 2015; Jacobson et al. 2019). Political
support for the Green New Deal became a condition of relevance for Democratic
presidential candidates during the 2019-2020 primaries. It then shaped President Biden’s
climate plan, who included Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Varshina Prakash (director of

The survey covered 50 countries accounting for 56% of the world’s population and the results
were weighted to create representative estimates of public opinion.
23
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the Sunrise Movement) on his climate taskforce. In May 2021, the first part of Biden’s
climate plan was unveiled as part of the American Jobs Plan, which would implement an
ambitious clean electricity standard (80% carbon-free by 2030), provide financial support
to help utilities achieve the standard, and build 500,000 electric vehicle charging stations.
In total, about $1 trillion is committed to climate stabilization efforts over 8 years, about
0.5% of U.S. GDP per year. The American Jobs Plan is not itself a Green New Deal, but it
has been shaped by the movement for a Green New Deal and can be seen as a useful starting
point for a more extensive Green New Deal program. Such a program is, for the first time,
within reach in the U.S.
Despite all of this, degrowth and revolution proponents offer only lukewarm
support at best. At worst, they act as an impediment to the Green New Deal’s success. For
example, Mastini et al. (2021) argue for a Green New Deal without growth. They
understand that this is radically different from the Green New Deal as conceptualized in
HR 109, which embraces economic growth in its calls to “spur economic development”
and “grow domestic manufacturing” (5). Degrowth proponents tend to call for “a more
radical restructuring of social organization in the mold of transition towns, low-impact
living, ecoregions with minimal trade, etc.” This “obviously chokes with the more statist
spirt of a [Green New Deal], with its emphasis on technology, big infrastructures and large
flows of money, and on jobs and salaries” (7). Thus, they see the Green New Deal without
growth as a “revolutionary reform,” i.e., a reform that leads radical structural change. They
believe degrowth proponents should not “accept [the Green New Deal] acritically…but
rather hijack it towards more radical positions.”

51

Juliet Schor and Andrew Jorgenson (2019b) similarly call for a Green New Deal
without growth, while Tim Jackson and Peter Victor—the two leading figures of the
degrowth camp—are practically silent on the Green New Deal.24
John Bellamy Foster, the leading scholar advocating revolution, responded to HR
109 in a 2019 interview:
I am impressed by some aspects of it….But none of this will really work, even if it
were possible to legislate it, given the system, unless it takes on the character of an
ecological revolution with a broad social base….A radical Green New Deal is, at
best, just the entry point to such wider, eco-revolutionary change.
The only aspects of HR 109 Foster spoke favorably about were the calls for mass
mobilization, public banking, and higher taxes for the rich. Jason Moore expresses even
more doubt, also in a 2019 interview:
Is the Green New Deal, understood as a new set of demands for economic and
environmental justice, a break with the ‘jobs vs. environment’ rift that has
dominated since the 1970s? Maybe. But the iron grip of ‘sustainable development’
has yet to be broken—the social democratic petrofantasy that endless accumulation
can coexist with diversity and well-being in the web of life. I’m also wary of the
historical metaphor.…The New Deal was an effort by relatively enlightened ruling
strata to contain workers’ power.
Andreas Malm discussed the Green New Deal briefly in a 2021 interview,
suggesting that it may be a waste of activist energy: “Who knows if in five or ten years

I conducted basic Google searches and did not find anything. Moreover, Victor’s 2019 book
does not even mention the term “Green New Deal.” Jackson (2016) briefly discusses calls for a Green New
Deal in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis.
24
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people will look back at the Green New Deal as a waste of activist energy because it wasn’t
radical enough?” However, unlike the others, he does caution against opposition to the
Green New Deal. If it has a real chance of succeeding, he says, “then I would be the first
to caution impatient, militant climate activists not to do anything that can damage this
campaign and the momentum behind it.”
Examining the degrowth and revolution perspectives in relation to the Green New
Deal highlights the importance of the key question in this paper: are the degrowth and
revolution proponents right? Does solving the immediate crisis of climate change require
moving beyond capitalism? If so, the Green New Deal will not work. While it poses a
major challenge to neoliberal capitalism—a variant of capitalism characterized by the
domination of capital over labor, deregulated markets, and privatization of the public sector
(Kotz 2015)—the Green New Deal does not challenge capitalism in general. If they are
wrong—and I have argued they are—then climate stabilization programs like the Green
New Deal are likely humanity’s best chance of averting the climate emergency, and
revolution and degrowth proponents risk damaging progress. This damage comes in at least
three forms: (1) the degrowth and revolution proponents themselves, some of the most
committed climate activists, will choose not to put their energy towards a Green New Deal;
(2) sowing doubt and division more broadly among the coalition of support for the Green
New Deal; and (3) making claims that support the idea that there are tradeoffs between a
healthy economy and a healthy environment, a view also espoused by fossil fuel
corporations and other defenders of the status quo.
On the third issue, Kallis (2019) is a case in point. Kallis acknowledges the potential
risks of implementing a degrowth program within a capitalist economy, including “rising
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poverty, inequality, debts, austerity, etc.” He therefore supports dismantling and replacing
capitalism. Nonetheless, he also implies that we need degrowth, even if it does lead to mass
suffering: “Should we support capitalism forever, just because a collapsing capitalism is
worse for workers than a capitalism that does well?” This view is in itself an obstacle to
climate stabilization.

1.3 An Alternative Theoretical Framework
I have argued that the degrowth and revolution perspectives are far from
convincing. They rely on unwarranted assumptions and lack basic evidence. At the same
time, world governments have yet to act at the scale and pace needed to sufficiently address
the climate crisis. Global carbon emissions continue to rise year after year, the only
exceptions coming during global economic crises (Osaka 2020). The climate impasse does
not stem from lack of cost-effective socio-technical solutions (IPCC 2018b; Jacobson and
Delucchi 2011; Delucchi and Jacobson 2011; Jacobson et al. 2017; Prentiss 2015), nor does
it stem from lack of overall economic resources (Pollin 2015; Chomsky and Pollin 2020;
Jacobson et al. 2019) or public demand (UNDP 2021; Ballew et al. 2020; Laville and Watts
2019). I argue that while capitalism itself is not an insurmountable obstacle to sufficient
action on climate change, the obstacles at the root of the climate impasse, i.e., continued
global inaction on climate change, still lie in the realm of political economy. This section
outlines the main theoretical issue with the degrowth and revolution perspectives and
proposes an alternative perspective, or theoretical framework, for identifying, analyzing,
and overcoming the political economic obstacles to climate stabilization.
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1.3.1 Theoretical Critique of Degrowth and Revolution
Ecological Marxists and ecological economists argue convincingly that capitalism,
the predominant economic system across the world, is inherently environmentally
unsustainable. It is worth briefly laying out their arguments and evidence. Capitalism is an
economic system based on never-ending accumulation of exchange-values via profitmaking and, by extension, economic growth. Central to profit-making is the continual
increasing of material throughput without tending to the regenerative needs of extra-human
nature. Indeed, general material throughput is tightly correlated with GDP (Jackson 2016;
Hickel and Kallis 2019), and environmental crises are accumulating. Humanity has
transgressed four planetary boundaries, including two core boundaries (climate change and
biodiversity loss) (Steffen et al. 2015). Earth Overshoot Day—the calendar day on which
humanity uses up more resources than Earth can regenerate based on current production
practices—moves up every year and is expected to fall on July 29 in 2021 (Global Footprint
Network 2021). One can point to instances of environmental improvement, such as the
Montreal Protocol to phase-out CFCs and the U.S. Acid Rain Program to reduce sulfur
dioxide emissions, but they are dwarfed by the strong tendency towards environmental
degradation. It is difficult to see, therefore, how civilization could achieve general
environmental sustainability as long as capitalism dominates the world economy.
Where degrowth and revolution proponents falter is in taking the general analysis
of ecological economics and ecological Marxism and attempting to apply it to one specific
environmental crisis: climate change. I examined their argument in Sections 1.2.1 and
1.2.2, finding that they do not hold up under scrutiny. They rely on unwarranted
assumptions, e.g., that future CO2 decoupling rates cannot exceed historical rates or that
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clean energy cannot support economic growth, and lack basic evidence to support their big
claims, e.g., that degrowth or revolutionary strategies would make decarbonization easier.
In the long-run, capitalism must be challenged. But right now, in the short- to mediumterm, carbon-emitting activities must be challenged. They argue that these two struggles,
i.e., anti-capitalist struggle and climate struggle, are one in the same. That movements for
climate stabilization must be anti-capitalist. While the struggles do overlap, I show that
climate stabilization very likely does not require dismantling and replacing capitalism. This
turns out to be a good thing given the short timeframe humanity has to avert the worst
impacts of climate change, which can be described as truly existential. Climate stabilization
alone will not bring general environmental sustainability, but it is a precondition of
sustainability—failing to stabilize the climate will leave little for humanity to fight for.
1.3.2 Theoretical Framework
Research on obstacles to climate stabilization requires disaggregation of both
environmental degradation and capitalism, i.e., understanding the particular requirements
for climate stabilization within historically-specific economic systems. My theoretical
framework is rooted in political economy, which I define as the exploration of economic
activities—the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth and “illth”—as
processes that shape, and are shaped by, relations of power. “Wealth” refers to all natural
and produced resources and services that provide use-value to people, whereas “illth” refers
to the negative use-values caused by economic processes, including climate change.
Boyce (2007) outlines five dimensions of power that describe how individuals and
groups influence social-decision-making. The first dimension is economic power—often
called “purchasing power”—which is wielded by those who have disproportionate levels

56

of income and wealth. There are then four dimensions of political power: decision power,
agenda power, value power, and event power. A person or group wields decision power if
they have a vote on final decisions; agenda power if they can set the agenda for the voters;
value power if they have outsized influence on voters’ preferences; and event power if they
play a role in determining the conditions under which people make decisions. As noted by
Boyce (2007), economic power and political power are highly correlated. Economic power
can be used to gain political power through, for example, making or threatening to withhold
donations to political organizations or campaigns. In a similar way, political power can be
used to rig the rules of the economy in favor of the already rich and powerful.
My theoretical framework, drawing on relations of power, consists of four
interrelated dimensions:
1. Climate stabilization pathways
2. Economic, political, and cultural institutions
3. Coalitions of opposition and support
4. Political strategy
The goal in this section is simply to provide an outline of my framework, which can be
used to help guide future research on the political economy of global inaction on climate
change.
1.3.2.1 Climate Stabilization Pathways
The first dimension is climate stabilization pathways. That is, considering the
technical and resource requirements of climate stabilization as well as the policy program
that can bring it about. For example, Pollin (2015; 2019b) proposes the following:
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1. Greenhouse gas emissions reductions in line with the 1.5 °C warming target (i.e.,
45% reduction by 2030 and net-zero by 2050).
2. Policies and regulations to induce the necessary clean energy investments, which
amount to 2.5% of GDP per year—e.g., subsidies, feed-in-tariffs, low-cost
financing, public investments, and public procurement policies.
3. Policies and regulations to phaseout fossil fuels in line with the emissions reduction
targets. Following the recommendation of Boyce (2019), this would be anchored
by a hard cap-and-dividend policy.25
4. A just transition for fossil fuel industry-dependent workers and communities,
including up to three years of full income support, guaranteed pensions, job
training, and job placement in the clean energy sector within three years (just
transition costs are included in 2.5% of GDP).26
However, there are many possible scenarios. In terms of technologies, Pollin (2015)
and Jacobson et al. (2019) argue that neither nuclear power nor negative emissions
technologies would be needed. Most scenarios considered by the IPCC (2018a), however,
do rely on negative emissions technologies. The extent to which negative emissions
technologies in particular are used has major implications for the speed at which fossil fuel
production would need to be phased out.
Several environmental organizations in the U.S.—including 350.org, Sunrise
Movement, and Friends of the Earth—recently released a report arguing that the U.S.

25
A cap-and-dividend policy places a hard cap on emissions (ratcheted up each year), auctions
allowable emission permits, and returns the auction revenues to residents in equal shares.
26

As Pollin and Callaci (2019) show, the cost of a just transition program is a tiny fraction of the
overall cost of a Green New Deal.
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should reduce emissions faster than what is required for the world as a whole. They argue
for emissions reductions of 70% by 2030 domestically, and that the U.S. should provide
support to developing nations that would induce additional emissions reductions equal to
125% of the U.S.’s current emissions. They base these figures on an estimation of the
U.S.’s contribution to causing climate change (Reyes et al. 2021).
Another conception of the Green New Deal is put forth by Ocasio-Cortez and
Markey in the Green New Deal resolution, discussed in Section 1.2.5 (Ocasio-Cortez
2019). They define the just transition more broadly to include measures like universal
healthcare, a job guarantee, and addressing the racial wealth gap. Klein (2019) argues in
favor of this approach on grounds that it would help to build a broader and more powerful
grassroots movement for the Green New Deal.
Examining the political economy of global inaction on climate change requires
understanding the similarities and differences between the various climate stabilization
pathways, and choosing one or more pathways to focus on. Each pathway comes with its
own set of political economic obstacles.
1.3.2.2 Social Institutions
I argue that (1) climate stabilization likely does not require moving beyond
capitalism; and (2) dismantling and replacing capitalism in the U.S., let alone the entire
world, is extremely unlikely within the short timeframe humanity has to solve climate
change. My starting point, therefore, is to treat capitalism in general as a constraint. In
other words, the central process driving capitalist economies, i.e., capital accumulation,
and the core institutions that reproduce it (private ownership of productive resources,
competitive markets, wage labor, and the social imperative to accumulate) will not be
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dismantled in the short- to medium-term. The economic, political, and cultural institutions
that make up and support a particular capitalist society, on the other hand, like the U.S.,
are malleable within the general capitalist constraint.
To understand the malleability of institution within capitalism, I draw on social
structure of accumulation theory. It was first developed by Gordon et al. (1982), who
argued that analysis of capitalism tended to be too general to be applied to historically
specific versions of capitalism. A social structure of accumulation (SSA) is a set of
economic, political, and cultural institutions that promotes stable capital accumulation and
profit-making. The goal of SSA theory was to understand and explain long waves of
capitalist expansion and crisis, but it also has applications for understanding climate
stabilization in capitalist economies.
For example, Kotz (2015) contrasts the postwar period (1945-1980) with the
neoliberal period (1980-present) in the U.S. The postwar era was characterized by a capitallabor accord and a capital-citizen accord. Unions expelled their radical members and
businesses agreed to peaceful bargaining over wages and benefits. The government
maintained and increased social welfare programs. The postwar era was also characterized
by co-respective behavior among capitalists and heavy government regulation of markets
and finance, which eschewed price wars and led to Keynesian demand-side government
policies, anti-trust laws, and a financial sector tied to the real sector (i.e., less speculative).
These institutions came together to create a regulated form of capitalism with rising real
wages, rapid productivity growth, a generous social safety net, and high profits.
The neoliberal SSA, on the other hand, is characterized by domination of capital
over labor (e.g., stagnant wages and low unionization rates), cuts to and stigmatization of
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social welfare programs, economic and financial deregulation, privatization of the public
sector, and general pro-market and anti-government sentiment. It is also characterized by
an important contradiction, where the economic elite depend substantially on government
support themselves via, for example, subsidies and economic crisis-relief. The neoliberal
SSA formed in response to the profitability crisis of the 1970s, and succeeded in restoring
high profits, and therefore capital accumulation. It is not difficult to see why the neoliberal
period, during which climate change entered the public sphere, is less than ideal for
implementing a Green New Deal, moderate or radical. Naomi Klein (2015b), for example,
writes, “Climate change…landed on the public agenda at the peak of free market, end-ofhistory triumphalism” (Conclusion).
Climate stabilization will require institutional change. The task in the second
dimension of the framework, then, is to identify institutions that are inhibiting progress on
climate stabilization as well as potential ways to overcome them, within the general
framework of capitalism. For example, any kind of Green New Deal in the U.S. will require
major legislative victories at the federal level. Even though two-thirds of Americans want
more federal action on climate change, federal climate legislation up until now has been
extremely weak (Funk and Kennedy 2020). Thus, there are obstacles within the institutions
that are supposed to translate what the majority of Americans want into policy.
To give a concrete example, take the U.S. Senate. North Dakota and South Dakota
have the same representation in the Senate as California and New York. That is, those who
are opposed to action on climate change are over-represented. While the nature of the
Senate is likely to change, one change that could ameliorate the problem is ending or
reforming the cloture rule (i.e., filibuster), which allows the minority party to block most
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legislation without a 60% majority. The legislature could also then take action to end
gerrymandering and expand voting access (e.g., by passing HR 1 in the 117th Congress),
which may help to ensure that U.S. Congressmembers are more representative of the U.S.
population.
Another example of an institutional obstacle is the anti-interventionist conception
of government that is characteristic of neoliberal capitalism. According to Mazzucato
(2015), it is the interventionist governments that have been most successful in promoting
innovation and growth. Some of the key characteristics of these governments are as
follows: providing strategic vision for researchers and firms; identifying and funding the
most promising technologies, companies, and researchers; and implementing strong
industrial policies to allow for new industries to become competitive. Climate stabilization,
which will involve completely remaking the energy system over a period of just three
decades, will require an interventionist state.
1.3.2.3 Coalitions of Opposition and Support
Capitalist economies today are full of inequalities, including inequalities based on
class, race, gender, and citizenship. For example, the world’s billionaire class, consisting
of just over 2,000 people, has more wealth than the world’s poorest 4.6 billion people, who
make-up 60% of the population (Oxfam 2020). Major transitions, like climate stabilization,
are also unequal. There will be winners, e.g., the clean energy industry, and losers, e.g., the
fossil fuel industry. The third dimension of my framework is to parse out the coalitions of
opposition and support for climate stabilization. This task includes identifying these
coalitions as they exist today, as well as searching for opportunities to expand and
strengthen the coalition of support, and shrink and weaken the coalition of opposition.
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Coalitional analysis should be based on economic, political, and ideological
interests. For example, the fossil fuel industry and auto-manufacturers have an economic
interest in opposing climate stabilization programs that are based on decarbonization (as
opposed to geoengineering).27 At least some fossil fuel workers, however, actually support
a Green New Deal with a just transition (Roth 2021). Market fundamentalists will likely
oppose any climate stabilization pathway that requires an interventionist government (they
may support a geoengineering approach). According to Dunlap and McCright (2016),
political party affiliation is the most important factor determining individuals’ climate
attitudes in the U.S. (Dunlap and McCright 2016). Brulle et al. (2012) found that structural
economic factors were also important—increases in unemployment and decreases in GDP
negatively impacted climate attitudes.
In addition to understanding the make-up of the coalitions of opposition and
support, it is important to analyze the relations of power between them. While most people
the world over are worried about climate change and want action on climate change, the
opposition to climate stabilization is wealthy and powerful,28 and constitutes the chief
obstacle to climate stabilization.
1.3.2.4 Political Strategy
The final dimension of the framework is political strategy: discerning how to
overcome the institutional and coalitional obstacles to climate stabilization. It is important
to note that all of the dimensions are interdependent. Feasible political strategies, for
example, will depend on the climate stabilization pathway, the particular institutional
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See Chapter 2.

28

See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the wealth and power of the fossil fuel industry in particular.

63

context, and the current state of coalitions of opposition and support. Similarly, feasible
climate stabilization pathways will depend on the array of social institutions and coalitions
of opposition and support. The framework, thus, is not linear. The four dimensions must
be considered together.

1.4 Conclusion
Degrowth and revolution proponents argue that climate stabilization will require
moving beyond capitalism. They are convincing in arguing that capitalism cannot be
sustainable in general. They falter, however, on the issue of climate stabilization in
particular. They present no credible evidence to support their claims that climate
stabilization means the end of capitalism. Evidence does, however, support the feasibility
of Green New Deal-like policy programs within capitalist economies.
This essay is not a defense of capitalism. There are many other reasons to oppose
capitalism, including that it tends to produce economic and social inequality and degrade
the environment in multiple dimensions. However, climate change, which has been deemed
a climate emergency by more than 11,000 scientists (Ripple et al. 2020), requires
unprecedented action in the short- and medium-term. Having to also dismantle and replace
capitalism—a centuries-old economic system that has survived many revolution
attempts—would only make climate stabilization more difficult, bordering on impossible.
In this context, making claims that degrowth or revolution is necessary to avert climate
change is at best distracting, and at worst damaging to the struggle for climate stabilization.
Indeed, all of the degrowth and revolution proponents I surveyed, many of whom are highly
influential among academics and activists, were either critical of or silent on the Green
New Deal that emerged in 2018 in the U.S.
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Even though climate stabilization will likely have to occur within capitalism, it will
not be automatic, and it will still require significant institutional change. To aid in
navigating this process, I outlined a theoretical framework for identifying and analyzing
political economic obstacles to climate stabilization within capitalism. Overcoming these
obstacles is the most important task humanity faces.
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1.5 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Decoupling rates for various scenarios
Decoupling rate by annual GDP growth rate (g)
CO2 Emissions Reduction
Target
g=2.1% g=0% g=-0.5% g=-1%
g=-5%
90% by 2050
9.6%
7.7%
7.2%
6.7%
2.8%
95% by 2050
11.7%
9.9%
9.4%
8.9%
5.1%
90% by 2035
17.0%
15.2% 14.8%
14.3%
10.7%
95% by 2035
21.0%
19.3% 18.9%
18.5%
15.0%
∼1.5 °C (average of 95% by
2050 and 90% by 2035)
14.4%
12.6% 12.1%
11.6%
7.9%
Source: Author’s calculations

Table 1.2: Size of global GDP in 2050 relative
to 2016 for various GDP (de)growth rates
Annual GDP
Size of economy in 2050
growth rate
(GDP in 2016 = 1)
2.1%
1.83
0%
1.00
-0.5%
0.86
-1%
0.74
-5%
0.22
Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 1.3: Impacts of degrowth for the world’s ten largest economies in 2050
(2019 USD, T=Trillion)

Country
US
China
Japan
Germany
India
UK
France
Italy
Brazil
Canada
Total

GDP data for
2019
GDP
per
GDP
capita

GDP per capita
equalized to
$15,680 in 2050
(0% annual GDP
growth)

GDP

Percent
Change

$21.4 T
$65,298 $5.1 T
-76%
$14.3 T
$10,262 $21.9 T 53%
$5.1 T
$40,247 $2.0 T
-61%
$3.9 T
$46,445 $1.3 T
-66%
$2.9 T
$2,100
$21.4 T 647%
$2.8 T
$42,330 $1.0 T
-63%
$2.7 T
$40,494 $1.1 T
-61%
$2.0 T
$33,228 $0.9 T
-53%
$1.8 T
$8,717
$3.3 T
80%
$1.7 T
$46,195 $0.6 T
-66%
$58.7 T
$58.7 T 0%
Sources: World Bank (2021b), author’s calculations

GDP per capita
equalized to
$11,100 in 2050
(-1% annual GDP
growth)

GDP per capita
equalized to
$2,700 in 2050
(-5% annual GDP
growth)

GDP

Percent
Change

GDP

Percent
Change

$3.6 T
$15.5 T
$1.4 T
$0.9 T
$15.2 T
$0.7 T
$0.7 T
$0.7 T
$2.3 T
$0.4 T
$41.6 T

-83%
8%
-72%
-76%
429%
-74%
-73%
-67%
27%
-76%
-29.2%

$0.9 T
$3.8 T
$0.3 T
$0.2 T
$3.7 T
$0.2 T
$0.2 T
$0.2 T
$0.6 T
$0.1 T
$10.1 T

-96%
-74%
-93%
-94%
29%
-94%
-93%
-92%
-69%
-94%
-82.8%

Figure 1.1: Comparing CO2 emissions paths
CO2 Emissions Paths: Geometric vs. Arithmetic
CO2 (billion metric tons)

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5

2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050

0

Geometric

Arithmetic

Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 1.4: Average decoupling rate by annual GDP growth rate (g) for the
arithmetic model
1.5 °C
2 °C
g = 2.1%
g = 0%
g = -1%
g = 2.1%
g = 0%
g = -1%
2022-2030
8.3%
6.4%
5.5%
5.1%
3.1%
2.2%
2031-2040
8.6%
6.7%
5.7%
4.8%
2.8%
1.9%
2041-2050
30.7%
29.3%
28.6%
5.9%
4.0%
3.0%
2051-2070
0%
0%
0%
19.7%
18.0%
17.2%
Source: Author’s calculations
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CHAPTER 2
STRANDED ASSETS AND REDUCED PROFITS: ANALYZING THE
ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY’S
RESISTANCE TO CLIMATE STABILIZATION

2.1 Introduction
The 2015 Paris Agreement sought to minimize the risk of future climate devastation
by committing governments to limiting the rise in global average temperature to 1.5-2 °C
above preindustrial levels (UNFCCC 2016). In the years since, governments in all regions
of the world have continually failed to act at the scale and pace necessary to achieve this
target.29 In January 2020, a group of more than 11,000 scientists warned “clearly and
unequivocally” that Earth is now facing a “climate emergency” (Ripple et al. 2020, 8). This
paper examines one key constraint on global action to combat climate change: the
resistance mounted by the fossil fuel industry, which has continued to expand fossil fuel
production and has allocated substantial resources toward impeding climate stabilization
efforts.
The economic losses the fossil fuel industry is likely to incur as a result of a
transition from fossil fuels to clean energy include stranded assets (i.e., assets that suffer
an unanticipated devaluation) and a reduction in profitability. The assets at risk include
fossil fuel reserves—the large quantities of oil, gas, and coal still in the ground—and the
capital goods used to extract and process them, including machinery, tools, and built

29

Greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, and even with the concrete mitigation commitments
made by governments as part of the Agreement, the IEA (2019c) expects GHG emissions to continue rising
through at least 2040.
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infrastructure. Using a methodology that emulates the expectations and valuation
procedures used by fossil fuel firms, I estimate the magnitude of wealth losses from
stranded assets under 2 °C and 1.5 °C climate stabilization scenarios, and the distribution
of these losses by region, between private firms and governments, and among the oil and
gas majors.30 I also compare profits, profit margins, and market capitalization between
fossil fuel and renewable energy firms for the period 2010-2019. My analysis focuses on
firms and governments involved in fossil fuel extraction, known as the “upstream fossil
fuel industry”. The results shed light on the economic stakes that help to explain the fossil
fuel industry’s past and future resistance to climate stabilization, and provide clues on how
to overcome it.
The stranded assets analysis indicates that fossil fuel reserves will suffer a
devaluation of 37%-44%, amounting to losses of $13-$15 trillion, while the losses due to
stranded investments in capital goods will be comparatively minimal. Together these two
findings imply a strong economic incentive to continue on the path of resistance. About
half (45%-63%) of the devaluation in reserves stems not from fossil fuels left in the ground
but from price decreases for reserves still extracted and sold during climate stabilization,
leading to the conclusion that even low-cost producers will bear significant losses. The
distributional analysis reveals that 76% of stranded assets belong to governments,
suggesting that the political obstacles to climate policies will be especially high in nations
with nationalized ownership of substantial fossil fuel reserves. This implies that actions
that reduce demand from their trading partners is likely to be crucial for climate

30

BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total.
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stabilization. A comparative analysis shows that fossil fuel firms remain substantially more
profitable than renewable energy firms, reinforcing the above conclusions.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on
the fossil fuel industry’s resistance to climate stabilization. Section 2.3 outlines the
methods and data employed for the stranded assets analysis. Section 2.4 presents the results
of the stranded assets analysis. Section 2.5 presents the results of the energy industry
comparative analysis. Section 2.6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the
results for strategies to overcome resistance to effective climate stabilization policies.

2.2 Fossil Fuel Industry Resistance to Climate Stabilization
Climate change entered the public sphere in 1988, when eminent climate scientist
James Hansen testified before U.S. Congress on the existence and consequences of humaninduced global warming, and the United Nations and World Meteorological Organization
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The fossil fuel
industry was already well aware of the causes and consequences of climate change
(Banerjee et al. 2015, Banerjee 2015; Young 2019). Nonetheless, they responded by
vehemently resisting climate stabilization efforts. This resistance takes two broad forms:
(1) economic resistance, entailing the continued expansion of fossil fuel operations despite
the clear need for the opposite; and (2) political resistance, comprising of efforts aimed at
impeding government action to combat climate change.
2.2.1 Economic Resistance
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2020a), the world’s largest
oil and gas firms allocated just 0.5%-0.8% of capital expenditures toward clean energy
from 2015-2019. These investments accounted for a negligible share of investments in all
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clean energy technologies, with one exception: carbon capture and storage (CCS). CCS
technology removes and stores carbon emissions resulting from fossil fuel combustion,
thereby prolonging the potential use of fossil fuels in a climate stabilization scenario. CCS,
however, remains expensive and unproven on a large scale.
The limited available evidence on coal companies’ investments suggests that the
industry remains strongly committed to coal. Despite the drop in coal-fired power
generation from 2018 to 2019, global coal supply actually increased by 15%. The IEA
(2020c) explains the apparent contradiction as follows:
Coal still represents more than one-third of global electricity generation and
remains the second-largest fuel in the global energy mix after oil and the secondlargest traded bulk commodity after iron ore. Investments are being proposed on
that basis, in response to economic signals coming from the coal market (65).
Amidst growing public pressure to address climate change and the economic
struggles induced by COVID-19, several European oil and gas firms, including BP, Eni,
Shell, and Total, have made greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction commitments to signal that
they are taking climate change seriously. However, none are consistent with the 1.5-2 °C
target, and the commitments from BP, Shell, and Total in particular are misleading. Shell
excludes all emissions from its products, Total excludes emission from its products sold
outside Europe, and BP excludes its 20% stake in Rosneft, accounting for 40% of BP’s oil
production and 15% of its gas production (Kusnetz 2020; Carbon Tracker 2020). Whether
these commitments are credible remains to be seen. BP made similar commitments in the
early 2000s through its “Beyond Petroleum” campaign, but abandoned it due to low returns

72

on renewable energy (Kusnetz 2020). As shown in Section 2.5, low returns continues to
plague the renewable energy industry today.
2.2.2 Political Resistance
Political resistance to climate stabilization exists among both private firms and
government producers. In the private sector, political resistance comes in three forms:
misinformation campaigns, political lobbying, and corporate promotional activities.
Climate change misinformation is produced by a network of conservative think tanks and
front groups (i.e., “social movement organizations” created by fossil fuel interests), which
are largely funded by the fossil fuel industry and other fossil fuel interests (McCright 2011).
Farrell (2016a; 2016b) found evidence that in addition to funding the contrarian network,
fossil fuel firms have played an active role in determining the content of misinformation.
Boussalis and Coan (2016)—the most recent assessment of the amount of climate change
misinformation produced over time—found that misinformation grew substantially from
1998-2013, and showed no signs of slowing down.
Political lobbying involves allocating resources toward directly influencing
government decision-making, while corporate promotional activities, such as advertising,
serves as a form of greenwashing—efforts aimed at changing the public’s perception of the
fossil fuel industry as a polluter. Brulle (2018) finds that fossil fuel interests, including the
fossil fuel industry, consistently outspend clean energy interests on political lobbying by a
ratio of ten to one. To exemplify the level of corporate promotion in the fossil fuel industry,
Kalhoefer (2016) calculated the ratio of industry advertisements to climate change news
coverage on CNN for one week. Fossil fuel ads were given five times as much air time as
climate coverage. Brulle et al. (2020) analyzed the advertising spending of five oil and gas
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firms—ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, BP, and ConocoPhillips—and found that average
annual per company spending increased from $35 million to $216 million between 1986
and 2016. For both lobbying and advertising, proposed climate legislation was the most
important determinant of the levels of annual expenditures (Brulle 2018; Brulle et al. 2020).
For example, from 2007-2010—the period with the highest amount of proposed climate
legislation—political lobbying from fossil fuel interests accounted for nearly 10% of all
lobbying expenditures in the U.S. (Brulle 2018).
Political resistance also exists among government producers, yet very little has been
written about it. This is likely due to the secretive nature of state-owned fossil fuel firms.
While private firms must lobby government officials to influence policy, state-owned firms
are controlled by, and operate for the benefit of, government officials. Many private firms,
including large publicly-listed corporations, must disclose substantial amounts of
information about their economic and political activities. State-owned firms can operate
mostly behind closed doors.
Harvey (2019) illustrates this point with two examples. First, the Natural Resource
Governance Institute (NRGI) recently published the National Oil Company Database after
three years of research. According to the lead author, Patrick Heller, less than one-third of
state-owned oil and gas firms disclosed enough information to fill out the “key indicators”
that he argued were necessary for public accountability (Harvey 2019). Second, The
Guardian in 2019 asked 12 of the largest state-owned fossil fuel firms about their plans for
meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement, which their countries had signed. The only firm
to respond was Petrobras of Brazil, and the response was short and rehearsed, simply
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stating that the firm is planning to cut carbon emissions from its operations (not from its
products) (Harvey 2019).
Despite the secrecy, Michael Mann (2021) points to several anecdotes of oil states
engaging in political resistance to climate stabilization:
1. In 1995, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait successfully changed some
of the language of the IPCC’s 1995 Second Assessment report. IPCC scientists had
originally stated in the “Summary for Policymakers”—the most widely read part of
the report—that humans were having an “appreciable” influence on the climate.
That word was watered down to “discernible.”
2. Fifteen years later, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Russia played an
important role in promoting the false allegations of “Climategate”31 (Mann 2021).
3.

More recently, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait joined the U.S. in refusing to
support an official motion at the 2018 United Nations Climate Change Conference
in Poland to “embrace” the IPCC’s (2018b) special report on the consequences of
1.5 °C of warming.
More generally, Johnsson et al. (2019) finds that countries with large levels of fossil

fuel reserves, which include mostly countries with nationalized fossil fuel ownership, are
doing less to address climate change than countries with small levels of reserves. Stateowned fossil fuel firms’ resistance to climate stabilization is an important area for further
research. According to the NRGI (2021), if these firms alone follow through on planned
fossil fuel investments, the 1.5-2 °C target would become unachievable.

31

Thousands of emails from climate scientists were stolen from a private computer and
misrepresented to suggest that climate change was a hoax.
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2.2.3 Effectiveness
Evidence suggests that resistance to climate stabilization has been effective. A 2001
memorandum from a top U.S. State Dept. official suggests that the Global Climate
Coalition, an anti-climate change front group created by fossil fuel firms and related
interests, played a pivotal role in the George W. Bush’s decision to reject the Kyoto
Protocol, i.e., the first major international agreement aimed at combating climate change
(DeSmog 2020). Climate change misinformation campaigns have successfully created a
rift between climate science and the public. For example, from 2007 to 2011, the percent
of the U.S. population that believed human-induced climate change was real decreased
from 71% to 54%. Similar trends were found in the U.K. and Australia (Klein 2015a).
These percentages have since increased, e.g., 80% in the U.S. in 2019 (Funk and Hefferon
2019), but still fall short of the scientific consensus comprising 97% of publishing climate
scientists (Cook et al. 2016). In a more general analysis, Johnsson et al. (2019) finds that
nations with large fossil fuel endowments have accomplished significantly less than nations
with small fossil fuel endowments.
2.2.4 The Economic Underpinnings of Resistance
In any economic system where an economic elite holds a very large share of
society’s wealth, members of that elite can be expected to act at great lengths to protect
their hold on wealth and power. Today’s economic elite includes those who wield power
in the fossil fuel industry: the chief executives, major shareholders, and boards of directors
of private firms, and senior officials in governments with nationalized fossil fuel
production. As an example of the sector’s immense wealth, on average five of the top ten
firms in Fortune’s Global 500 list—a ranking of the world’s largest companies based on
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revenue—from 2010 to 2020 were oil and gas producers. This includes five firms in fiscal
year 2020, despite the pandemic-induced crash in oil prices (Fortune 2020). Saudi
Aramco—Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company—remained the world’s most profitable
company by a sizable margin in 2020.
Climate stabilization poses an existential threat to humanity, but it also poses an
existential threat to current and future fossil fuel wealth. It is the latter that motivates the
industry to resist climate stabilization, a premise well-established in the literature (Farrell
et al. 2019; Banerjee 2015; Jennings et al. 2015; Brulle et al. 2012; Dunlap and McCright
2011). Understanding how to overcome the industry’s resistance therefore requires a
careful analysis of its economic motivations, i.e., the wealth and profits at stake. Sections
2.3-2.5 undertake this task.

2.3 Method and Data for Stranded Assets Analysis
2.3.1 Estimating Losses from Stranded Assets
Two types of assets are at risk of becoming stranded from climate stabilization: (1)
fossil fuel reserves, and (2) the capital goods used to extract, process, and transport fossil
fuel reserves. The loss of wealth from stranded assets (SA) for each fuel (i) is equal to the
sum of wealth losses from stranded reserves (SR) and stranded capital (SC). This is shown
in equation (2.1). The terms “stranded reserves” and “stranded capital” refer to stranded
assets in the forms of fossil fuel reserves and capital goods, respectively.
𝑆𝐴𝑖 = 𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝑆𝐶𝑖

(2.1)

Wealth losses from stranded reserves (SR) and stranded capital (SC) are estimated
through scenario comparison, as shown in equations (2.2) and (2.3). The value of reserves
(VR) and the value of capital goods (VC) are estimated in a baseline scenario and a climate
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stabilization scenario, denoted with subscripts BS and CSS, respectively. The baseline
scenario represents a future in which current trends in fossil fuel supply and demand
continue with minimal changes, whereas the climate stabilization scenario represents a
future that is consistent with the 1.5-2 °C climate stabilization target.
𝑆𝑅𝑖 = 𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝐵𝑆 − 𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝐶𝑆𝑆

(2.2)

𝑆𝐶𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝐵𝑆 − 𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝐶𝑆𝑆

(2.3)

Stranded capital can be further disaggregated into losses from stranding existing
capital goods and losses from stranding investments in future capital goods. If industry
refrains from overinvesting in the future, stranded capital from climate stabilization is
limited to the existing capital goods left unused. The magnitude of future capital
expenditures at risk is difficult to quantify. If the world transitions from the baseline
scenario to the climate stabilization scenario, firms will transition their future capital
expenditures accordingly. One way to assess future capital expenditures at risk is in terms
of the potential time lag between when governments implement climate stabilization
measures, and when industry transitions capital expenditures to be consistent with those
measures. In other words, if governments shift policies from the baseline scenario to a
climate stabilization scenario—either 1.5 °C or 2 °C—it may take some time before
industry follows suit. I call this the “government-industry time lag”. Wealth losses from
future capital expenditures is equal to the excess capital expenditures made during this
time.
The value of losses from stranded capital (SC) shown in equation (2.3) can thus be
reformulated into equation (2.4),
𝑆𝐶𝑖 = 𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝐵𝑆 − 𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝐶𝑆𝑆 + ∑𝐿𝑡=1

(𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑖,𝐵𝑆 −𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑖,𝐶𝑆𝑆 )
(1+𝑑)𝑡
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(2.4)

where EC is the value of existing capital goods, CE is the value of future capital
expenditures, d is the discount rate, L is the length of the time lag, and t is the specific year
of the time lag. In the case of future capital expenditures, the losses are discounted in order
to convert future cashflows into present value terms. The discount rate is discussed in depth
in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.2 Valuing Fossil Fuel Reserves
Estimating losses from stranded reserves requires valuing fossil fuel reserves.
Academic researchers and industry practitioners generally agree that the market value of a
quantity of fossil fuel reserves is equivalent to the present value of expected cumulative
net income from producing them.32 This is captured in the discounted cashflow (DCF)
model in equation (2.5).
𝑉𝑅𝑖 = ∑𝑇𝑡=0

(𝑃𝑡,𝑖 −𝑀𝐶𝑡,𝑖 )𝑄𝑖 𝑆𝑡,𝑖 −𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑖

(2.5)

(1+𝑑)𝑡

Variables are defined as follows:
-

VRi: Value of fossil fuel reserves for fuel i.

-

Pt,i: Market price of fuel i in year t.

-

MCt,i: Marginal cost of production per unit of reserves for fuel i in year t.

-

Qi: Total quantity of proved reserves for fuel i.

-

St: Share of proved reserves expected to be extracted for fuel i in year t.

-

CEt,i: Future capital expenditures for fuel i in year t.

-

d: Discount rate.

32

This is stated explicitly in Caldwell et al. (2018), Schumann (2014), McGowan (2000), Weir
(1993) and PetroWiki (2017).
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-

T: Time period—the number of years it will take to fully extract the resource in
question.
Under the DCF model, the net income from producing fossil fuel reserves is

determined for each year, discounted at rate d (this determines how future cashflows are
valued in the present), and then summed over the entire time period. An alternative
valuation method promoted by some researchers is the Hotelling Valuation Principle,
which holds that the value of any non-renewable natural resource is equivalent to its net
price (P-MC) (Miller and Upton 1985a) This method is a special case of the DCF model in
equation (2.5) where capital costs are ignored and the net price increases at the rate of
discount, implying that the timing of extraction does not matter. Empirical evidence,
however, overwhelmingly rejects the viability of this method for valuing fossil fuel
reserves (Livernois 2009). For a more in-depth discussion, see Appendix A.
Based on equation (2.5), fossil fuel reserves risk two forms of stranding. First, large
quantities of reserves will be left in the ground in a climate stabilization scenario. Research
indicates that this includes most proved reserves and all probable and possible reserves.33
The value of these reserves will drop to zero. I refer to this as the “carbon budget effect.”
Second, climate stabilization will cause the demand for fossil fuels to decrease, which will
push down the expected prices of fossil fuels received by producers. The decrease in
expected prices leads to a decrease in value of the reserves that are still extracted and sold
during climate stabilization. I refer to this as the “price effect.”34

33

See Meinshausen et al. (2009), Leaton (2011), Leaton et al. (2013), McGlade and Ekins (2015),
and Heede and Oreskes (2016).
34

van der Ploeg and Rezai (2020) and Semieniuk et al. (2021) use similar categories.
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2.3.2.1 Prior Estimates
To my knowledge, no one has estimated the potential wealth losses from fossil fuel
reserves specifically. Six studies have, however, estimated global economic losses from
fossil fuel production in a 2 °C scenario using methods similar to equation (2.5). Two of
these studies measure losses in terms of foregone profits, with estimates of $12 trillion and
$25 trillion (Bauer et al. 2016, Nelson et al. 2014), while four studies measure losses in
terms of foregone revenue, with estimates ranging from $3-$185 trillion (Mercure et al.
2018; Linquiti and Cogswell 2016; Channell et al 2015; Lewis 2014). The variation among
the estimates is especially concerning—losses of $3 trillion carries drastically different
implications than losses of $185 trillion. This section seeks to understand the causes of this
variation in order to inform the stranded assets estimation in this paper. A comparison of
the methods and data across the studies reveals three main causes of variation: differences
in the timeframe of estimation, discount rate, and sources of future projections.
Each study uses scenario comparison, estimating the magnitude of foregone profits
or revenue as the difference in profits or revenue between a baseline scenario and a 2 °C
scenario. It is important to note that none of the studies considers the more ambitious 1.5
°C target set by the Paris Agreement. As shown in Table 2.1, timeframes of estimation
range from 18-100 years, discount rates range from 0%-10%, and several different sources
are used for future projections of fossil fuel supply, prices, and production costs.
The higher estimates generally use longer timeframes and a lower discount rate.
The highest estimate, for example—$185 trillion from Linquiti and Cogswell (2016)—
uses the longest timeframe (100 years) and a low discount rate (3.18%). It is also important
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to note that estimates of foregone revenue ignore production costs, making them generally
higher than estimates of foregone profits.
Much of the variation, however, is caused by the use of different sources of
projections. Most of the studies use one of three sources: the E3ME-FTT-GENIE model,
the REMIND model, or the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook
(WEO). The WEO, published annually, includes two baseline scenarios: The Current
Policies Scenario (CPS) and the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS). CPS assumes that no
new climate policies will be implemented in the future, while STEPS assumes governments
will follow through on announced climate policies. Two studies use CPS as the baseline,
while one study uses STEPS. Channell et al. (2015) do not use any of these projection
sources. Rather, they simply multiply the magnitude of fossil fuel reserves expected to be
left in the ground in a 2 °C scenario (as estimated by McGlade and Ekins 2015) by fossil
fuel prices at the time of analysis.
To get a sense of the differences across the sources, Table 2.2 displays oil price
projections for the years 2019 and 2040 in the baseline and 2 °C scenarios.35 I also include
the prices used in the present study for comparison. Price projections for the year 2040
vary significantly across the sources, and projections from the E3ME-FTT-GENIE model
are especially low. In 2040, this model projects a price of $42 per barrel in the baseline
scenario—similar to crude oil prices throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.36

35
I used linear extrapolation to fill in any missing years. It is also important to note that the IEA
projections displayed are from the 2019 edition of the WEO.
36

While oil prices briefly turned negative in April 2020, they have generally hovered around $40
per barrel through October 2020 (FRED 2020).
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With these methodological and data differences in mind, the wide variation in
estimates becomes clear. Linquiti and Cogswell’s (2016) $185 trillion estimate is nearly
two times the next highest estimate, $100 trillion from Channell et al. (2015). While both
studies measure foregone revenue using long timeframes and low discount rates, their oil
price projections differ substantially. Channell et al. use a constant oil price of $70 per
barrel for both the baseline and climate stabilization scenarios, while Linquiti and Cogswell
use price projections from the WEO, which are higher for the baseline scenario and lower
for the climate stabilization scenario. The estimates from Mercure et al. (2018) lie at the
lower end of the range: $3-$4 trillion.37 They measure foregone revenue using the shortest
timeframe, highest discount rate, and lowest fossil fuel price projections.
The wide variation across the estimates illustrates the importance of carefully
choosing the parameters and projections based on the goals of the analysis. In the sections
that follow, I describe my choices and provide justifications. My overall goal is to estimate
losses from stranded assets from the perspective of the fossil fuel industry, so that I can
draw conclusions about the industry’s resistance to climate stabilization. In the results
section, I include a sensitivity analysis exploring alternative parameters and projection
sources for comparison.

2.3.3 Scenarios and Timeframe
The main source I use for scenario projections is the IEA’s 2019 World Energy
Outlook (WEO). The WEO provides scenario projections for baseline and climate
stabilization scenarios for 2020-2040. The scenarios are defined in Table 2.3. For the

37

The estimate stated in their paper is $1-$4 trillion. However, the lower estimates incorporate
scenarios that are irrelevant to this paper.
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baseline scenario, I use the average of the Current Policies Scenario (CPS) and the Stated
Policies Scenario (STEPS). Given the 1.5-2 °C target set by the Paris Agreement, I include
a 2 °C climate stabilization scenario and a 1.5 °C climate stabilization scenario. Both are
based on the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) from the WEO. They are
abbreviated “SDS2” and “SDS1.5”. SDS2 is identical to SDS, whereas SDS1.5 is altered
slightly to be consistent with the 1.5 °C target.
In general, a baseline scenario represents a future with relatively little change from
current trends. In the context of this paper, the baseline scenario should also reflect the
expectations of fossil fuel firms. As described in Table 2.3, the CPS scenario represents a
future in which no new climate policies are implemented. This is highly unlikely, even if
preferred by the fossil fuel industry. The STEPS scenario, on the other hand, assumes that
governments will implement further climate policies according to their policy
announcements and targets, including those made as part of the Paris Agreement. These
policies, however, should not be taken for granted. Given the fossil fuel industry’s
continued resistance to climate policies, it seems unlikely they would expect STEPS to
come to fruition. Industry expectations, therefore, likely lie somewhere in-between CPS
and STEPS.
This hypothesis is supported by the 2020 Global Energy Outlook from Resources
for the Future (RFF), which reviews energy market projections from leading energy
organizations and corporations around the world (RFF 2020). In their comparison of
energy-related CO2 emission projections, they include 13 scenarios from eight
organizations, including the IEA, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Institute of Energy Economics
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Japan (IEEJ), BP, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Equinor. Among the eight baseline scenarios,
STEPS and CPS generally constitute the upper and lower bounds, with the others dispersed
in-between.38 Thus, I use the average of STEPS and CPS as the baseline scenario.
I use two climate stabilization scenarios for estimation: SDS2 and SDS1.5. Based
on the language of the Paris Agreement, civilization should limit global warming to “wellbelow 2 °C” above preindustrial levels, and strive for 1.5 °C. Accordingly, SDS2 is a
stringent 2 °C scenario, entailing a two-thirds chance of limiting warming to 1.8 °C above
preindustrial levels. SDS1.5 is a less stringent 1.5 °C scenario, entailing a one half to twothirds chance of limiting warming to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels by 2100, with the
possibility of a 0.1 °C overshoot before 2100. STEPS, CPS, and SDS2 are directly from
the WEO. SDS1.5 is identical to SDS2, with the exception of fossil fuel supply projections.
Supply projections are adjusted to be consistent with the 1.5 °C target.
In light of the reduction in fossil fuel demand from the COVID-19 pandemic, some
fossil fuel companies have already written off small amounts of assets. It seems unlikely
that fossil fuel demand will remain low after the pandemic ends, at least without major
policy interventions. Nonetheless, I consider this possibility in the sensitivity analysis by
including a baseline scenario with depressed projections of fossil fuel prices and supply.
The scenarios discussed in this section are limited to the timeframe of 2020-2040.
During this time, only a fraction of the world’s known fossil fuel reserves will be extracted,
even in the baseline scenario. This leads to the potential problem of under-valuation of
reserves. However, evidence suggests that the present value of reserves that will not be
extracted until after 2040 is extremely small, alleviating this concern. Bauer et al. (2016)

38

The exception is ExxonMobil, which dips below STEPS near 2040.
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show that most post-2040 reserves are unprofitable by today’s standards due to high
production costs, leading to a low market value. This value is further depressed by the
discount rate, discussed in detail in the next section.
2.3.4 Discount Rate
The discount rate indicates how future cashflows are valued in the present. The
higher the discount rate, the lower the present value of future cashflows. Before considering
what the discount rate should be, it is important to first answer the following question: why
discount at all? There are certainly cases where discounting is controversial and arguably
does not make sense. For example, when economists discount the value of future climate
damages or human lives (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2002). However, discounting does
make sense for valuing fossil fuel reserves. This can be illustrated with a simple example.
Assume an oil well will produce $1 million in net income in ten years. Without discounting,
the firm would value this income as equivalent to receiving $1 million today. However, if
the firm received $1 million today, it would likely invest that money. Assuming a positive
rate of return on investment, the $1 million received today would be worth more than $1
million in ten years. Thus, $1 million received in ten years is not valued as highly as $1
million received today. The market value of fossil fuel reserves incorporates this
phenomenon through the discount rate, which—for a firm—represents the required rate of
return on investment. I argue that a real discount rate (i.e., adjusted for inflation) of 10% is
appropriate for valuing fossil fuel reserves.
The literature reviewed in the previous section use real discount rates ranging from
0% to 10%. Only two of these studies—Mercure et al. (2018) and Linquiti and Cogswell
(2016)—justify their chosen rates. Mercure et al. (2018) use a rate of 10%, calling it the
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“corporate” rate, suggesting that it reflects corporations discount future cashflows. They
provide no evidence for this, however. Linquiti and Cogswell use a rate of 9.42% for
private firms, which represents the weighted average cost of capital of fossil fuel firms (i.e.,
the cost of debt and equity). They use 3% for state-controlled production, representing a
“risk-free” rate.
Anderson et al. (2018) and Adelman and Watkins (1995)—two studies that value
oil and gas properties—use similar discount rates: 8.6% and 10%, respectively, in real
terms. Anderson et al. calculated their rate as the average S&P 500 return from 1928-2014.
Adelman and Watkins do not offer any reasoning for the 10% real discount rate. However,
their analysis suggests that it is accurate. They test the conventional DCF method using the
10% real discount rate against the Hotelling Valuation Principle in valuing oil and gas
properties. Their results show that the values produced by the conventional method were
consistent with actual data on oil and gas property sales from the time. Studies have used
survey data to estimate discount rates for corporations in general. This includes
Jagannathan et al. (2016), Graham and Harvey (2011), and Poterba and Summers (1995)
who find the average real discount rate to range from 12%-13%.
As stated at the beginning of this section, I argue that 10% is appropriate. It serves
as a good mid-point between the studies surveyed above. While the survey data suggests
firms discount at rates between 12% and 13%, S&P500 returns and the weighted average
cost of capital suggest rates of 8%-9%. Additionally, the fossil fuel-specific studies use
real discount rates of no more than 10%. In the sensitivity analysis, I use discount rates of
0%, 7%, and 12.5% for comparison.
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2.3.5 Projecting Fossil Fuel Supply
With a 10% discount rate, fossil fuel reserves produced in 20 years are worth just
15% as much as they would be if the same quantity of reserves were produced today. Thus,
obtaining future supply projections is extremely important. There are two methods for
obtaining these projections. The first entails using yearly scenario projections from the
WEO or some other source, which projects the quantity of reserves expected to be produced
each year. This is the method used by the studies reviewed in Section 2.3.2. However, in
determining the market value of fossil fuel reserves, industry practitioners use a different
method. They value reserves based on the assumption that the reserves will enter the
production process immediately. For coal reserves, the methods are practically identical.
Most reserves expected to be produced over the next two decades are already in production.
For oil and gas production, however, the methods differ significantly. Thus, I use the
second method, or the “practitioner method” for oil and gas reserves.
Understanding the practitioner method requires understanding how reserves are
categorized. Every quantity of reserves is categorized as proved, probable, or possible,
based on the probability that the reserves can be profitably extracted with current
technologies (90%-100% for proved, 50%-90% for probable, and 10%-50% for possible).
As noted in Section 2.3.3, this paper only considers reserves expected to be burned from
2020-2040. Probable and possible reserves, thus, are excluded. Proved oil and gas reserves
are further categorized as proved developed and proved undeveloped. Proved developed
reserves can be extracted from existing wells with little to no further capital investments.
Proved undeveloped reserves require substantial capital investments to be developed.
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The practitioner method in the oil and gas industry can be traced back to J.J. Arps
(1945). Production rates from oil and gas wells are governed by the physical properties of
reservoirs, and can be described by three types of production decline curves: exponential,
hyperbolic, and harmonic. Oil and gas wells are most productive in their first days of
production. Production then declines at a declining rate until the wells are no longer
profitable. While a company may not be planning to produce the reserves immediately, this
assumption makes sense in terms of determining market value. For proved developed
reserves, production is assumed to begin immediately. Proved undeveloped reserves must
first be developed, which takes an average of three years (IEA 2019b). Thus, I assume they
enter production in year four. For my analysis, I use the exponential curve as shown in
equation (2.6), where Q is the quantity of oil or gas produced, D is the annual production
decline rate, and t denotes the year.
𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄0 (1 − 𝐷)𝑡

(2.6)

I assume a 10% decline rate (D=0.1), consistent with the oil and gas valuation
literature (Anderson et al. 2018; Adelman 1990; Cairns and Davis 2001). The typical
lifetime of oil and gas wells is 15-30 years (Hyne 2008; CAPP n.d.). The 21-year estimation
timeframe used in this paper falls near the middle of this range. Thus, I assume that all
wells stop producing after 21 years.
In the sensitivity analysis, I consider alternative production decline curves for
comparison. For a more in-depth discussion on decline curves, and additional evidence on
the efficacy of the practitioner method, see Appendix B.
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2.3.6 Projection Data
2.3.6.1 Stranded Reserves
I compiled data projections from several government and non-government sources.
For fossil fuel supply, price, and capital expenditure projections, I use the WEO, EIA
(2020a), and IIASA and IAMC (2018). For marginal cost of production estimates, I use
the EIA (2011), Statista (2015), and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) (2016). Below, I
describe the data used for each variable in the model to value fossil fuel reserves,
reproduced here.
𝑉𝑅𝑖 = ∑𝑛𝑡=0

(𝑃𝑡,𝑖 −𝑀𝐶𝑡,𝑖 )𝑄𝑖 𝑆𝑡,𝑖 −𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑖

(2.5)

(1+𝑑)𝑡

Supply projections (Q) for each scenario are from the WEO for the baseline and 2
°C scenarios, and from IIASA and IAMC (2018) for the 1.5 °C scenario. Projections of
supply only include reserves that will be extracted for the time period in question: 20202040. All reserves extracted over this timeframe are proved reserves. The practitioner
method of estimating yearly production requires proved developed reserves to be
distinguished from proved undeveloped reserves. The method for this is outlined in
Appendix B. Table 2.4 reports the total supply for each scenario (i.e., reserves produced
from 2020-2040), the supply of proved developed reserves, and total proved and unproved
reserves (i.e., including reserves that will not be extracted from 2020-2040).
Natural gas and coal price projections are from the WEO. For oil, WEO projections
for 2019 are higher than actual 2019 prices. Thus, I supplement them with baseline oil price
projections from the EIA (2020a), which start at about $9 per barrel lower.39 I use the EIA

39

I take the average of the West Texas Intermediate and Brent Crude oil prices.
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baseline scenario projections for STEPS (prices increase at about the same rate in both
scenarios) and then adjust the other scenarios proportionately.40 For both fossil fuel supply
and prices, the WEO provides data for 2018 and projections for 2025, 2030, 2035, and
2040. I use a linear interpolation to fill in the missing years.
Projections for future capital expenditures (CE) are taken from the WEO and
amortized equally over the entire time period.41 For marginal costs of production (MC), I
use operational costs per barrel of oil equivalent from the EIA (2011), Statista (2015), and
WSJ (2016). The EIA provides data for 2008 and 2009, Statista for 2015, and WSJ for
2016. For oil, I average the per unit operational costs from all three sources. For gas, I use
just EIA (2011), as the other sources only consider oil. In order to account for the extremely
low natural gas prices in the U.S., I adjust operating costs for U.S. natural gas by a factor
of 0.5, and allocate 20% of the U.S. natural gas capital costs to oil.42 I assume these costs
remain constant over the timeframe of estimation. While unconventional oil and gas
production entails higher production costs, about 90% of production in the baseline
scenario, and even more in the climate stabilization scenarios, is conventional. Moreover,
according to the IEA (2019c), capital costs for oil and gas production over the past decade
have remained relatively stable. If follows that operational costs are likely stable as well.

40
For example, to obtain the adjusted CPS oil price for each year, I multiplied the EIA baseline
price by the ratio of the WEO CPS price to WEO STEPS price.
41

Projections for oil and gas are combined in the WEO. However, in the text they give the annual
average capital expenditures for gas development for STEPS ($370 billion total, $240 billion for upstream
resource development) (IEA 2019c, 187). Under the assumption that the ratio of gas to oil capital
expenditures is constant across all scenarios, I split the oil and gas capital expenditure figures into oil
expenditures and gas expenditures.
42

U.S. natural gas prices are less than half the prices elsewhere in the world. Without making
these adjustments, U.S. natural gas would have negative value.
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Data on marginal costs of production for coal were unavailable publicly. Thus, I
extrapolate from oil and gas. I assume that the ratio of the marginal cost of production to
the market price for coal is equivalent to the average of such ratios for oil and gas for the
year 2020.
2.3.6.2 Stranded Capital
Estimating wealth losses from stranded capital includes the devaluation of existing
capital goods and the potential devaluation of future capital expenditures. Future capital
expenditure projections are taken from the WEO, which provides projections for 20202030 and 2031-2040. I assume that capital expenditures are spread equally across each time
period.
Estimates of losses from existing capital goods are based on the IEA (2020b), which
estimates that $250 billion of existing oil and gas infrastructure will be stranded under a 2
°C scenario.43 I extrapolate the $250 billion figure to coal under the assumption that the
ratio of losses from existing capital goods to losses from future capital expenditures is equal
across industries.44 I then extrapolate from 2 °C to 1.5 °C based on the assumption that
losses from existing capital goods increase proportionately to the change in future capital
expenditures between the two scenarios.
2.3.7 Distributional Analysis
I use regional categories from the WEO: North America, Central and South
America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Asia Pacific. For the distribution
between private firms and governments, I use the reserves distribution shown in Table 2.5
43

I split this up into oil expenditures and gas expenditures as described in previous footnote.

44

I do not have evidence supporting this assumption. However, its impact on overall SFFA is
insignificant.
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and assume a 29% combined royalty and tax rate based on PwC (2019). For the distribution
among the majors, I use Forms 10-K from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and company annual reports. The remainder of this section outlines these data in
more detail.
The WEO provides projections for fossil fuel supply (Q) and future capital
expenditures (CE) by region. IIASA and IAMC (2018)—used for the 1.5 °C scenario—
provides only aggregate projections. I create regional projections by assuming that
production from each region relative to world production for each year is proportionate
between the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios. For price projections, the WEO assumes oil prices
are equal across all regions, whereas natural gas and coal prices are provided for the U.S.,
EU, China, and Japan. Additionally, the sources used for marginal cost of production (EIA
2011, Statista 2015, and WSJ 2016) each provides data for a set of regions or top producing
countries. I map price and marginal cost data onto the WEO regions as described in
Appendix C.
Table 2.5 displays my estimates for the shares of fossil fuel reserves controlled by
governments and private firms for each region. For oil and gas reserves, I begin with a
recent report from the IEA (2020b). The IEA provides aggregate data on who controls oil
and gas proved + probable reserves and production as of 2018. Governments exercise
control through state-owned firms, which are defined as firms in which a government has
a controlling share. All other firms are considered private. Governments own 66% of oil
reserves and 60% of gas reserves, and private firms own 34% and 40%, respectively.
Regarding 2018 production, governments control 58% of oil production and 51% of gas
production, and private firms control 42% and 49%, respectively.
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The reserves distribution provided by the IEA (2020b) is not directly applicable to
my analysis. Whereas they consider all proved and probable reserves, my analysis only
includes proved reserves that will be produced from 2020-2040. Thus, I take the midpoint
between the reserves and production shares. That is, I assume governments control 62% of
2020-2040 oil reserves and 56% of 2020-2040 gas reserves, and private firms control 38%
and 44%, respectively. I make this adjustment for two reasons. First, it is likely that private
firms control a greater share of 2020-2040 reserves, as they generally hold less reserves
than governments. The average reserves to production ratio of the majors, for example, is
just 12 years.45 However, it is also likely that governments will continue to increase their
role in production, as they own the bulk of the lowest-cost reserves. Taking the average of
the shares of production and reserves accounts for both of these phenomena. In order to
translate the aggregate distribution between governments and private firms from the IEA
(2020b) into a regional distribution, I use the National Oil Company Database from the
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) (2020). Details are outlined in Appendix
C.
For coal reserves, due to data limitations, I use a bottom-up approach. I estimate
the distribution of reserves between governments and private firms in several top producing
countries, including China, India, Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the U.S., South Africa, and
Colombia. Together, they account for 93% of global coal production.46 The resulting
regional estimates are shown in Table 2.5. Sources and a more detailed explanation of my
approach are in Appendix C.

45

Author’s calculations using data from Forms 10-K and company annual reports.

46

Author’s calculations based on 2018 production data from the WEO.
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According to the PwC (2019), in 2018 both the oil/gas and coal industries paid 29%
of their income to governments in the form of direct taxes and royalties. Accordingly, I
transfer 29% of net income from private firms to governments.
To estimate the distribution of stranded assets among the majors—BP, Chevron,
ConocoPhillips, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total—I compiled data on proved net
developed and undeveloped reserves,47 future capital expenditures, marginal costs, and
taxes from SEC Forms 10-K and company annual reports.48

2.4 Results for Stranded Assets Analysis
2.4.1 Stranded Capital
Wealth losses from stranded capital are presented in Table 2.6. Losses from existing
infrastructure amount to $303 billion in the 2 °C scenario and $364 billion in the 1.5 °C
scenario. As noted in Section 2.3.1, I estimate potential losses from future capital
expenditures as the unneeded capital expenditures made during the government-industry
time lag. For example, if governments implement climate stabilization policies in 2021,
but industry does not transition investments accordingly until 2023, the governmentindustry time lag is equal to two years. Wealth losses are equivalent to the excess capital
expenditures made during this time. Estimates of wealth losses from stranded capital with
one-year and two-year time lags amount to $539-$754 billion in the 2 °C scenario and
$649-$908 billion in the 1.5 °C scenario.

47

Net reserves exclude reserves due others in the form of royalties.

48

See BP (2020), Chevron (2020), ConocoPhillips (2020), Eni (2020), ExxonMobil (2020), Shell
(2020), and Total (2020).
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While these wealth losses are large in absolute terms, they are insignificant in
relative terms. From 2014-2018, capital expenditures for fossil fuel production totaled $925
billion per year (IEA 2019c). Losses from existing capital goods amount to just one third
of capital expenditures for a single year. The risk is similar for future capital expenditures.
In terms of revenue, fossil fuel production will bring in about $3 trillion in 2020 alone.49
When singling out the coal industry, the results are more significant. Future coal
capital expenditures at risk amount to 65% of the industry’s projected capital expenditures
per year in the 2 °C scenario and 73% in the 1.5 °C scenario. In terms of existing capital
goods, my estimates for the coal industry are less reliable, as they are extrapolated from
the estimates for the oil and gas industry (details in Section 2.3.6.2).
The low levels of stranded capital for the oil and gas industry deserve further
examination. In Figure 2.1, I compare oil and gas demand under 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios
with oil and gas supply from existing wells with no new capital investments. Supply from
existing wells is modeled assuming a 10% exponential production decline curve from 2020
production levels (see Section 2.3.5). I also include an 8% annual decline rate, which the
IEA (2020b) uses in a similar exercise.50 Under every supply-demand combination, oil and
gas supply from existing wells leads to a substantial undersupply. In the 1.5 °C scenario,
demand falls by an average of just 3.2% per year for oil and 2.6% per year for gas. In other
words, substantial capital expenditures in oil and gas will continue to be needed even if the
world follows a 1.5 °C path.

49

Author’s calculations based on data for the baseline scenario.

50

According to the IEA, 8% represents the average oil and gas field decline rate.
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2.4.2 Stranded Reserves
Wealth losses from stranded reserves—presented in Table 2.7—amount to $12.7
trillion in the 2 °C scenario ($9.9 trillion for oil, $1.7 trillion for gas, and $1.1 trillion for
coal) and $15.3 trillion in the 1.5 °C scenario ($10.8 trillion for oil, $3.0 trillion for gas,
and $1.5 trillion for coal). In both scenarios, 90% of stranded reserves belong to the oil and
gas industry. These losses can be understood as the reduction in market value of proved
fossil fuel reserves that private firms and governments expect to extract and sell in the
baseline scenario between 2020 and 2040.
The magnitude of wealth losses from stranded reserves can be disaggregated into
the price effect, which captures the devaluation in reserves from price decreases for
reserves still extracted and sold during climate stabilization, and the carbon budget effect,
which captures the devaluation in reserves left in the ground. This is best understood with
an example. In the 2 °C scenario 633 billion barrels of oil reserves will be produced and
sold from 2020 to 2040. Due to a decrease in demand, the market price of oil drops in the
2 °C scenario relative to the baseline scenario. This reduction in prices, i.e., the price effect,
leads to a devaluation in reserves. Additionally, 172 billion barrels of oil will remain in the
ground in the 2 °C scenario that would have been extracted in the baseline scenario. The
value of these reserves falls to zero, constituting the carbon budget effect.
Table 2.8 displays the shares of losses from stranded reserves attributed to each
effect. In the 2 °C scenario, 63% of stranded reserves can be attributed to the price effect.
Only 37% is attributed reserves that remain in the ground. Under the 1.5 °C scenario, more
reserves are left in the ground, leading to a larger carbon budget effect. Nonetheless, 45%
of wealth losses is still attributed to the price effect. The price effect is smaller for coal, as
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coal production declines much faster than oil or gas production in both climate stabilization
scenarios, but it remains substantial at 17-36%.
2.4.3 Distributional Analysis
I estimate the distribution of wealth losses from stranded assets by region, between
private firms and governments, and among the seven influential oil and gas majors.51 The
main results can be summarized as follows:
1. Governments will bear about 76% of total stranded assets.
2. The three regions with the greatest shares of stranded assets are the Middle East
(33%), North America (19%) and Eurasia (17%), together accounting for nearly
70% of total stranded assets.
3. Stranded reserves for the majors amount to $402-$456 billion, equivalent to about
five years’ worth of typical profits.
Table 2.9 displays the distribution between private firms and governments for each
region.52 Governments will bear 76% of total stranded assets, while private firms bear just
24%. The three regions with the greatest shares of stranded assets are the Middle East
(33%), North America (19%) and Eurasia (17%), together accounting for nearly 70% of
total stranded assets. For all three, the bulk of stranded assets comes in the form of stranded
oil and gas reserves. Asia Pacific accounts for just 6% of stranded oil and gas assets, but
79% of stranded coal assets. In total, they account for 15% of stranded assets.

51
The distributional results are based on the distribution of stranded reserves. However, stranded
capital are likely distributed similarly.
52

Distributional analysis is based on stranded reserves. Stranded capital accounts for a much
smaller portion of overall stranded assets, and is likely distributed similarly to reserves.
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Table 2.10 presents wealth losses from stranded oil and gas reserves for the majors.
In total, these seven companies account for just 3% of total stranded reserves (14% among
private firms). As noted in Section 2.3.7, the majors on average carry reserves equivalent
to just 12 years of production (i.e., reserves to production ratio is 12), leading to relatively
low levels of stranded reserves. Most of their proved reserves are developed, and thus will
be produced from 2020-2040. Nonetheless, the $402-$456 billion in stranded reserves for
1.5-2 °C—mainly due to the price effect—is equivalent to about five years of profits
between 2010 and 2019.53
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented above are based on the methods, data, and assumptions
outlined in Section 2.3. This section presents a sensitivity analysis to test how wealth losses
from stranded reserves changes from alternative estimation methods and projections.
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 compare a variety of estimates of the value of stranded
reserves for 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, respectively. The estimations vary by method of
projecting supply (practitioner method vs. scenario projection method), discount rate (0%,
3%, 5%, 10%, and 12.5%), and sources for price and supply projection data (“Present
study”, “WEO-STEPS”, “WEO-CPS”, and “Mercure/STEPS”). “Present study” refers to
the projection data used in this paper. “WEO-STEPS" and “WEO-CPS" refer to projections
from the STEPS and CPS scenarios in the WEO. “Mercure/STEPS” refers to price
projections from Mercure et al. (2018) combined with supply projections for STEPS. I
chose these specific variables and data sources based on the literature reviewed in Section

53

This is based on the analysis in Section 2.5.
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2.3.2.1. The estimates that most closely resemble the methods and data of each study are
in bold font and denoted with superscripts.
These estimates are not exact replications of studies reviewed. All estimates
presented in the tables use the 2020-2040 timeframe and the capital and marginal cost
projections used in my main analysis. This differs from Mercure et al. (2018), Lewis
(2014), and Linquiti and Cogswell (2016) as they estimated revenue only. Additionally, all
WEO projections are from the 2019 edition of the report, while Lewis (2014), Linquiti and
Cogswell (2016), and Nelson et al. (2014) used previous editions. Nelson et al. use an 8%
discount rate, whereas I show 0%, 3%, 5%, 10%, and 12.5%. Mercure et al. (2018) provide
incomplete price projection data, so I used linear interpolation to fill in the missing years.
Finally, I do not have access to sufficient price and supply data from Bauer et al. (2016).
They average prices for their baseline scenario, but not their climate stabilization scenario.
I represent their estimate using STEPS, as the baseline projections are similar to STEPS.
The estimates of wealth losses are highly sensitive to the discount rate and sources
used for projections. The estimates that are representative of Lewis (2014) and Bauer et al.
(2016), for example, are identical in every way except the discount rate. Lewis’ 0% rate
leads to an estimate two times that of Bauer’s 5% rate. Estimates for STEPS and the present
study are quite similar. The estimates using CPS are significantly higher while those using
Mercure/STEPS are significantly lower. The practitioner and scenario projection methods
of projecting oil and gas supply generally did not lead to substantial differences in
estimates, the exceptions being the 0% and 12.5% discount rates.
In Table 2.14, I present estimates of losses from stranded reserves using alternative
production decline curves. The differences between the curves are insignificant.
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Finally, as noted in Section 2.3.3, some believe the COVID-19 pandemic and
resultant economic crisis will lead to a permanent decrease in future fossil fuel demand.
While this seems unlikely, if this does occur, the baseline scenario would shift closer to the
WEO’s STEPS scenario. Table 2.15 presents stranded reserves using STEPS as the
baseline scenario (rather than the average of STEPS and CPS). Recall from Section 2.3.6.1
that for oil price projections for STEPS, I replace the WEO projections with projections
from the EIA (2020a), which leads to lower overall estimates of wealth losses. The results
in Table 2.15 therefore differ from the STEPS projections in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 above.
Wealth losses from stranded reserves are lower under the COVID-19 case, dropping from
$12-$15 trillion to $9-$12 trillion. Nonetheless, they are still significant, and they do not
change any of the major implications of this paper.

2.5 Energy Industry Comparison
The stranded assets analysis reveals what is at stake for the upstream fossil fuel
industry in terms of assets they already own. In the case of a clean energy transition, the
industry will also experience economic gains from clean energy production. This section
compares profits, profit margins, and market capitalization between the fossil fuel and
renewable energy industries for the period 2010-2019. The results give an indication as to
what extent the losses from fossil fuel production could be recouped through gains from
clean energy production. These gains assume firms will be able to obtain access to
sufficient clean energy resources, e.g., land with the most sunlight and wind.
I compiled data on publicly traded companies from 2010-2019 from Bloomberg
L.P. (2020). I only included companies which had revenue and profit data for every year
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between 2010-2019, and excluded companies with revenues of less than $10 million.54 I
compared six groups of firms:
1. Oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) sector (pre-defined in Bloomberg
Terminal)
2. Integrated oil and gas sector (pre-defined in Bloomberg Terminal)
3. The seven oil and gas majors55
4. Coal operations sector (pre-defined in Bloomberg Terminal)
5. Renewable energy sector (pre-defined in Bloomberg Terminal)56
6. Solar energy firms from four solar energy stock indices57 (the Ardour Solar Energy
Index, BlueStar Solar Energy Industry Index, MAC Global Solar Energy Index,
and MVIS Global Solar Energy Index).
Table 2.11 presents average profits, revenue, and profit margins for fossil fuel and
renewable energy companies. The sample size for each sector is shown in parentheses.
Two sets of values are given for each metric: the per company average of the full sample
and of the ten largest companies (by revenue). The integrated oil and gas sector contains
the largest companies by a wide margin, and includes six of the majors. ConocoPhillips is
included in the exploration and production (E&P) sector. Coal companies are comparable
to oil and gas E&P companies in size, and—surprisingly—have the highest profit rate. The

54

The data for these firms was less consistent from year to year. For example, firms often
recorded the exact same amounts of revenue and profits for every year. Also, I am less interested in small
companies, which have little leverage is affecting politics.
55

The majors are also included in the E&P and integrated sectors. ConocoPhillips is in the E&P
sector, and the other six in the integrated sector.
56

The one exception is that I added Ørsted to this group, as Bloomberg had excluded it, likely by

57

These firms are also part of the renewable energy sector.

mistake.
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average renewable energy company is much smaller than oil and gas or coal companies,
and has yet to turn a profit. Solar companies are just above the breakeven point, with a
profit margin of 0.2%. It is worth noting that the top ten renewable energy companies,
which includes Ørsted, do turn a small profit margin of 3.2%.
The lower profits of renewable energy companies is consistent with an analysis by
the IEA (2020b), which compares internal rates of return of typical upstream oil and gas
projects to wind and solar projects. Renewable energy is still a young industry competing
with the centuries-old fossil fuel status quo. The declining per unit production costs of
renewable energy, owing to technological advancements, are encouraging. This
phenomenon makes renewable energy more competitive with fossil fuels. However, it can
also make past renewable energy investments unprofitable. Capital investments made in
wind and solar energy ten years ago, for example, are necessarily expensive and inefficient
by today’s standards. Das et al. (2020) show that wind and solar companies in particular
also face a problem of diminishing marginal revenues. Wind turbines and solar panels in a
particular area all produce electricity at the same time (i.e., when it is windy or sunny).
Without scaling up electricity storage capabilities—a technology that remains small in
scale and relatively expensive—this phenomenon leads to an oversupply of electricity.
Oversupply lowers electricity prices, and therefore firm revenues.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show how average revenue and profit margins have changed
over time. In terms of revenue, renewable energy companies show a small upward trend,
but still lie far below fossil fuel companies. In terms of profit margins, renewable energy
generally remains below fossil fuels. The E&P sector shows the highest profit margin for
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most years, but is most susceptible to collapses in oil prices, which is what caused the 55% profit margin in 2015. There are no clear upward or downward trends.
Finally, Figure 2.4 displays the average market capitalization of publicly listed
firms in each industry. Interestingly, renewable energy stocks show an upward trend while
all fossil fuel stocks show a downward trend. This suggests that investors expect renewable
energy to become more important and profitable in the future.

2.6 Conclusions
All of the evidence from the stranded assets analysis and energy industry
comparison point to the general conclusion that the fossil fuel industry faces strong
economic incentives to continue resisting climate stabilization. This evidence includes (1)
aggregate estimates of the wealth losses from stranded assets; (2) the disaggregation of the
devaluation in fossil fuel reserves into the carbon budget effect (i.e., losses from reserves
being left in the ground) and the price effect (i.e., losses from price decreases for reserves
still extracted and sold); (3) the distribution of the wealth losses from stranded assets by
world region, between private firms and governments, and among the oil and gas majors;
and (4) a comparison of profits, profit margins, and market capitalization between the fossil
fuel and renewable energy industries. The results shed light on the economic incentives
facing the industry, and approaches to overcoming the industry’s resistance.
2.6.1 Incentives Facing the Industry
Based on the results of the stranded assets analysis, proved fossil fuel reserves will
lose 37%-44% of their value, amounting to $13-$15 trillion in losses from stranded
reserves, while the wealth losses from stranded capital are minimal—just $303-$364
billion for existing capital goods, amounting to about one third of the industry’s capital
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expenditures for a single year. These results imply that the fossil fuel industry, in general,
has little to lose and much to gain from continuing on the path of resistance. If industry
were to alternatively choose to transition its operations to clean energy production,
consistent with the 1.5 °C or 2 °C scenario, it would end up undermining the economic
value of future fossil fuel production, leading to stranded reserves. Transitioning to clean
energy now would help to minimize the potential losses from stranded capital, but these
losses are insignificant compared to those of stranded reserves.
These conclusions are strengthened by the results of the energy industry
comparison. Fossil fuel firms consistently outperformed renewable energy firms from
2010-2019. Most important is the significant differential in profit margins: 6%-8% for
fossil fuel firms and -0.5% for renewable energy firms. Renewable energy firms did not
become more profitable over time—they reported negative profit margins in both 2018 and
2019. While this may change with technological advancements and climate policies, the
future prospects for profitmaking from clean energy production remains uncertain. The
profitability analysis, thus, provides further incentive for the fossil fuel industry to resist
climate stabilization efforts.
Most of the research on stranded reserves has focused on the quantities of reserves
that will be left in the ground in 2 °C scenarios.58 Based on my results, the reserves that
are still extracted and sold under climate stabilization are just as important, as they account
for 45%-63% of the wealth losses from stranded reserves. This is due to the expected
decrease in fossil fuel prices in the climate stabilization scenarios, or the price effect. This
has major implications for the fossil fuel industry in general, and low-cost producers in

58

See footnote 33.
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particular. The level of production from low-cost producers, e.g., Saudi Aramco’s oil
production, does not change significantly in either the 1.5 °C or 2 °C scenario, as fossil
fuels continue to supply a significant portion of the world’s energy demand through 2040.
The large price effect implies that even these producers will bear substantial wealth losses
from stranded reserves. It also implies that, for the entire industry, the per unit profits from
fossil fuel production will be drastically reduced relative to the baseline scenario.
The distributional analysis shows that government producers also deserve more
attention than they have received in the scholarly literature and news media, as they will
bear 76% of wealth losses from stranded assets. The 76% figure is significantly greater
than the share of fossil fuel production governments control. From 2020-2040—the time
period in question—governments are expected to account for 62% of oil production, 56%
of gas production, and 59% of coal production. This discrepancy is for two reasons. First,
private producers pay 29% of their gross profits to governments in the form of taxes and
royalties. Second, governments control the world’s lowest cost, most lucrative oil. This
includes the Middle East, followed by North Africa and Eurasia. The large price effect
described above is therefore especially debilitating for governments.
Approximately 90% of stranded assets occur in the oil and gas industry, mostly
from oil production. Regionally, the Middle East, North America, and Eurasia account for
38%, 25%, and 14% of stranded assets, respectively, almost entirely from oil and gas
production. Asia Pacific is the one region in which coal is more important. It accounts for
just 15% of total stranded assets, but 79% of coal-based stranded assets. Of these regions,
North America is the only one in which private firms account for more stranded assets than
governments.
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The analysis of the oil and gas majors suggests that they are relatively wellpositioned to weather a transition to clean energy, but are unlikely to undertake this
transition on their own. The majors controlled 16% of the world’s oil and gas production
in 2018, yet account for just 3.5% of stranded oil and gas reserves. This follows from the
fact that these firms hold an average of just 12 years’ worth of oil and gas reserves, most
of which are proved developed reserves. Compared to smaller private firms and most stateowned firms, the majors are less confined by borders, making it easier to locate and invest
in clean energy resources. The majors are also some of the largest firms in the world, with
BP, Shell, and ExxonMobil ranking 5th, 8th, and 11th in Fortune’s Global 500 list for fiscal
year 2020 (Fortune 2020). One can therefore conclude that the majors have the monetary
capital necessary to make an orderly transition from fossil fuels to clean energy production.
Having the ability to transition, however, does not mean that they will transition on
their own. Wealth losses from stranded reserves for the majors still amount to $402 billion
in the 2 °C scenario and $456 billion in the 1.5 °C scenario. These losses are approximately
five times greater than their average profits from 2010-2019. When combined with the low
profit margins for renewable energy firms, a transition away from fossil fuels seems
unlikely for the foreseeable future. Recent leaked documents and recordings from
ExxonMobil and BP support this argument. ExxonMobil expects its emissions to increase
17% by 2025 (Crowley and Rathi 2020), and according to BP CEO Bernard Looney, BP
is “probably going to be in oil and gas for decades to come,” adding, “because how else is
that $8 billion dividend going to get serviced?” (Westervelt 2020).
The results discussed above also point to several potential avenues for future
research. Researchers can use firm-level data to examine the variation in stranded asset risk
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and profitability across firms to better understand how they influence firms’ approaches to
climate change. The distributional analysis suggests more research is needed on stateowned fossil fuel production. For example, how are these governments responding to the
need for a clean energy transition? What do the intra- and inter-government struggles over
the future of fossil fuels look like, and how do they manifest themselves in geopolitics?
The price effect points to the importance of the actions of importers of fossil fuels. What
are the obstacles to climate stabilization in these countries, and what role can they play in
effecting a clean energy transition? Finally, the upstream fossil fuel industry is not the only
industry with stranded asset risk from climate stabilization. Similar analyses for midstream
(transportation) and downstream (refining) oil and gas operations, electric utilities, auto
manufacturers, and the insurance industry, among others, may prove enlightening.
2.6.2 Overcoming Industry Resistance
The fossil fuel industry has gone to great lengths to protect its hold on wealth and
power. These include efforts to mislead the public and lobby governments to forestall
major changes in energy policy. The vested interests in the sector also include fossil fueldependent governments, operating in a global environment of contests for geopolitical
power. I conclude this paper with a discussion of my results in relation to two broad
approaches to overcoming this resistance: (1) appeasing the fossil fuel industry, and (2)
defeating it.
The appeasement approach attempts to entice the industry to change. It prioritizes
fossil fuel producers in climate policies and international agreements so as to induce them
into taking a leading role in remaking the energy system. This approach would likely
require some form of compensation for the $13-$16 trillion in wealth losses from stranded
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assets, as well as ensuring that whatever the industry transitions to, such as clean energy
production, is as profitable and exclusive as fossil fuel production.
The feasibility of this approach varies by country and depends on several factors.
In the U.S., fossil fuel production makes up a relatively small percentage of overall GDP,
and the government is not dependent upon fossil fuel revenues for its tax base. The U.S. is
also home to substantial clean energy resources to which fossil fuel firms could transition.
Thus, compensation may be feasible. Wealth losses from stranded assets in North
America—the bulk of which are from the U.S.—amount to $2-$3 trillion. For comparison,
the COVID-19 relief package passed in the U.S. in March 2020 (the CARES Act)
amounted to $2.2 trillion.
The path to appeasing industry will be more difficult in countries where fossil fuel
production constitutes a substantial portion of economic activity, and where fossil fuel
production is nationalized, as in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, for
example, oil rents accounted for 29%, 16%, and 45% of GDP in 2018, respectively (World
Bank 2020). Because oil production is nationalized across the Middle East, governments
are particularly vulnerable to economic losses from climate stabilization. This is illustrated
by the fiscal breakeven oil prices (i.e., the crude oil price required by a government to
balance its budget) in the region for 2020, which range from $46-$194 per barrel (Knoema
2020). Compensation for wealth losses from stranded assets in the Middle East, which
amount to $4-$5 trillion, would therefore have to come from the international community.
This kind and level of compensation is highly unlikely, especially without major strings
attached.
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It is important to note that, even when appeasing industry is economically feasible,
it may not be politically feasible. The Yellow Vests movement in France, triggered by a
small increase in fuel prices, provides an example of how people may react if the burden
of climate stabilization is transferred from polluters to ordinary people.
The second approach—defeating industry—aims to hold fossil fuel producers
accountable for their decades of resistance, and to disempower them to the point that their
continued resistance becomes inconsequential. The sentiment behind this approach is well
captured in the writings of environmentalist Bill McKibben, who has termed the fossil fuel
industry “a rogue industry, reckless like no other force on Earth” and “Public Enemy
Number One to the survival of our planetary civilization” (McKibben 2012).
As long as fossil fuels are in high demand as essential commodities, the industry
will retain significant leverage in shaping politics. As the analysis in this paper indicates,
the economic viability of fossil fuel production quickly diminishes as demand for fossil
fuels declines. Eroding demand, thus, is the key to the approach of defeating industry.
Other strategies, such as attempts at isolating the fossil fuel industry socially and politically
(i.e., deeming it “Public Enemy Number One”) can help to create the political space
necessary for enacting policies to curtail demand. These policies are likely to find more
success in non-fossil fuel producing countries, and among producer countries in those with
privatized fossil fuel production.
The first approach—appeasing industry—may find more support among those in
positions of wealth and power, while the second—defeating industry—may find greater
support among the lower and middle classes. However, the two approaches are not
mutually exclusive, and can be complementary. For example, the curtailment of fossil fuel
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demand would reduce the fossil fuel industry’s bargaining power. This in turn would
reduce the level of compensation necessary to appease industry. Both approaches are likely
to be attempted in some combination, both domestically and internationally, in efforts to
avert the global climate emergency.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary of previous estimates of fossil fuel industry losses (estimates
are shown in US$; T=Trillion)
Climate
DisBaseline
stabilization
count
Timeframe projections
projections
rate
Study
Estimate Metric
Baseline
2 °C from
from
E3MEE3ME-FTTMercure et
GENIE
10%
al. (2018)
$3-$4 T Revenue 2018-2035 FTT-GENIE
Baseline
2 °C (450e
from
from
Bauer et
Profit
2010-2100 REMIND
REMIND)
5%
al. (2016)
$12 T
2 °C (450S
CPS
from
from 2013
Nelson et.
Profit
2015-2035 2013 WEO
WEO)
8%
al (2014)
$25 T
STEPS**
2 °C (450S
from 2013
from 2013
Lewis
Revenue 2013-2035 WEO
WEO)
0%
(2014)
$28 T
Baseline
from
2 °C from
Channell
McGlade and McGlade and
et al.
Revenue Unknown* Ekins (2015) Ekins (2015)
0%
(2015)
$100 T
Linquiti
and
Cogswell
(2016)

$185 T

Revenue 2016-2115

CPS from
2015 WEO

2 °C (450S
from 2015
WEO)

3.18%

* See text for details—the timeframe is unknown, but is likely similar to that of Linquiti and Cogswell
(2016).
** In the 2013 WEO, STEPS was called the New Policies Scenario (NPS).

Table 2.2: Comparison of oil prices across projection sources (US$ per barrel)
Baseline
2 °C
Source
2019 2040 2019 2040
E3ME-FTT-GENIE
$38
$42
$36
$27
REMIND
$71
$89
N/A
N/A
2019 WEO - STEPS & SDS
$70
$103 $67
$59
2019 WEO - CPS & SDS
$71
$134 $67
$59
Constant price from Channell et al. (2015)
$70
$70
$70
$70
Present study
$60
$102 $60
$51
Sources: Mercure et al. (2018), Bauer et al. (2016), IEA (2019c), and Channell et al. (2015).
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Table 2.3: Scenario descriptions
Scenario
Description
According to the IEA, “The Stated Policies Scenario (identical in
design to the previous New Policies Scenario) provides a detailed
sense of the direction in which today’s policy ambitions would take
the energy sector. The change in name to ‘Stated’ from ‘New’ is
intended to clarify that this scenario does not speculate on how
Stated Policies policies might evolve in the future. It incorporates policies and
Scenario
measures that governments around the world have already put in
(STEPS)
place, as well as the effects of announced policies, as expressed in
official targets and plans.” They add, “Given that intended policies
are typically not fully reflected in legislation or regulation, the
prospects and timing for their realization are based upon our
assessment of relevant regulatory, market, infrastructure and financial
constraints” (IEA 2019c, 751).
According to the IEA, “The Current Policies Scenario provides a
Current
baseline for the analysis by considering only the consequences of
Policies
existing laws and regulation. It excludes the effects of stated
Scenario
ambitions and targets that have not yet been translated into
(CPS)
operational laws and regulations” (IEA 2019c, 751).
SDS2 is the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) from the
WEO, which represents a stringent 2 °C pathway. The WEO
describes SDS as follows: “The outcomes embodied in the
Sustainable
Sustainable Development Scenario are derived from the Sustainable
Development
Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations….The Sustainable
Scenario - 2
Development Scenario is fully aligned with the Paris Agreement and
°C (SDS2)
lays out an integrated strategy to achieve climate, air quality and
access objectives while also having a strong accent on energy
security” (IEA 2019c, 751).
SDS1.5 is identical to SDS2, with the exception of fossil fuel supply.
For supply, I use the average projections from all 1.5 °C-consistent
pathways used by the IPCC (2018a), which include below-1.5 °C
pathways and 1.5 °C pathways with low overshoot. Below-1.5 °C
Sustainable
pathways “[limit] peak warming to below 1.5°C during the entire 21st
Development
century with 50–66% likelihood,” and 1.5 °C with low-overshoot
Scenario - 1.5
pathways “[limit] median warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 and with a
°C (SDS1.5)
50–67% probability of temporarily overshooting that level earlier,
generally implying less than 0.1°C higher peak warming than Below1.5°C pathways” (IPCC 2018a, 100). The data is available from
IIASA and IAMC (2018).
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Table 2.4: Fossil fuel reserves
Reserves by Scenario (20202040)
CPSSTEPS
Fuel
Average*
SDS2
SDS1.5
Oil
(billions of
barrels)
805
633
462
Gas
(trillions of
cubic feet) 102
87
55
Coal
(billions of
metric
tons)
120
75
62

Total Known Reserves
Proved
Developed

Proved

Probable +
Possible

296

1,700

6,165

38

225

803

N/A

1,043

23,014

Sources: IEA (2019c); IIASA and IAMC (2018). * Used for baseline scenario in stranded assets analysis.

Table 2.5: Reserves distribution between governments and private firms
Oil
Gas
Coal
Region
Private Public Private Public Private Public
North America
90%
10%
98%
2%
100% 0%
Central & South America 20%
80%
20%
80%
90%
10%
Europe
70%
30%
70%
30%
100% 0%
Africa
8%
92%
8%
92%
90%
10%
Middle East
5%
95%
5%
95%
5%
95%
Eurasia
50%
50%
50%
50%
90%
10%
Asia Pacific
5%
95%
5%
95%
25%
75%
World
38%
62% 44%
56% 41%
59%
Source: Appendix C.

Table 2.6: Losses from stranded capital for 1.5 °C and 2 °C by governmentindustry time lag (2018 US$, B=Billion)
Scenario
2 °C
1.5 °C
Time lag
0 years
1 year
2 years
0 years
1 year
2 years
Oil + Gas
$250 B
$445 B
$623 B
$306 B
$545 B
$762 B
Oil
$163 B
$290 B
$406 B
$192 B
$343 B
$479 B
Gas
$87 B
$155 B
$217 B
$113 B
$202 B
$283 B
Coal
$53 B
$94 B
$131 B
$59 B
$104 B
$146 B
Total
$303 B
$539 B
$754 B
$364 B
$649 B
$908 B
Source: Author’s calculations (data and methods described in Section 2.3).
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Figure 2.1: Supply from existing wells vs. demand under climate stabilization

Sources: IEA (2019c); Author’s calculations (see text for details).
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Table 2.7: Wealth losses from stranded reserves (percentage loss in parentheses)
(2018 US$, B=Billion)
2 °C
1.5 °C
Stranded oil + gas reserves
$11,628 B (-37%)
$13,754 B (-44%)
Stranded oil reserves
$9,920 B (-46%)
$10,789 B (-50%)
Stranded gas reserves
$1,708 B (-17%)
$2,965 B (-30%)
Stranded coal reserves
$1,089 B (-32%)
$1,514 B (-45%)
Total stranded reserves
$12,717 B (-37%)
$15,268 B (-44%)
Source: Author’s calculations (data and methods described in Section 2.3).

Table 2.8: Wealth losses from stranded reserves disaggregated into the price
effect and carbon budget effect
2 °C
1.5 °C
Price
Carbon Budget
Price
Carbon Budget
Effect
Effect
Effect
Effect
Stranded oil + gas reserves 65%
35%
48%
52%
Stranded oil reserves
66%
34%
53%
47%
Stranded gas reserves
62%
38%
28%
72%
Stranded coal reserves
36%
64%
17%
83%
Total stranded reserves
63%
37%
45%
55%
Source: Author’s calculations based on the results in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.9: Distribution of wealth losses from stranded assets
between governments and private firms and by region
Private
Regional
Firms Governments Total
Oil and Gas
North America
16%
9%
25%
Central & South
America
1%
7%
8%
Europe
1%
1%
2%
Africa
0%
7%
8%
Middle East
1%
37%
38%
Eurasia
5%
9%
14%
Asia Pacific
0%
5%
6%
World
24%
76%
100%
Coal
North America
4%
2%
5%
Central & South
America
1%
0%
1%
Europe
2%
1%
3%
Africa
2%
1%
3%
Middle East
0%
0%
0%
Eurasia
5%
3%
8%
Asia Pacific
14%
65%
79%
World
28%
72%
100%
Total fossil fuels
North America
12%
7%
19%
Central & South
America
1%
6%
7%
Europe
1%
1%
2%
Africa
1%
7%
7%
Middle East
1%
32%
33%
Eurasia
6%
11%
17%
Asia Pacific
2%
13%
15%
World
24%
76%
100%
Source: Author’s calculations (data and methods described in Section 2.3 and Appendix C).
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Table 2.10: The value of stranded reserves as distributed among the majors
(2018 US$, B=Billion)
2 °C
Company
BP
ExxonMobil
Chevron
Total (company)
Shell
Eni
ConocoPhillips
Majors (in
total)

1.5 °C

Share
Stranded of
reserves total
$100 B
0.9%
$87 B
0.7%
$62 B
0.5%
$62 B
0.5%
$39 B
0.3%
$30 B
0.3%
$23 B
0.2%

Share of
total of private
firms
3.6%
3.1%
2.2%
2.2%
1.4%
1.1%
0.8%

Stranded
reserves
$122 B
$93 B
$74 B
$71 B
$39 B
$33 B
$23 B

Share
of
total
0.9%
0.7%
0.5%
0.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%

Share of
total of private
firms
3.8%
2.9%
2.3%
2.2%
1.2%
1.0%
0.7%

$402 B

14.4%

$456 B

3.3%

14.2%

3.5%

Source: Author’s calculations (data and methods described in Section 2.3).

Table 2.11: Mean annual profits, revenues, and profit margins for listed fossil fuel
and renewable energy companies from 2010-2019 (2018 US$, M=Million)
Mean annual profits
Mean annual revenue
Mean annual
(per company)
(per company)
profit margin
All
Top
Industry
All firms
Top 10
All firms
Top 10
firms 10
Oil & Gas
E&P (n=201) $81 M
$1,463 M
$1,433 M
$17,841 M 5.6% 8.2%
Integrated
$239,460
oil/gas (n=36) $5,314 M
$12,822 M $88,401 M
M
6.0% 5.4%
N/A
$214,261 M
N/A
5.5% N/A
Majors (n=7) $11,888 M
Coal
$120 M
$1,093 M
$1,440 M
$10,411 M
Coal
operations
(n=130)
8.4% 10.5%
Clean energy
All renewable
energy
(n=201)
-$3 M
$144 M
$576 M
$4,509 M
0.5% 3.2%
Solar energy
(n=26)
$2 M
-$6 M
$843 M
$1,797 M
0.2% -0.3%
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Bloomberg L.P. (2020)
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Figure 2.2: Average revenue per company by industry from 2010-2019

Source: Author’s calculations using Bloomberg L.P. (2020).

Figure 2.3: Average profit margins by industry from 2010-2019

Source: Author’s calculations using Bloomberg L.P. (2020).
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Figure 2.4: Average market capitalization per company by industry from 2010-2019

Source: Author’s calculations using Bloomberg L.P. (2020).
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Table 2.12: Alternative estimates of wealth losses from stranded reserves in the 2 °C scenario (d=discount rate;
values are in billions of 2018 US$)
Source of Price
2 °C - Practitioner method
2 °C – Scenario Projection Method
and Supply
Projections
d=0% 3%
5%
10%
12.5% d=0%
3%
5%
10%
12.5%
Oil Reserves
Present study
23,471 17,589 14,737 9,920a
8,316
27,233
18,394
14,417
8,323
6,517
WEO - STEPS
21,424 16,141 13,573 9,223
7,769
24,210b 16,465
12,971c 7,599
6,000
d
e
WEO - CPS
37,028 27,796 23,316 15,746
13,224 42,618
28,926
22,752
13,266
10,446
Mercure/STEPS
5,225
3,981
3,365
2,296
1,930
5,930
3,887
2,977
1,604f
1,205
Gas Reserves
Present study
3,914
2,977
2,513
1,708a
1,432
4,596
2,900
2,157
1,061
753
b
c
WEO - STEPS
2,811
2,156
1,829
1,260
1,063
3,230
2,022
1,495
726
511
d
e
WEO - CPS
5,016
3,798
3,196
2,156
1,801
5,962
3,778
2,819
1,397
996
Mercure/STEPS
599
463
391
255
205
841
424
248
7f
(54)
Coal Reserves
Present study
3,509
2,384
1,875
1,089a
855
3,509
2,384
1,875
1,089
855
b
c
WEO - STEPS
2,645
1,769
1,374
768
589
2,645
1,769
1,374
768
589
WEO - CPS
4,374
2,999
2,376
1,410
1,120
4,374
2,999d
2,376
1,410e
1,120
f
Mercure/STEPS
154
67
30
(21)
(35)
154
67
30
(21)
(35)
Total
Present study
30,895 22,950 19,124 12,717a 10,602 35,339
23,679
18,449
10,474
8,125
b
c
WEO - STEPS
26,880 20,066 16,777 11,251
9,421
30,085
20,256
15,840
9,093
7,100
WEO - CPS
46,418 34,593 28,888 19,312
16,144 52,954
35,703d 27,946
16,074e 12,561
Mercure/STEPS
5,979
4,511
3,786
2,530
2,100
6,925
4,378
3,256
1,589f
1,116
Source: Author’s calculations (see text for details on data sources).
a
Uses method from this paper (identical to results in Section 2.4.2)
b
Method analogous to Lewis (2014)
c
Method analogous to Bauer et al. (2016)
d
Method analogous to Linquiti and Cogswell (2016)
e
Method analogous to Nelson et al. (2014) (they use a slightly lower discount rate at 8%)
f
Method analogous to Mercure et al. (2018)
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Table 2.13: Alternative estimates of wealth losses from stranded reserves in the 1.5 °C scenario (d=discount rate;
values are in billions of 2018 US$)
Source of Price
1.5 °C - Practitioner Method
1.5 °C – Scenario Projection Method
and Supply
Projections
d=0% 3%
5%
10%
12.5% d=0%
3%
5%
10%
12.5%
Oil
Present study
25,258 19,006 15,961 10,789a 9,056
28,970
19,530
15,281
8,772
6,843
WEO - STEPS
23,958 18,144 15,302 10,455
8,821
26,642b 18,090
14,231c 8,294
6,526
d
e
WEO - CPS
39,562 29,799 25,045 16,978
14,276 45,050
30,551
24,012
13,961
10,971
Mercure/STEPS
5,580
4,294
3,647
2,505
2,107
6,176
3,996
3,026
1,564f
1,141
Gas
Present study
6,554
5,045
4,290
2,965a
2,504
7,224
4,618
3,468
1,756
1,267
b
c
WEO - STEPS
5,451
4,224
3,607
2,517
2,135
5,857
3,740
2,807
1,420
1,025
d
e
WEO - CPS
7,656
5,867
4,974
3,412
2,873
8,590
5,496
4,130
2,092
1,510
Mercure/STEPS
1,284
1,010
862
584
481
1,562
838
529
91f
(24)
Coal
Present study
4,616
3,188
2,535
1,514a
1,204
4,616
3,188
2,535
1,514
1,204
b
c
WEO - STEPS
3,752
2,573
2,035
1,193
938
3,752
2,573
2,035
1,193
938
WEO - CPS
5,481
3,803
3,036
1,835
1,469
5,481
3,803d
3,036
1,835e
1,469
f
Mercure/STEPS
375
223
155
53
23
375
223
155
53
23
Total
Present study
36,428 27,240 22,786 15,268a 12,764 40,810
27,336
21,285
12,042
9,314
b
c
WEO - STEPS
33,161 24,941 20,944 14,165
11,894 36,251
24,403
19,072
10,907
8,489
WEO - CPS
52,699 39,469 33,055 22,225
18,618 59,121
39,851d 31,178
17,888e 13,950
Mercure/STEPS
7,240
5,527
4,665
3,142
2,611
8,113
5,057
3,710
1,708f
1,141
Source: Author’s calculations (see text for details on data sources).
a
Uses method from this paper (identical to results in Section 2.4.2)
b
Method analogous to Lewis (2014)
c
Method analogous to Bauer et al. (2016)
d
Method analogous to Linquiti and Cogswell (2016)
e
Method analogous to Nelson et al. (2014) (they use a slightly lower discount rate at 8%)
f
Method analogous to Mercure et al. (2018)
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Table 2.14: Wealth losses from stranded oil and gas reserves for alternate
production decline curves (2018 US$, B=Billion)
Production decline curve 2 °C
1.5 °C
Exponential with 8%
decline
$11,431 B
$13,434 B
Exponential with 10%
decline
$11,628 B
$13,754 B
Hyperbolic with 20% initial
decline (B=0.5)
$11,759 B
$14,041 B
Hyperbolic with 30% initial
decline (B=0.5)
$12,006 B
$14,513 B
Source: Author’s calculations based on results from Table 2.7 and production decline curves described in
Appendix B.

Table 2.15: Wealth losses from stranded reserves under a permanent decrease in
demand from COVID-19 (2018 US$, B=Billion)
2 °C
1.5 °C
Stranded oil + gas reserves
$8,573 B
$10,699 B
Stranded oil reserves
$7,313 B
$8,182 B
Stranded gas reserves
$1,260 B
$2,517 B
Stranded coal reserves
$768 B
$1,193 B
Total stranded reserves
$9,341 B
$11,892 B
Source: Author’s calculations (see text for details).
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CHAPTER 3
ECONOMICS AND CLIMATE JUSTICE ACTIVISM: ASSESSING THE
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT

3.1 Introduction
We know from climate science that humanity faces a potentially existential threat
resulting from climate change. The single most important task that needs to be achieved to
stabilize the climate is to dramatically reduce emissions of CO2 generated through burning
fossil fuels—oil, coal, and natural gas—to produce energy. Climate change cannot be
entirely blamed on we humans consuming oil, coal, and natural gas to generate energy. But
people consuming fossil fuels for energy can be blamed for about 80% of the problem.
This reality raises the urgent question: what are the most effective ways to
transform the global economy away from its ongoing dependency on fossil fuels?
Throughout the world, a wide range of policy approaches have been debated and, to a lesser
extent, implemented. These include regulations to limit CO2 emissions from various
sources; subsidies to support investments in both energy efficiency and clean renewable
energy sources such as solar and wind power; and putting a price on CO2 emissions through
taxation or a carbon cap. Such measures are having positive impacts where they are being
implemented, but not nearly to the extent necessary to reverse the persistent rise of global
CO2 emissions.
This becomes clear from considering the most recent October 2018 report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the most authoritative global
organization advancing climate change research. The October 2018 report emphasized the
importance of limiting the increase in global mean temperatures to 1.5 °C above pre124

industrial levels by 2100 as opposed to its previous primary target of 2 °C. The IPCC has
now concluded that limiting the global mean temperature increase to 1.5 °C rather than 2
°C will have major impacts in terms of diminishing the negative impacts of climate change.
These include the risks of heat extremes, heavy precipitation, droughts, sea level rise,
biodiversity losses, and corresponding impacts on health, livelihoods, food security, water
supply, and human security. The IPCC concludes that to achieve the 1.5 °C maximum
global mean temperature increase target as of 2100, global net CO2 emissions will have to
fall by about 45% as of 2030 and reach net zero emissions by 2050.59
These highly challenging 2030 and 2050 emissions reduction goals stand in sharp
contrast with the current trajectory for global CO2 emissions. Thus, according to the 2019
forecast by the International Energy Agency, if current global economic and energy
consumption patterns prevail through 2040, global CO2 emissions will not fall at all, but
rather rise from the current level of about 33 billion metric tons to 41 billion tons (IEA
2019, 680-681). If this is the actual situation in 2040, then there would be virtually no
chance to bring global emissions down to net zero, or any figure close to that, by 2050.60
Clearly, much more effective interventions are urgently needed to successfully drive down
CO2 emissions both in the US and globally.
Beginning in 2011, climate activists, primarily in the US and Western Europe but
also elsewhere in the world, have advanced divestment campaigns against private fossil
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The precise wording of the IPCC’s assessment is as follows:

In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5 degrees, global net anthropogenic
CO2 emissions decline by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030 (40-60 percent interquartile
range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045-2055 interquartile range) (IPCC 2018b, 14).
60

The IEA forecasting model extents only to 2040. The formal analysis in this paper remains
within the parameters of the IEA forecast.
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fuel corporations, such as Exxon/Mobil, Chevron, and Cloud Peak Energy, as one strategy
for strengthening the necessary global decarbonization project. These divestment
campaigns entail that all entities that own stocks or bonds in private fossil fuel corporations
sell these assets. The fossil fuel divestment campaigns are roughly modeled on earlier such
campaigns around ending apartheid in South Africa and opposing the sale of tobacco
products.
The divestment campaigns have aimed to inflict damage on fossil fuel corporations
through two channels. The first is to stigmatize them—to eliminate what has been termed
their “social license to operate”—through forcefully establishing the culpability of these
corporations as contributing to and profiting from the climate crisis. The second is to
undermine their financial operations by weakening their prospects as profitable enterprises.
In this paper, our focus is on analyzing this second purpose of the movement. More
specifically, we ask these questions: (1) To what extent have divestment campaigns
succeeded to date in inflicting financial damage on fossil fuel corporations; and (2) What
is the likelihood that they can succeed in this aim moving forward? Our examination
includes an analysis of the available descriptive data on global divestment patterns, an
estimation of the level of divested fossil fuel stocks and bonds, and an econometric
modeling exercise that evaluates the impact of divestment events on the stock market prices
of fossil fuel companies. Our overarching conclusion from examining the evidence brought
together in this paper is that divestment campaigns have not been successful in inflicting
significant economic damage on fossil fuel corporations and are not likely to do so in the
future.
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In reaching these conclusions, we recognize that, in the early phases of the
divestment movement, such economic impacts were a secondary focus of the campaigns,
with the primary purpose being to turn public opinion against the fossil fuel corporations
through stigmatization. But it is also the case that the goal of directly imposing economic
costs on the corporations has become increasingly significant to the movement over time.
Here is the perspective, as of December 2018, of Bill McKibben, one of the founders and
ongoing leaders of the movement, in an article titled “At Last, Divestment is Hitting the
Fossil Fuel Industry Where It Hurts”:
At first we thought our biggest effect would be to rob fossil fuel companies of their
social license. Since their political lobbying power is about all what prevents
governments taking serious action on global warming, that would have been worth
the fight As time went on, though, it became clear that divestment was about
squeezing the industry.
McKibben argues that the movement has indeed succeeded in “squeezing the
industry.” He cites as evidence that Peabody Coal stated in its 2016 bankruptcy
proceedings that the divestment movement had been a factor weakening its capacity to
raise funds on financial markets, and that Shell Oil stated in 2018 that the divestment
movement represented a “material risk” to its business.
This same perspective is advanced in other major outlets of the divestment
movement. Thus, the GoFossilFree.org website states the following:
The campaign began in an effort to stigmatize the Fossil Fuel Industry—the
financial impact was secondary to the socio-political impact. But now, with trillions
of USD of assets under management divesting, and more commitments flowing in
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all the time, money is moving. We have a responsibility and an opportunity to ask
ourselves how moving the money itself (and not just the fight to move it) can help
us usher forth our vision (GFF n.d.).
It is true that not all proponents of the divestment movement hold the view that the
financial impacts of the movement are significant. For example, Gunningham (2017)
argues that:
The movement is fully aware that divestment of holdings in fossil fuels by the main
institutional targets of the campaign is unlikely to have much, if any, short-term
effect on the valuations of fossil fuel companies themselves. In any event, other,
less ethically concerned investors will snap up the divested shares…. These matters,
however, are of little concern to the movement because it views pressuring
vulnerable institutional investors as primarily a vehicle through which to achieve
its main goal(s); raising awareness of the climate change crisis and of the role
played by fossil fuel extracting companies in precipitating it, and labeling these
companies as morally reprehensible (311).
Gunningham’s position is significant in articulating the primary motivations of
some divestment activists. But for the present discussion, we will work from the current
perspectives of the leading proponents of the divestment movement that we have cited
above, i.e., those who do regard “squeezing the industry” as a major goal of the movement
at present. As such, it is appropriate to evaluate systematically the extent to which the
movement has, in fact, succeeded in “squeezing the industry.” If we conclude from a
systematic review of evidence that the divestment movement has not been successful in
inflicting significant economic damage on the fossil fuel industry, it would then be
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appropriate for the climate movement to shift its focus towards alternative approaches to
phasing out the fossil fuel industry.
In raising such issues, our purpose is certainly not merely to criticize the divestment
movement. To the contrary, we recognize several important contributions of the
movement. To begin with, the divestment movement has been a critical vehicle through
which activists have been able to fight for goals that can be clearly articulated and achieved
within the institutions and communities in which they work and live, as opposed to
attempting to influence public policies where the decision-making process is more remote.
Divestment campaigns also have a demonstrated record of success in forcing climate
change into mainstream public debates—on college campuses, in religious institutions as
well as at the levels of municipal and state governments.61 In turn, these activities have
galvanized and trained a new generation of climate activists.
At the same time, as the IPCC’s October 2018 report makes clear, we face
formidable hard deadlines to achieve dramatic reductions in global CO2 emissions (IPCC
2018b). We therefore have no choice but to prioritize political actions and policy
interventions that are capable of contributing to driving down fossil fuel consumption and
CO2 emissions as much as possible and as rapidly as possible. Correspondingly, we need
to shift focus and energy away from strategies that are less likely to contribute significantly
to driving down CO2 emissions significantly and rapidly.
The overall structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides
general background on the fossil fuel divestment movement and financial conditions for
fossil fuel companies as they relate to the questions at hand. Section 3.3 reviews the
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See Schifeling and Hoﬀman (2017).
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relevant literature as a framework through which we can then most effectively focus our
own empirical analyses. Section 3.4 presents a range of descriptive evidence on global
divestment activity. In Section 3.5, we present our econometric analysis as to how major
fossil fuel divestment events have affected stock market prices of fossil fuel firms. Section
3.6 offers some concluding observations, including brief observations on alternative
strategies for advancing the global climate stabilization project.

3.2 Background on the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement
The first fossil fuel divestment campaign began in October of 2011 at Swarthmore
College, a small elite liberal arts college outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Swarthmore 2012). While ultimately unsuccessful in forcing the college to divest, the
Swarthmore campaign caught the attention of other environmentalists, including the wellknown environmental journalist, activist, and co-founder of 350.org, Bill McKibben.
Following McKibben’s publication of a 2012 article in Rolling Stone titled “Global
Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” the fossil fuel divestment movement gained major
momentum. McKibben’s article argued that, in order for global CO2 emissions to fall
sufficiently to stabilize the climate, 80% of all existing proven oil, gas and coal reserves
will have to remain in the ground. That is, these fossil fuel assets cannot be used to generate
energy if climate stabilization is a serious goal. McKibben reached the logical conclusion
that the value of these assets for both the public and private entities which own them will
have to fall to zero. While the exact level of fossil fuel reserves that must remain in the
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ground is up for debate, McKibben’s general thesis that most reserves must remain in the
ground is consistent with a range of evidence.62
The McKibben article generated huge interest, becoming the most widely read
article in Rolling Stone’s history (Hopke and Hestres 2017). Building from this response,
350.org, the climate justice organization that McKibben helped to found and lead, began
mobilizing divestment campaigns widely. Within five months of the publication of
McKibben’s article, the movement had spread to more than 150 college campuses and
continued to expand further from there (Bagley 2012). As of 5 September 2018, institutions
across 37 countries including religious institutions, municipal and state-level governments,
pension funds as well as colleges and universities—had committed to some form of fossil
fuel divestment (Arabella 2018).
As McKibben himself pointed out in the passage we quoted in our introduction, the
movement began increasingly to focus on the goal of inflicting financial damage on fossil
fuel corporations as divestment campaigns spread. Divestment activists pointed to the
trillions of dollars in “assets under management”—i.e., the total value of assets held across
all industries—by entities that had divested themselves to some degree from their fossil
fuel holdings. Despite this, the process through which divestment activity would inflict
significant economic damage on fossil fuel corporations remained an open question.
Indeed, as we consider in detail below, it is not clear that “assets under management” is a
reliable metric as to the actual scope of the divestment movement.
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McKibben uses Leaton (2011) for his analysis. For an updated version, see Leaton et al. (2013).
Other literature conﬁrming the general thesis that most fossil fuel reserves must stay in the ground to
stabilize the climate includes McGlade and Ekins (2015), Heede and Oreskes (2016), and Meinshausen et
al. (2009), among others. The carbon budget included in the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) also supports this thesis (IPCC 2018b).
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These are the issues at hand. Ethically motivated owners of fossil fuel stocks and
bonds certainly have the power to sell these assets as a statement of principle and act of
protest. Equally significantly, the public debates that are central to all such divestment
campaigns have demonstrated their ability to raise awareness of the climate crisis and to
inspire increasing numbers of people to join the climate justice movement. Nevertheless,
these accomplishments significant as they are—will still have no direct impact on the
operations of the fossil fuel corporations as long as investors who are profit-seekers, as
opposed to being motivated ethically, are willing to purchase the stocks and bonds that
ethically motivated divestors have been put up for sale. At the very least, the direct impacts
of the core divestment strategy of selling fossil fuel assets remain an open question until
one also evaluates who will be purchasing these for-sale divested assets and under what
circumstances.
It is a truism that profit-seeking investors will continue to purchase these divested
fossil fuel assets as long as they can profit from them. Their profit opportunities will not
be diminished through the divestment-led sales per se. This is because divestment per se
does not affect either the cost structure of the corporations’ productive operations or the
goods markets in which consumers buy energy. In other words, divestments are capable of
exerting a direct impact on the financial market valuation only of fossil fuel companies,
not their sales on goods markets or their production cost structure. But still further, it is
also likely that any such impacts on financial market valuations will be minimal as long as
profit-seeking investors continue to see profit opportunities in owning oil, gas, and coal
stocks.
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The critical question then becomes: What can succeed in cutting into the
profitability of fossil fuel corporations? The short answer to this question includes the
following: policies that raise the costs of producing and consuming fossil fuels, such as a
carbon tax; regulations that establish tight and binding limits on allowable emissions; and
various sorts of subsidies and supports for energy efficiency and clean renewable energy
as viable substitutes for fossil fuel energy. Such policies raise the costs of both producing
and consuming fossil fuel energy, and lower the costs of substituting energy efficiency and
clean renewable energy for fossil fuels. The profitability of firms producing and selling oil,
coal and natural gas will decline as a result, while opportunities for clean energy will
correspondingly rise.
The coal industry is an obvious case-in-point for understanding what effects
profitability in the fossil fuel industry. Coal companies in the US and elsewhere have faced
direct challenges to their profitability for decades. The emergence of low-cost natural gas
supplies extracted through fracking, and, increasingly through low-cost wind and solar
power,63 has created viable substitutes for coal as a raw material in generating electricity.
Coal companies have been further burdened by environmental regulations that have raised
their production costs. The competition created by low-cost substitutes has prevented the
coal companies from passing on their increased regulatory costs to consumers through
raising consumer prices. The coal companies’ profits have consequently been squeezed.
These companies are now mostly generating losses. Profit-seeking investors have moved
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E.g., for a comparison of levelized costs of electricity generation between coal, natural gas, and
renewable sources, see EIA (2019) and IRENA (2018).
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out of coal, and share prices have fallen. By contrast, oil and gas companies have generally
not faced challenges to their profitability at a comparable scale.64
We can obtain a sense of these broad patterns in Table 3.1, which provides evidence
on net income between 2012 and 2015 for the five largest U.S. oil/gas and coal companies,
respectively. As the table shows, there are large variations in the profitability of the
individual companies, both in oil/gas and coal. But the overall patterns are clear. Over
2012-2015, the largest oil/gas companies earned a total of $203.8 billion in net income
while the largest coal companies lost $17.2 billion. Moreover, Peabody Energy, Arch Coal
and Alpha Coal have all been in and out of bankruptcy in recent years. Coal-fired power
plants have also been shutting down steadily, despite pledges of support from the Trump
Administration (Campbell and Lustig 2018).
In short, the simple logic of a fossil fuel divestment campaign suggests that it is not
likely to produce a major impact on the operations of fossil fuel companies, much less
produce significant reductions in CO2 emissions. The coal industry is in a steady trajectory
of decline, but the divestment movement is not likely to have impacted this trend
significantly.
We address these issues more formally in the next three sections, first through
reviewing the existing literature on the relevant questions, then presenting our own
empirical findings and analysis.

We recognize, of course, that during the ﬁrst half of 2020, the market value of oil and gas
companies collapsed. For example, the combined value of U.S. companies fell by nearly 50% from January
to April, from $1.27 trillion to $700 billion. This was due ﬁrst to the price war between Russia and Saudi
Arabia, but still more, to the global economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. But the
market value of the private oil and gas corporations is likely to return to something like their early 2020
levels once a recovery from the COVID crisis takes hold. As of this writing (May 2020), we cannot know
when that recovery will commence.
64
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3.3 Literature Review
The relevant research literature and journalistic reporting on divestment covers
three broad topics: (1) estimates of amount of fossil fuel assets that have been divested; (2)
financial impacts of divestments; and (3) indirect impacts through generating public
debates. We consider these in turn.
3.3.1 Total Amount of Fossil Fuel Assets Divested
Efforts at measuring the scope of the divestment movement have mainly focused
on the “assets under management” of the entities that have committed to divestment to
some extent—that is, the total amount of assets held by these entities across all industries
and classes of financial assets. A 2018 report by Arabella Advisors (which follows from
similar earlier reports) finds that “nearly 1,000 institutional investors with $6.24 trillion in
assets have committed to divest from fossil fuels, up from $52 billion four years ago—an
increase of 11,900 percent” (1). To be sure, this figure for assets under management is large
in absolute dollar terms, and the growth in the amount of assets under management held by
divesting entities was indeed rapid from 2014 to 2018. Still, a more relevant measure for
assessing the impact of divestments would be the total amount of assets that have actually
been divested from fossil fuel companies, as distinct from all the other assets held by the
divesting entities. To our knowledge, a 2016 news article by Carrington is the only
published estimate of this figure. Carrington recognizes that “it is often difficult to calculate
the precise proportion of fossil fuel investments in complex funds,” but nevertheless reports
the figure of divested fossil fuel assets to be about $400 billion as of 2016.65 However, he
offers no explanation as to how he derived this figure.

Carrington’s article more generally is summarizing the ﬁndings of the December 2016 report by
Arabella Advisors, “The Global Fossil Fuel Divestment and Clean Energy Investment Movement”
65
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3.3.2 Financial Impact of Divestments
Some recent studies and news stories show that divestment actions have had a
negative impact on the financial market valuation of fossil fuel companies. As one
prominent example, Dordi and Weber (2019) analyzed the impact of 24 fossil fuel
divestment commitments, endorsements, and campaigns between 2012 and 2015 on fossil
fuel share prices. Their primary methodology is econometric analysis, and specifically an
“event study.” With this approach, they aim to formally measure the extent to which fossil
fuel share prices may respond to specific divestment “events.” The events Dordi and Weber
analyze include 13 announcements of divestment pledges, 5 endorsements of the
divestment movement, and the launching of 6 divestment campaigns. Dordi and Weber
conclude that these events have produced negative impact on fossil fuel share prices,
writing that “Our results suggest that prominent divestment announcements have a
statistically significant negative impact on the price of fossil fuel shares” (14).
In fact, however, Dordi and Weber’s results actually show that the effects they
observe are very short-term, modest, and inconsistent. Thus, in terms of one-day impacts
only, they find that only 14 of the 24 events registered any statistically significant impacts
on fossil fuel share prices, with 10 of the 24 events exerting no statistically significant
effect even on the day of the event itself. Moreover, the impact of 8 of the 24 events on
one-day share prices was positive, as opposed to the expected negative effect. When Dordi
and Weber allow for a longer 10-day time period for measuring the impact of the various

https://www.arabellaadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Global_Divestment_Report_ 2016.pdf. In
2013, Ansar et al. provided a very wide range for an upper limit ﬁgure for the total amount of fossil fuel
assets, at between $360 and $900 billion. But they also cautioned that even this broad estimate was itself
preliminary.
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events, they then find that only 8 of the 24 total events exerted any statistically significant
impact on fossil fuel share prices. That is, 16 of the 24 events—fully two-thirds of their
sample—exerted no statistically significant impact within the 10-day time frame.
Moreover, with the 10-day impact analysis, 11 of the 24 events exerted a positive impact
on share prices.
In order to assess the longer-term impacts of divestment, Dordi and Weber present
a graph comparing fossil fuel share prices with the MSCI All-Country World Index over a
260-day event window. However, as the authors concede, “This study cannot make any
inference to the long-term effect (10+ days) of divestment due to confounding effects”
(Dordi and Weber 2019, 15). As we demonstrate in section 3.5, the most important of these
confounding effects is likely to be movements in the price of crude oil. Crude oil prices
fell sharply in 2014 and 2015, two of the four years in their period of study.66
A final problem with Dordi and Weber’s model is that the 24 events they analyze
are not representative of the divestment movement as it has developed since 2011. This is
because their data sample is limited to events that occurred between 2012 and 2015. As
such, their model does not incorporate the largest divestment commitments, which have
occurred after 2015.67
A distinct but related issue in terms of assessing the financial impact of divestment
campaigns is evaluating how rates of return for investors may be affected through
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See a time series of the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price at
https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart.
67

In terms of more anecdotal evidence, Davies (2019) reported in a news story that the market
value of ﬁve UK-based oil companies decreased by about 3% on the day that Norway’s sovereign wealth
fund divested from upstream oil and gas companies. But we do not have evidence as to how long these
stock prices remained at this lower level.
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eliminating fossil fuel stocks from their portfolios. Trinks et al. (2018) provide the most
comprehensive analysis on this question. They compare the financial performance of fossil
fuel free portfolios with unconstrained portfolios using U.S. stock market data from 1927
to 2016. They find that “fossil fuel divestment has not significantly impaired financial
performance of investment portfolios.” They explain their result as follows:
The absence of diversification costs from divestment can be explained by the fact
that fossil fuel company stocks have thus far not outperformed other stocks on a
risk-adjusted basis and only provide relatively limited diversification benefits. We
find that fossil fuel stocks are more or less substitutes for the market index (747).
Trinks et al. do also make clear that, according to their results, the returns on a
fossil-free portfolio are not higher than an unconstrained portfolio. This result contradicts
the findings of Hunt and Weber (2018) who do show that, over 2011-2015 for the Canadian
stock index TSX 260, the risk-adjusted returns on a fossil fuel free portfolio are higher than
an unconstrained portfolio. The primary factor explaining the difference between the two
sets of results is the respective time periods under consideration. Trinks et al. explain that
the “underperformance of fossil fuel stocks in the most recent period (2011-2016) can be
attributed mainly to the oil price shock in that time period.”68
3.3.3 Indirect Impacts through Public Debates
A key study here is that by Schifeling and Hoffman (2017). Similar to
Gunningham’s position that we cited above, Schifeling and Hoffman acknowledge that the

Bergman (2018) presents another discussion of the ﬁnancial impact of divestment actions on
fossil fuel companies, within a broader context of impacts on policy environment and public discourse.
Bergman concludes that “the direct impacts of divestment are small,” but he holds that the “indirect
impacts, in terms of public discourse shift, are signiﬁcant.” His discussion on direct ﬁnancial impacts is
brief and does not include a systematic review of evidence.
68
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divestment campaigns were never likely to have a significant effect on the financial
operations of fossil fuel companies. Nevertheless, Schifeling and Hoffman argue that the
indirect effects have been substantial. Using a dataset of more than 42,000 articles from
nearly 300 newspapers spanning 2011-2015, they found that, as a result of the divestment
movement, “radical” issues (e.g., carbon bubble, unburnable carbon) moved closer to the
mainstream, and “liberal” issues (e.g., carbon tax, mitigation) moved into the mainstream.
They write,
Although the divestment campaign chose an objective that is largely impossible to
fulfill, as divestment will not likely undermine the valuations of fossil fuel
companies, this objective also provided leverage to expand the boundaries of the
public debate and enhance the position of progressive issues (17).
Overall, we can conclude from the relevant literature that the divestment movement
has certainly been successful in raising public consciousness around climate change. But
beyond this, we have found no reliable evidence to date as to the actual amount of fossil
fuel assets that have been divested, as opposed to the total assets under management of the
divesting entities. We also have only sketchy evidence from the literature as to any possible
impacts of divestment activity on the financial conditions of fossil fuel companies. We do
see substantial evidence that investors will not experience losses through holding a fossil
fuel divested portfolio. This result can be used to support divestment campaigns. But it still
does not follow that divestment activity can succeed in inflicting significant financial
damage on the private fossil fuel corporations. This is because fossil fuel corporations will
still maintain their capacity to earn profits from selling oil, coal, and natural gas to generate
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energy, and profit-oriented investors will still be able to purchase fossil fuel company
stocks from the ethically motivated investors and earn favorable returns from these stocks.
We now turn to examining a range of empirical evidence that will enable us to
evaluate these issues more systematically.

3.4 Descriptive Evidence on Global Divestment Activity
Our starting point for estimating global divestment levels among all entities is the
valuable dataset produced by GoFossilFree.org (GFF). GFF is a project of 350.org, serving
as a major website providing information on the divestment movement, including all
available data on divestment commitments. The GFF dataset includes information for each
entity that has either already divested or has committed to divest its portfolio of fossil fuel
assets. These entities include asset management firms, pension funds, religious institutions,
educational institutions, and government bodies such as municipalities (primarily in
France). The information provided by GFF includes: the home countries of each entity; the
total assets under management at the time of the divestment commitment; and the extent
of the divestment commitment.
As an initial matter, it is critical to be clear on the distinction between the assets
under management of an entity committed to divestment and the actual level of divestment
by that entity. As an example, CalPERS (the California Public Employees Retirement
System) manages the largest public pension fund in the United States. It has about $350
billion in assets under management as of February 2018. On 8 October 2015, CalPERS
committed to divest its coal holdings of $83 million. Thus, its level of divestment out of
coal, at $83 million, amounts to about 0.02% of its total assets under management.
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It is equally important to be clear on distinctions in terms of divestment
commitments levels among various entities, since these commitment levels do vary
significantly. We list different commitment levels in Table 3.2. As we see there, we divide
commitment levels into two broad categories, “limited” and “full” divestment
commitments. Under limited commitments, we include three more specific categories—
divestment from (1) coal only; (2) coal and tar sands only; and (3) some other mix of fossil
fuel divestments, such as coal plus some natural gas, or (as is often the case) a limited
portion of coal companies. Under full divestment commitments, we include entities that
have either: (1) already fully divested themselves of all their fossil fuel holdings; or (2)
formally committed to doing so.
The GFF database includes some ambiguities and gaps which we have addressed
to the extent possible. First, GFF states that all of the divestment commitments that it
reports in its dataset are ‘binding.’ But we found that not all commitments are in fact
binding. For example, city councils of some municipalities have voted to divest. But the
final decision to sell off fossil fuel assets rests with the fund managers, not the council
itself. We were also unable to consistently establish whether some entities have already
divested, are in the process of divesting, or have yet to initiate the asset sale process.
Additionally, for some entities, figures for commitment dates, commitment levels, and
amount of assets under management are unavailable.
We have referenced additional sources beyond the GFF to fill in the data gaps to
the extent possible.69 Specifically, we obtained additional information on both the level of
divestment commitment as well as total assets under management for two sets of large

69

These references are documented in detail in Appendix 1.
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entities within the overall GFF database. These are: (1) entities with assets under
management of $1 billion or more that have made full divestment commitments; and (2)
entities with assets under management of $90 billion or more that have made limited
divestment commitments.
3.4.1 Composition of Divesting Entities
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics on entities in the GFF dataset that have
divested at any commitment level as of 26 March 2018. As the table shows, there are a
total of 796 entities in this dataset. Of these 796 entities, we have figures on assets under
management for a total of 480 of them, i.e., 60.3% of the entities listed by GFF. From the
available data, we assess that the remaining 316 entities, for which we do not have figures
on assets under management, hold insignificant amounts of assets under management. 70
Even in the aggregate, the level of assets under management for all 249 entities is modest,
almost certainly less than $15 billion.71
Focusing on the 480 entities for which we do have data on assets under
management, the total assets under management for these entities, as we show in Table 3.3,
amounts to $6.5 trillion.72 But, critically, we also see in Table 3.3 that total assets under
management are highly concentrated in a small number of the overall pool of 480 entitles.
Specifically, 15 entities—only 1.9% of the 796 entities with some known level of

70

The one exception among this group of entities would be the city of Paris. But data on assets
under management for Paris are unavailable. Moreover, the extent of the divestment commitment by Paris
remains unclear as of this writing.
71
Median assets under management are $35.7 million. Multiply this by the 316 entities gives us
$11.3 bil- lion. However, this is likely an overestimate based on the types of entities represented among the
316 entities (e.g., disproportionate number of small churches and municipalities).
72

Our estimate is consistent with Arabella Advisors (2018), who provide a slightly lower estimate
of $6.24 trillion as of 5 September 2018.
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divestment commitment—account for $5.7 trillion of the $6.5 trillion of assets under
management that we can identify. That is, these 15 entities account for about 88% of all
the assets under management among the 480 entities that GFF has identified as having
taken some divestment action and for which assets under management data are available.
Only one of these entities (the New York City pension fund system) committed to full
divestment, leaving 14 entities with limited commitments accounting for 85% of the $6.5
trillion in assets under management.
Working from these figures in Table 3.3, we can usefully divide all divesting
entities into three broad categories:
1. The 14 largest entities with limited commitment levels, which account for roughly
85% of all assets under management among divesting entities.
2. The remaining smaller entities—aside from the 14 largest entities—committed to
limited divestment levels.
3. All entities committed to full divestment levels.
3.4.1.1 The 14 Largest Divestment Entities with Limited Commitments
Table 3.4 lists the 14 largest global entities that have made limited divestment
commitments. The table shows both the level of assets under management for these entities
and their divestment commitment levels. As noted above, all of these entities have made
limited divestment commitments only, some specifics of which we present in Table 3.4.
For all of these entities, the figures on assets under management come directly
either from the GFF database or other published sources. For the figures on divestment
levels, the figures come from other published sources for 9 of the 14 entities. With five of
the entities—Aegon, Aviva, Lloyd’s, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, and Swiss Reinsurance
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Company—no published data were available on divestment commitment levels. We
therefore extrapolated figures for these five entities based on data for the other 9 divesting
entities.73
As Table 3.4 shows, the entity with the largest divestment commitment is the
Government Pension Fund Global. This is a Norwegian sovereign wealth fund that was
created to manage the country’s oil revenues, with total assets under management
amounting to $890 billion at the time of the divestment commitment (5 June 2015). Their
total divestment, which is for coal only, is $9 billion, i.e., 1% of their total assets under
management. The next largest divesting entity is AXA Investment Managers (IM), a
French asset management firm. The total assets under management by AXA IM were $782
billion at the time of the divestment commitment (25 April 2017). Their divestment
commitment was for $209 million, i.e., about 0.03% of their total assets under
management. AXA IM’s level of commitment was a coal-only divestment.
Overall, we estimate the total funds divested from the 14 largest divesting entities
to be $21.7 billion.74 This amounts to roughly 0.4% of their total assets under management.
The level of their divestment commitments ranges between 0.01% and 1.17% of their assets
under management.

73
Appendix 1, again, provides full references to our data sources. Appendix 2 describes our
extrapolation methods.

After compiling our data, on 8 March 2019 Norway’s sovereign wealth fund committed to
divest an estimated $7.5 billion from upstream oil and gas companies (a small portion of their total
investments in oil/gas companies), beyond their original coal divestment displayed in Table 3.4 (Davies
2019). This was not part of the divestment movement, but was instead done for economic reasons (reducing
risk expo74

sure to a permanent decline in oil prices). Even if we did include this additional $7.5 billion, it
would not change our overall results.
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3.4.1.2 Smaller Entities with Limited Divestment Commitments
As we show in Table 3.5, there are a total of 94 entities in this category of entities
with limited divestment commitments. These smaller divesting entities control a total of
$675 billion under management. We do not have direct figures on the extent of total coal
and tar sands stocks for which they had divested. But to approximate, we assume that the
pre-divestment portfolio of these firms is the same as that for the 9 large firms listed in
Table 3.4 for which we do have data. That overall level of holdings was 0.43% of the total
portfolio. We therefore assume that the level of divestment for these entitles is 0.43% of
their total assets under management. This implies that the level of limited divestments by
these firms amounts to $2.9 billion.
3.4.1.3 Entities with Full Divestment Commitments
Table 3.6 presents figures on these entities. As we see, most of the entities in the
GFF dataset—671 of 796 in total—are committed at this full divestment level. Of those
671 entities, we have asset information on 372 of them. The assets under management for
these firms amount to $290 billion, i.e., only 3.2% of the total assets under management
for both the limited and full divestment entities. Moreover, of these entities with full
divestment commitments, two of them—New York City pension funds and MP Pension
Fund—manage $208 billion, or 71.3% of the total assets under management for entities
committed to full divestment. These two entities have committed to divesting $5.2 billion
from fossil fuels.
Using data on the fossil fuel industry’s share of the global stock market (see
Appendix E), we estimate the total funds divested from the other 371 entities fully divesting
to be $6.3 billion. That amounts to a total of $11.5 billion for all entities that have divested
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fully, including the $5.2 billion from New York City and MP Pension Fund as well as the
$6.3 billion from all other fully divesting entities.
3.4.1.4 Summary of Descriptive Evidence
As we have seen, the data we have been able to compile on global fossil fuel
divestment activity are incomplete. In particular, we have data on assets under management
for only about 60% of all entities listed in the GFF database. Of these entities, we have
documented data on divestment levels for only 11 entities in total. However, these 11
entities do account for roughly 63% of all assets under management for all divesting
entities. We are also confident that our methods of estimating divestment levels for the
remaining firms are broadly reliable. Our basic approach is to assume that the levels of
fossil fuel asset holdings prior to divestment for the divesting entities broadly match the
fossil fuel asset holdings for all entities in global financial markets.
Based on the data we have compiled and estimated on assets under management
and divestment levels, the main patterns we observe are as follows:
1. Virtually all of the entities that have committed to divestment at any level are very
small, as measured by assets under management.
2. Most of the entities are committed at full divestment levels. But here as well,
virtually all of the entities committed to full divestment are small.
3. Fifteen large entities dominate the overall pool of divesting entities, as measured
both directly by assets under management, and, through our estimations, by levels
of divestment. Moreover, all but one of these 15 large entities have made only
limited divestment commitments.
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Table 3.7 summarizes the estimates we have derived for overall levels of
divestment. As we see in Panel A of Table 3.7, we estimate that total divestment
commitments as of March 2018 amount to $36.1 billion. Of this total, $21.7 billion, or
about 60%, are the divestments committed by the 14 largest entities with limited
divestment commitments.
In Panel B, we show these divestment commitment levels as a share of the market
value of fossil fuel assets in all global financial markets, using figures from 2014. As we
see, the $24.6 billion in limited divestment commitments, including the commitments of
both the 14 largest entities and the 94 smaller entities, amounts to 10.6% of the $233 billion
in total market value for global coal corporations. The full divestment commitments of
$11.5 billion amount to 0.2% of total market value for all global fossil fuel companies. The
$36.1 billion in total divestment commitments—including all limited and full
commitments—amounts to 0.7% of the total market value of global fossil fuel companies
as of August 2014 (Bullard 2014).75

3.5 Econometric Analysis of Divestment Events
In this section, we conduct time-series econometric analysis to assess the impact of
specific divestment events on the stock market share prices of oil/gas and coal companies,
respectively. Our modeling approach is a standard “events study” methodology.76 The
dependent variables in the regressions are the share prices of the oil/gas and coal

75
We note that entities continue to commit to divest. As of 2 June 2019, GFF estimates total assets
under management to be $8.77 trillion (see www.gofossilfree.org/commitments). We cannot conﬁrm this
amount because we have not cleaned the data since 29 March 2018, but if we extrapolate from our estimate
of $36 billion, this would entail an additional $12 billion, bringing the total to about $48 billion.

The econometrics of event studies in the ﬁnance literature is well summarized in Campbell et al.
(1997), Chapter 4.
76
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companies, measured according to three alternative specifications. In terms of explanatory
variables, we run a first set of regressions with variables that typically influence fossil fuel
share prices. We then run a second set of regressions, in which we add the divestment
events as additional dummy variables in the time series models. Through this approach, we
are able to formally test the extent to which any given divestment event affects fossil fuel
share prices, after controlling for the effects of explanatory variables that are typically
significant. We are also able to measure the extent to which all the divestment events,
considered cumulatively, are influencing fossil fuel share prices.
As we have shown in the previous section, the assets under management of
divesting entities are heavily concentrated in a small number of large entities. Given this,
we are able to concentrate our regression analysis on these largest divestment commitments
to estimate the overall impact of divestments on the share prices of fossil fuel companies.
With respect to oil and gas divestments, the 11 divestment commitments we use in our
event study account for roughly 78% of all assets that have been divested, with the New
York City pension fund system accounting for 65% on its own. With coal, the 12
divestment commitments we use in our event study similarly account for about 78% of all
assets that have been divested.
Our basic model is a single equation:
𝐹𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)𝑡 +
𝛽2 (𝑆&𝑃 500 𝐹𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑡 + ε𝑡
This equation tests how much variation the share prices of either oil/gas or coal
companies are affected by the following:
1. Changes in the market prices of oil/gas or coal respectively in goods markets;
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2. Changes in overall stock market prices exclusive of the fossil fuel share prices; and
3. Any of the 11 divestment events with respect of oil and gas stock holdings or the
12 divestment events of the coal companies.
The specific variables we use in these regression models are as follows:
Oil and Gas Share Price Analysis
1. Fossil Fuel Share Price. We specify this through three data series, running separate
regressions with each data series as the dependent variable:
• The Dow Jones US Oil & Gas Index;
• The Royal Dutch Shell share price;
• The Exxon/Mobil share price.
2. Fossil Fuel Price Index. Two benchmark oil and gas prices in the US—the West
Texas Intermediate oil price and the Henry Hub natural gas price.
3. S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Free Index. This is an S&P stock market index that excludes
all fossil fuel firms, but otherwise incorporates a broad set of 500 publicly listed
corporations.
4. Divestment Events. Dummy variables for the dates of 11 of the largest full
divestment commitments.77 We list these 11 divestment commitment events in
Table 3.8. We include the divestment commitments from Syracuse University and
the Guardian Media Group as one event since they occurred within one day of each
other, i.e., 3/31/15 and 4/1/15.

77

We excluded four divestment commitments because we either did not know the commitment
date, could not verify the commitment from a published source outside of GFF, or the commitment date
was too recent (e.g., MP Pension Fund’s divestment on 26 March 2018 was too recent to include in the
event study).
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Coal Share Price Analysis
1. Fossil Fuel Share Price. We specify this through three data series, again running
separate regressions with each data series as the dependent variable:
• The Dow Jones US Coal Index;
• The Cloud Peak Energy share price;
• The Alliance Resource Partners share price.
2. Fossil Fuel Price Index. We include here four separate coal prices: (1) an
Appalachian price, derived averaging separate prices for Central and Northern
Appalachia; (2) the Illinois Basin price; (3) the Powder River Basin price; and (4)
the Uinta Basin price.78
3. S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Free Index. As described above for the oil/gas regression
variables.
4. Divestment Events. Dummy variables for the dates of 12 of the largest coal
divestment commitments.79 We list these 12 divestment commitments in Table 3.9.
We include the divestment commitments from CalPERS and the California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalStrs) as one event since they occurred on the
same day, 8 October 2015. Similarly, we considered the coal divestments by PFZW
and Allianz Group as one divestment event, since they occurred in consecutive

78
We experimented with diﬀerent combinations of coal prices in the regressions but decided to
keep them all because there was not one single price that could serve adequately as a benchmark.
Moreover, the statistical signiﬁcance of the event dummies was essentially the same across the diﬀerent
combinations.
79

We excluded three divestment commitments because we did not know the commitment date, or
the details surrounding the commitment were ambiguous.
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weeks, 16 November 2015 and 23 November 2015 (coal price data are reported
weekly).
3.5.1 Adjustments with Data and Models
We ran the model using ordinary least squares with heteroskedastic-consistent
standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. Most variables with both sets of data
include stochastic unit roots, as measured by Augmented Dickey Fuller tests. We therefore
converted the variables into stationary series through taking first differences in all cases.
3.5.2 Results of Oil and Gas Share Price Analysis
We show the results for oil and gas share prices in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. There we
report results for 12 separate regressions. In regressions R1-3, we show results for our three
different measures of oil/gas share prices as the dependent variable. For the explanatory
variables in these regressions, we include only the oil goods market price index, and the
S&P 500 fossil free share price index. In regressions R4-6, we then include the natural gas
goods market price index as an explanatory variable. In regressions R7-9, we work with
the same three oil/gas share prices as dependent variables, and we again exclude the natural
gas goods market price as an explanatory variable. But in regressions R7-9, we now include
the 10 divestment events as dummy variables, along with the oil goods market price and
the S&P 500 fossil free index. In regressions R10-12, we include the natural gas goods
market price index, along with all the other explanatory variables, including the 10
divestment event dummies.
The results for regressions R1-6, which do not include the divestment dummies, are
consistent. Both the oil goods market price and the S&P 500 fossil free index have large
statistically significant effects on oil/gas share prices, with the anticipated positive signs in
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all 6 regressions. Natural gas goods market prices do not produce any additional
statistically significant explanatory power. The magnitude of the positive effects does vary,
depending on whether the dependent variable is the overall oil/gas share price index or the
specific share prices for Shell and Exxon, respectively. Not surprisingly, the coefficient
values, t-statistics, and R2 values are all much higher with the broad oil/gas share price
index as the dependent variable. When we use the specific share prices for Shell and Exxon
as dependent variables, there will be more firm-specific influences on these share prices
that are not included in our explanatory variables.
In regressions R7-12, we see that adding the 10 divestment event dummies as
explanatory variables does not alter the oil/gas share price in any significant way relative
to what we see in regressions R1-6. That is, the coefficient values for all the divestment
event dummies are either statistically insignificant or, in two cases only, significant at the
5 percent level, but in the theoretically unanticipated positive direction. That is, in
regressions R9 and R12, with the Exxon share price as the dependent variable, the HCF
and CIFF divestment event dummies are statistically significant explanatory variables,
shown to be contributing positively to the Exxon share price. These positive coefficients
are almost certainly capturing some other unspecified influence on Exxon’s share price.
But in any case, we do not have an explanation as to why these divestment events would
contribute toward increasing Exxon’s share price.
With these regressions, we are also able to test whether the divestment events may,
in combination, have had a cumulative impact on oil/gas share prices, even if no single
event has a significant effect. We can test for this possible effect through the F-statistics
for each regression, which are measuring whether the coefficients on all the divestment
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event dummies are statistically significant in combination. In fact, as we see, the F-statistics
for each of the regressions R7-12 are strongly insignificant.
Overall then, the results from regressions R1-12 consistently show that the
divestment events had no negative impact on the share prices for oil/gas firms. Neither the
share prices as measured by the oil/gas price index nor the individual share prices for Shell
or Exxon have been negatively affected by either any single divestment event or by the
combined impact of all the divestment events included in our model.
3.5.3 Coal Share Price Analysis
We present our regression results for the coal share prices in Tables 3.12 and 3.13,
including regressions R13-24. We present these results within a framework similar to that
with the oil/gas regressions. That is, we include three separate dependent variables, the
Dow Jones Coal share price index as well as the share prices for Cloud Peak and Alliance.
Regressions R13-15 include only coal goods market prices and the S&P 500 Fossil Free
price index as explanatory variables. Regressions R16-18 then include both the natural gas
price and oil price in goods markets as additional explanatory variables. We would expect
price increases in oil and gas to positively influence coal share prices, by making coal more
competitive as a substitute energy source.
With regressions R13-18, variation in the coal goods market prices do not influence
coal share prices in any consistent pattern. In most cases, the coefficients on the price
variables are insignificant. The signs are also not consistently positive, as would be
expected. One interpretation of this pattern is that they reflect the general difficulties that
the coal industry has experienced for roughly the past two decades, as we discussed in
Section 3.2. The impact of these broader problems could be frequently exerting greater
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influence on share prices than the positive influences that we would expect commodity
prices to have on share prices.
By contrast, we do see in regressions R13-18 that the S&P 500 Fossil Free Index is
exerting a consistently positive influence on coal share prices. The coal share prices do also
respond positively to increases in both natural gas and oil prices, as expected. These effects
are especially strong with the broader Dow Jones share price index included as the
dependent variable.
As with the oil/gas regressions, we next use the independent variables in regressions
R13-18 as control variables to test whether the coal divestment events provide any
additional explanatory power in the regressions. With these regressions, there is some
modest evidence that coal share prices have been impacted by divestment events, though
not on a consistently negative basis, as we would expect. Thus, we see that the AXA-SA
divestment event in May of 2015 does produce a statistically significant negative effect on
both the Dow-Jones Coal share index and on the Cloud Peak share price. The University
of California divestment event in September of 2009 generates a statistically significant
negative effect on the Cloud Peak and Alliance share prices. Other divestment events in
our model also generate negative coefficients, though none that are statistically significant.
But in addition, the Nordea, Aviva, CalPension, and PFZW/Allianz divestment events all
generate positive coefficients on the dummy variables, though none that are statistically
significant.
The F-statistics measuring the combined effects of all divestment effects on coal
share prices are statistically significant, indicating that the divestment events are having a
measurable cumulative impact on coal share prices. However, because the signs on the
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individual coefficients do not have a consistent pattern—either positive or negative—we
cannot draw an overall conclusion that the divestment events are generating a consistently
negative impact on coal share prices, as we would anticipate theoretically.
The long-term decline in the coal industry, as discussed above, has had a major
negative effect on the share prices of coal firms. Beyond this, we do see some evidence
that the coal divestment events have contributed in some cases to lowering coal share
prices. This evidence is relatively weak and mixed. But it still contrasts with our results for
the oil/gas industry, where we saw no evidence at all that divestment events negatively
impacted share prices.
One major difference with the coal divestments is that, as we have seen, the relative
magnitude of these divestments has been far greater than has been the case with oil and
gas. Specifically, as we saw in Table 3.7, the full divestment events, including oil and gas
divestments, amounted to about 0.2% of the overall market value for oil/gas stocks. The
coal divestments, by contrast, amounted to over 10% of the market value of coal stocks. In
addition, the oil/gas industry has remained broadly profitable while the coal industry has
been experiencing a decline.

3.6 Concluding Considerations
Our empirical investigations in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 lead us to one basic conclusion:
that the fossil fuel divestment movement has not been successful in inflicting significant
economic damage on fossil fuel corporations and is not likely to do so in the future. We
reach this conclusion based on two main sets of findings.
From our analysis of descriptive evidence in Section 3.4, we conclude that total
fossil fuel divestment commitments as of March 2018 amount to $36.1 billion. Of that
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amount, $21.7 billion, or about 60%, are divestments committed by the 14 largest entities.
These 14 entities have made limited divestment commitments only. In particular, they have
not committed to fully divesting from oil and gas stocks. We estimate full divestment
commitments to be about $11.2 billion, equal to about 0.2% of the total market value for
all global fossil fuel companies. The $36.1 billion in total divestment commitments,
including limited as well as full divestment commitments, is equal to roughly 0.7% of the
total market value of all fossil fuel assets.
The econometric analysis we present in Section 3.5 finds that divestment activity
has had no measurable impact on the share prices of oil and gas companies. There is some
evidence that share prices of coal companies have been affected by divestments. But, at
most, such effects have been relatively weak and mixed. This is despite the fact that coal
divestments amounted to over 10% of the market value of coal stocks.
In short, we find no evidence that the divestment movement has succeeded in
“squeezing the industry.” Beyond our own main findings, there is also nothing in the
relevant literature that significantly contradicts our main results. Rather, as we reviewed in
Section 3.3, the empirical evidence to date on the financial impacts of the divestment
movement has been quite limited. Thus, at the very least, the research we present here
provides a more in-depth foundation from which others may also evaluate the financial
impacts of the fossil fuel divestment movement.
Assuming our main findings are at least broadly accurate, these results still do not
gainsay the contributions of the fossil fuel divestment movement. The movement has
succeeded in stigmatizing private fossil fuel corporations for profiting off of the climate
crisis. More broadly, it has also successfully mobilized public opinion and activism around
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climate issues. These accomplishments are significant. Nevertheless, the fact that the
divestment movement is not inflicting economic damage on the fossil fuel corporations
should at least invite consideration of alternative approaches to climate activism that offer
the prospect of significant financial impacts. Such reconsiderations should be seen as
especially appropriate given the urgency for climate activists to focus their commitments
on initiatives that offer the greatest possible likelihood of success.
As a brief concluding observation, we note one such alternative strategy that has
begun to gain support on college and university campuses. That is for activists to demand
that the institutions to which they belong commit to eliminating altogether their own CO2
emissions by 2035, or some other date that falls well within the IPCC’s stipulated climate
stabilization time frame.80 The institutions can choose a range of specific measures for
accomplishing this goal. But fundamentally, meeting the goal will require that the
institutions invest heavily in clean renewable energy sources—primarily solar and wind
power—to eliminate their current dependency on fossil fuels. Correspondingly, they will
also need to invest significantly in measures that can raise energy efficiency levels in their
buildings, equipment, and transportation systems.
Note that through this approach, the financial viability of fossil fuel corporations is
being directly attacked. This is simply because, of course, fossil fuel corporations can
sustain themselves only to the extent that they are able to sell oil, coal, and natural gas as
energy sources. This approach can therefore be seen as effectively amounting to a direct

80

We are aware of activities at our own institution, University of Massachusetts Amherst, as well
as Smith, Amherst, Middlebury and Williams Colleges, the University of California Berkeley, as well as
Vanderbilt, Boston, and Cornell Universities. One of the authors (Pollin) has received much of this
information as a member of the UMass Amherst Carbon Mitigation Task Force.
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consumer boycott on purchasing oil, coal, and natural gas, as opposed to the indirect
approach of impacting the stock market prices of fossil fuel corporations. This direct
consumer boycott approach should also be able to produce impacts similar to divestment
campaigns with respect to stigmatizing fossil fuel corporations.
Of course, the overarching commitment of the climate movement should be to
advancing climate stabilization, not to any particular strategy that may be more or less
effective at advancing this ultimate goal. The research we present here demonstrates
limitations of the divestment movement as a climate stabilization strategy, while also
recognizing the contributions of the movement to date. These results will serve a useful
purpose if they contribute towards the development of still more effective strategies in
behalf of the climate stabilization imperative before us.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Net income for major U.S. oil/gas and coal companies, 20122015
Oil/Gas Companies
◼
Exxon/Mobil
$131.2 billion
◼
Chevron
$71.9 billion
◼
Conoco-Phillips
$19.8 billion
◼
Anadarko
-$5.0 billion
◼
Devon
-$13.7 billion
Oil/Gas Total
$203.8 billion
Coal Companies
◼
Peabody Energy
◼
Arch Coal
◼
Cloud Peak Energy
◼
Alpha Natural Resources
◼
Alliance Resource Partners
Coal Total

-$3.9 billion
-$4.8 billion
$100 million
-$10.1 billion
$1.5 billion
-$17.2 billion

Sources: Pollin and Callaci (2019)

Table 3.2: Commitment levels among divesting
entities
Limited divestment commitments
◼ Coal only
◼ Coal and tar sands only
◼ Partial commitments from varied fossil
fuel assets
Full divestment commitments
◼ Fully divested from all fossil fuel assets
◼ Committed to full divestment
Source: Gofossilfree.org (2018)

159

Table 3.3: Entities at all divestment commitment levels and assets under
management data, as available
Number of
Assets under
Entities
Management
All entities with known
Not available for
commitment types
796
316 entities
480
All entities with Assets
(60.3% of total
under Management Data
$6.5 trillion
entitles)
Largest Entities,
15
$5.7 trillion
with +$90 billion in assets
(1.9% of total
(88.0% of assets
under management
entities)
under management)
Largest Entities (+$90
billion in assets under
14
$5.5 trillion
management) with limited
(1.8% of total
(85% of assets under
commitment levels
entities)
management)
Sources: Gofossilfree.org (2018); Appendix D
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Table 3.4: Largest divesting entities with limited divested commitments

Entity
1.Government
Pension Fund,
Global
2.AXA
Investment
Managers
3.Allianz SE
4.AXA SA
5.Aviva
6.Aegon
7.Lloyd’s
Corporation
8.CalPERS
9.Nordea Asset
Management
10.CalSTRS

11.PFZW
12.Bank J. Safra
Sarasin
13.Swiss
Reinsurance
Company Ltd
14.University of
California
TOTAL

4)Level of
Divestment
Commitment

5) Date of
Divestment
Commitment

6)Divestment
Commitment as
share of Assets
Under
Management
(= column 3/2)

1)Home
Country of
Entity

2) Assets under
Management
(at time of
divestment)

3)Funds
Divested or
Committed
(at time of
divestment)

Norway

$890 billion

$9.0 billion

Coal Only

6/5/2015

1.01%

France
Germany
France
UK
Netherlands

$782 billion
$668 billion
$589 billion
$572 billion
$382 billion

$209 million
$4.38 billion
$590 million
$492 million
$1.64 billion

Coal Only
Coal Only
Coal Only
Coal Only
Coal Only

4/25/2017
11/23/2015
5/22/2015
7/24/2015
5/25/2016

0.03%
0.66%
0.1%
0.09%
0.43%

UK
USA

$378 billion
$289 billion

$1.63 billion
$83 million

Coal Only
Coal Only

11/17/2017
10/8/2015

0.43%
0.03%

Sweden
USA

$228 billion
$186 billion

$100 million
$10 million

1/17/2015
10/8/2015

0.04%
0.01%

Netherlands

$172 billion

$2.01 billion

Coal Only
Coal Only
Partial (100%
coal, 30% other
fossil fuels)

11/16/2015

1.17%

Switzerland

$150 billion

$643 million

Coal Only

3/2017

0.43%

Switzerland

$130 billion

$559 million

2016

0.43%

USA
---

$98 billion
$5.5 trillion

$350 million
21.7 billion

Coal Only
Coal & Tar
Sands
---

9/29/2015
---

0.36%
0.39%

Sources: Gofossilfree.org (2018); Appendices 1 and 2.
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Table 3.5: Smaller entities with limited divestment commitments
Total number of entities
94
Assets under management
$675 billion
Estimated level of divestment
$2.9 billion
Estimated divestment level as
share of assets under management
0.43%
Sources: Gofossilfree.org (2018); Appendices 1 and 2.

Table 3.6: Entities with full divestment commitments
Total number of entities
671
Entities with assets
under management data
Assets under
management for 373
entities with data
Assets under
management for 2
largest entities (NYC
Pension Funds and MP
Pension Fund)
Divestment level of 2
largest entities
Average divestment
level as share of assets
under management for 2
largest entities
Estimated divestment
levels for 371 smaller
entities with asset under
management data
Estimated divestment
level as share of assets
under management for
371 smaller entities
Total divestment level

372

$290 billion

$208 billion
(= 71.8% of assets under
management for entities
with data)

$5.2 billion

2.5%

$6.3 billion

7.7%
$11.5 billion

Sources: Gofossilfree.org (2018); Appendices 1 and 2.
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Table 3.7: Overall level of divestment commitments for all entities with assets under
management data
A) Divestment Commitments
1) Limited Divestment
Commitments
-- 106 entities
◼
14 largest entities
◼
94 smaller entities

$24.6 billion
$21.7 billion
$2.9 billion

3)Full Divestment Commitments
-- 348 entities
2 largest entities
346 smaller entities

$11.5 billion
$5.2 billion
$6.3 billion

Total Divestment Commitments
(= rows 1+5)

$36.1 billion

◼
◼

B) Divestment Commitments as Share of Global Fossil Fuel Assets
-- Global Fossil Fuel Assets at $4.88 trillion as of 2014
$24.6 Billion in Limited Divestment
10.6%
Commitments as share of $233 billion
(=$24.6 billion/$233
Coal Market Value
billion)
$11.5 Billion in Full Divestment
0.2%
Commitments as share of $4.88 trillion
(=$11.5 billion/$4.88
in Total Fossil Fuel Market Value
trillion)
$36.1 Billion in Total Divestment
0.7%
Commitments as share of $4.88 trillion
(= $36.1 billion/$4.88
in Total Fossil Free Market Value
trillion)
Sources: Tables 3.4-3.6; Bullard (2014)
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Table 3.8: List of divestment events for oil & gas study
Entity

1)Home
country of
entity

5) Date of
divestment
commitment

USA

2) Assets
under
management
(at time of
divestment)
$189 billion

NYC Pension
Funds
Oslo
Pensjonsforsikring
Ireland
Children’s
Investment Fund
Foundation
(CIFF)
Amalgamated
Bank
Protestant Church
Hessen-Nassau
Medibank
HCF
London Borough
of Southwark
Pension Fund
Guardian Media
Group
Syracuse
University
TOTAL

Norway

$9.3 billion

10/19/2015

Ireland
UK

$8.5 billion
$4.7 billion

1/27/2017
9/22/2015

USA

$4.0 billion

9/21/2016

Germany

$3.1 billion

11/30/2015

Australia
Australia
UK

$1.9 billion
$1.5 billion
$1.5 billion

11/13/2017
2/9/2017
12/13/2016

UK

$1.2 billion

4/1/2015

USA

$1.2 billion

3/31/2015

---

$226 billion

Sources: Gofossilfree.org (2018); Appendix D
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1/10/2018

---

Table 3.9: List of divestment events for coal study
Entity
1)Home Country of 2) Assets under
Entity
Management
(at time of
divestment)
Government
Norway
$890 billion
Pension Fund,
Global
AXA Investment
France
$782 billion
Managers
Allianz SE
Germany
$668 billion
AXA SA
France
$589 billion
Aviva
UK
$572 billion
Aegon
Netherlands
$382 billion
CalPERS
USA
$289 billion
Nordea Asset
Sweden
$228 billion
Management
NYC Pension
USA
$189 billion
Funds
CalSTRS
USA
$186 billion
PFZW
Netherlands
$172 billion
University of
USA
$98 billion
California
Total
--$5.0 trillion

5) Date of
Divestment
Commitment
6/5/2015

4/25/2017
11/23/2015
5/22/2015
7/24/2015
5/25/2016
10/8/2015
1/17/2015
1/10/2018
10/8/2015
11/16/2015
9/29/2015
---

Sources: Gofossilfree.org (2018); Appendix D

Table 3.10: Regression results: oil & gas (excluding divestment events; t-statistics
in parentheses)

Oil_Price

(R1)
D.Jones_
Oil/Gas

(R2)

(R3)

Shell

Exxon

2.816***
(19.11)

0.138***
(5.61)

0.135***
(6.51)

0.317***
(25.46)
-0.210
(-1.82)
1564
0.637

0.0130***
(5.53)
-0.0145
(-0.68)
1564
0.092

0.0120***
(4.69)
-0.0140
(-0.65)
1564
0.081

Nat_Gas_Price
SP500_FFF
_cons
N
R-sq
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(R4)
D.Jones_
Oil/Gas

(R5)

(R6)

Shell

Exxon

0.591***
(18.89)
-0.0409
(-0.31)
0.0671***
(26.18)
-0.0358
(-1.48)
1562
0.637

0.138***
(5.61)
0.0252
(0.27)
0.0130***
(5.52)
-0.0147
(-0.69)
1562
0.092

0.134***
(6.50)
0.00302
(0.03)
0.0121***
(4.69)
-0.0139
(-0.64)
1562
0.081

Table 3.11: Regression results: oil & gas (including divestment events; t-statistics
in parentheses)

Oil_Price

(R7)
D.Jones_
Oil/Gas

(R8)

(R9)

(R11)

(R12)

Exxon

(R10)
D.Jones_
Oil/Gas

Shell

Shell

Exxon

2.821***

0.138***

0.135***

2.819***

0.138***

0.135***

(19.15)

(5.61)

(6.52)

(19.13)

(5.60)

(6.51)

-0.211

0.0205

-0.00459

(-0.33)

(0.22)

(-0.04)

Nat_Gas_Price
SP500_FFF

0.316***

0.0128***

0.0117***

0.316***

0.0128***

0.0117***

(25.33)

(5.41)

(4.58)

(25.29)

(5.40)

(4.57)

-0.719

-0.0967

-0.0974

-0.718

-0.0967

-0.0974

(-1.66)

(-1.07)

(-1.05)

(-1.66)

(-1.07)

(-1.05)

1.969

0.500

0.566*

1.966

0.501

0.566*

(1.56)

(1.71)

(2.08)

(1.56)

(1.71)

(2.08)

-1.238

-0.572

-0.479

-1.238

-0.572

-0.479

(-0.80)

(-1.70)

(-1.36)

(-0.79)

(-1.70)

(-1.36)

-0.166

0.178

0.0117

-0.163

0.178

0.0119

(-0.16)

(0.90)

(0.05)

(-0.15)

(0.90)

(0.05)

0.680

0.0911

0.122

0.680

0.0911

0.122

(0.92)

(0.64)

(0.87)

(0.92)

(0.64)

(0.87)

-1.696

-0.0673

-0.352

-1.700

-0.0669

-0.353

(-1.86)

(-0.45)

(-1.79)

(-1.86)

(-0.45)

(-1.79)

-0.969

-0.249

-0.209

-0.971

-0.249

-0.210

(-0.66)

(-1.19)

(-0.86)

(-0.66)

(-1.18)

(-0.86)

1.570

0.265

0.425*

1.575

0.265

0.425*

(1.16)

(1.34)

(2.21)

(1.16)

(1.34)

(2.22)

0.275

0.0328

0.0613

0.331

0.0279

0.0720

(0.40)

(0.39)

(0.69)

(0.46)

(0.32)

(0.77)

-0.325

-0.169

-0.286

-0.384

-0.164

-0.297

(-0.32)

(-1.11)

(-1.64)

(-0.37)

(-1.07)

(-1.68)

-0.0374

-0.0183

-0.00148

-0.0377

-0.0183

-0.00149

(-0.24)

(-0.64)

(-0.05)

(-0.24)

(-0.64)

(-0.05)

N

1564

1564

1564

1562

1562

1562

R-sq
F stat (divestment events
= 0)

0.639

0.098

0.091

0.640

0.098

0.091

1.270

0.900

1.573

1.272

0.879

1.583

Prob > F

0.242

0.532

0.109

0.241

0.553

0.106

Syracuse/Guardian
CIFF
Oslo_Pension
Church_HN
Amalgamated_Bank
Southwark_Pension
Ireland
HCF
Medibank
NYC_Pension
_cons
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Table 3.12: Regression results: coal (excluding divestment events; t-statistics in
parentheses)

Appalachia_Price
Powder_River_Price
Illinois_Price
Uinta_Price
SP500_FFF

(R13)
D.Jones_
Coal

(R14)
Cloud_
Peak

(R15)

(R17)
Cloud_
Peak

(R18)

Alliance

(R16)
D.Jones_
Coal

-0.141

-0.00172

0.209*

-0.476

-0.0189

0.197

(-0.33)

(-0.05)

(2.05)

(-1.16)

(-0.51)

(1.92)

-0.309

-0.0597

-0.410

0.189

-0.0304

-0.386

(-0.34)

(-0.68)

(-1.48)

(0.22)

(-0.36)

(-1.40)

1.189*

0.0702

-0.0682

1.096*

0.0623

-0.0762

(2.24)

(1.59)

(-0.64)

(2.01)

(1.45)

(-0.69)

0.0198

0.0133

0.0755

-0.0113

0.00566

0.0657

(0.03)

(0.19)

(0.62)

(-0.02)

(0.08)

(0.54)

0.0509***

0.00512***

0.0123***

0.0487***

0.00475***

0.0119***

(4.36)

(4.41)

(4.69)

(4.32)

(4.07)

(4.40)

3.228*

0.254

0.205

(2.41)

(1.56)

(0.71)

0.369**

0.0241

0.0221

(3.04)

(1.73)

(0.78)

Nat_Gas_Price
Oil_Price
_cons

Alliance

-0.694*

-0.0651

-0.105

-0.630

-0.0641

-0.105

(-2.04)

(-1.89)

(-1.49)

(-1.88)

(-1.87)

(-1.48)

N

314

314

314

312

312

312

R-sq

0.073

0.059

0.090

0.125

0.079

0.092
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Table 3.13: Regression results: coal (including divestment events; t-statistics in
parentheses)
(R20)
Cloud_
Peak
-0.0156
(-0.41)
-0.0312
(-0.31)
0.0510
(1.09)
0.00161
(0.02)
0.00527***
(4.59)
---

(R21)

Nat_Gas_Price

(R19)
D.Jones_
Coal
-0.302
(-0.66)
0.0579
(0.06)
1.007
(1.72)
-0.0369
(-0.06)
0.0517***
(4.40)
---

Oil_Price

---

---

---

Nordea

0.790
(0.61)
-4.569*
(-2.36)
1.466
(0.73)
3.613
(1.65)
-3.702
(-1.69)
2.100
(1.04)
2.094
(1.24)
-0.761
(-1.05)
0.274
(0.38)
-0.548
(-0.47)
-1.144
(-1.86)
314
0.095

0.0174
(0.12)
-0.337*
(-2.29)
0.0620
(0.37)
0.605**
(2.71)
-0.546*
(-2.09)
0.236
(0.97)
0.0240
(0.18)
0.0577
(0.56)
-0.0469
(-0.45)
-0.0480
(-0.32)
-0.0984
(-1.65)
314
0.077

2.467
0.00755

4.330
0.0000115

Appalachia_Price
Powder_River_Price
Illinois_Price
Uinta_Price
SP500_FFF

AXA_SA
Gov_Pension_Fund
Aviva
Univ_CA
CalPension
PFZW_Allianz
Aegon
AXA_IM
NYC_Pension
_cons
N
R-sq
F stat (divestment
events = 0)
Prob > F

(R23)
Cloud_
Peak
-0.0305
(-0.81)
-0.00521
(-0.05)
0.0435
(0.92)
-0.00374
(-0.05)
0.00489***
(4.18)
0.250
(1.48)
0.0231
(1.58)
-0.00799
(-0.06)
-0.282*
(-2.07)
0.0352
(0.21)
0.603**
(2.76)
-0.550*
(-2.24)
0.262
(1.13)
-0.0138
(-0.11)
0.0602
(0.58)
-0.0515
(-0.48)
-0.0637
(-0.43)
-0.0908
(-1.52)
312
0.095

(R24)

-0.686
(-1.76)
0.0936
(0.15)
-0.453
(-0.69)
1.630**
(2.86)
-1.293*
(-2.28)
0.112
(0.20)
0.520
(1.00)
0.164
(0.48)
-0.215
(-1.03)
0.0438
(0.13)
-0.0335
(-0.30)
314
0.127

R22)
D.Jones_
Coal
-0.642
(-1.48)
0.531
(0.56)
0.905
(1.49)
-0.0474
(-0.09)
0.0508***
(4.44)
3.304*
(2.40)
0.339**
(2.69)
0.425
(0.35)
-3.748
(-1.74)
1.007
(0.43)
3.732
(1.78)
-3.956
(-1.96)
2.477
(1.27)
1.671
(1.04)
-0.727
(-0.99)
0.493
(0.80)
-0.00980
(-0.01)
-1.066
(-1.72)
312
0.145

1.736
0.0722

2.089
0.0253

4.996
0.00000104

1.678
0.0852

Alliance
0.182
(1.70)
-0.434
(-1.50)
-0.145
(-1.11)
0.120
(0.95)
0.0128***
(4.81)
---
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Alliance
0.172
(1.60)
-0.411
(-1.45)
-0.153
(-1.14)
0.112
(0.88)
0.0123***
(4.38)
0.202
(0.68)
0.0242
(0.81)
-0.713
(-1.82)
0.137
(0.22)
-0.460
(-0.66)
1.615**
(2.71)
-1.292*
(-2.25)
0.142
(0.26)
0.476
(0.93)
0.170
(0.51)
-0.230
(-1.09)
0.0104
(0.03)
-0.0242
(-0.21)
312
0.129

APPENDIX A
VALUING OIL AND GAS RESERVES
The Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP) is based on Harold Hotelling’s 1931
paper, “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources”. Responding to the conservationist
movement of the time, which warned of over-use of nonrenewable resources from
unregulated private markets, Hotelling argued that nonrenewable resource markets,
theoretically, should lead to the socially optimal rate of non-renewable resource use
(Livernois 2008). This paper led to the “Hotelling Rule”, which posits that the net price
(market price minus marginal cost) of a nonrenewable resource rises at the rate of discount
(Hotelling called this the “interest rate”, by which he means the normal or required rate of
return on an investment). The Hotelling Rule implies that an investor has no incentive to
over-use nonrenewable resources today—the present value of the net price of a
nonrenewable resource is the same in every period.
Hotelling assumed the conditions of competitive market equilibrium, including
perfect competition, complete property rights, and zero externalities, none of which hold
in the real world. As such, in an extensive literature review of the empirical literature on
the Hotelling Rule, Livernois (2008) finds that empirical tests of the rule have been “mostly
unsuccessful,” and that “one cannot conclude that the Hotelling Rule has been a significant
force governing the evolution of observed price paths of nonrenewable resources” (37).
However, in one of the most widely cited tests of the Hotelling Rule, Miller and Upton
(1985a) found evidence supporting the rule for oil and gas firms. This paper led to the
HVP, which suggests that the value of any quantity of nonrenewable resources is equal to
its current net price. Its simplicity makes it an attractive valuation method. To value fossil
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fuel reserves, all one needs is current net price and quantity of reserves. Net price is
assumed to increase at the rate of discount, making the timing of production irrelevant.
The evidence since 1985 overwhelmingly rejects the HVP for valuing oil and gas
reserves, finding that the principle substantially overvalues reserves. This includes another
paper from Miller and Upton (1985b), though they continue to support the HVP. The most
compelling rejection both theoretically and empirically comes in a series of papers led by
the late Morris A. Adelman,81 leading to what Cairns and Davis (2001) call “Adelman’s
Rule”. Adelman (1990) found that the HVP overvalued oil and gas reserves by a factor of
approximately two, which is also consistent with the rule-of-thumb used by practitioners
in the oil and gas industry (see Appendix B). Livernois (2008) reviews several factors to
explain why net prices of nonrenewable resources historically have not increased at the
discount rate, including technological advancement, continual discoveries of proved
reserves, and imperfect competition.
As far as I know, Adelman was the first in the economics literature to connect
valuation of oil and gas reserves to the practitioner literature, i.e., how oil and gas engineers
actually value fossil fuel reserves in the field. As noted above, Adelman and others have
confirmed the practitioner rule-of-thumb that value of reserves equals half of net price. But
why does it work? Adelman (1990) pointed to the production constraint. Economists
generally viewed oil and gas producers as choosing not only when to drill a new oil or gas
well, but how much to extract and produce from that well on any particular day. When
resource prices decreased, one would expect producers to decrease production, and vice

81

Most of the papers are summarized in Adelman (1993), which is a collection of his essays in
book form. However, Adelman (1990) is arguably the most important regarding the HVP. See also
Adelman and Watkins (1995).
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versa. Adelman (1990) noted that extraction rate was not actually determined by prices,
but by reservoir characteristics. The conceptual counterpart in the practitioner literature is
the production decline curve, discussed in Section 2.3.5 and Appendix B.
Thompson (2001) translated the practitioner methodology of reserve valuation into
an economic model, which assumed that “developed reserves have a maximum daily rate
of production, and price-takers maximized wealth by producing at capacity” (153). He then
provided an empirical test showing the model’s viability. More recently, Anderson et al.
(2018) analyzed oil production data confirming that it does indeed decline in accordance
with Arps’ curves. While it is technically feasible for an oil operator to “shut in” a well
(i.e., temporarily stop production), doing so for economic reasons is extremely rare. Only
in extreme cases, where the discount rate is below 4% or the production decline rate at least
30% annually, would the operator gain anything from shutting in a well (Anderson et al.
2017). This stems from the fact that the marginal cost of producing another barrel of oil (or
cubic meter of natural gas) is extremely low, and oil and gas operators cannot predict future
prices.
For the purposes of this study—measuring stranded assets to better understand the
economic underpinnings of the fossil fuel industry’s resistance to clean energy—it is
important to value reserves the way fossil fuel companies do. Thus, I follow the lead of
practitioners, whose methods have been justified empirically. Fossil fuel reserves should
be valued according to the net present value of the future income they will create. The
industry rule-of-thumb suggests that this will be approximately equal to one half of current
net price. However, it is not meant to replace a full DCF analysis. The evidence here
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suggests that the net price will not rise at the rate of discount, and the timing of extraction
is important for valuation.
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APPENDIX B
FURTHER DETAILS ON METHODOLOGY
J. J. Arps (1945) laid out three models, called “production decline curves”, that
accurately describe the production rate of conventional oil and gas wells over time. These
curves are used by petroleum and natural gas engineers to estimate future production rates
and cumulative production from wells. The three decline curves are the exponential curve,
hyperbolic curve, and harmonic curve. The exponential curve is modeled by equation
(B.1), and the hyperbolic and harmonic curves from equation (B.2). The variables are
defined as follows: Pt is quantity produced in time period t; P0 is initial quantity produced;
D0 is initial decline rate; and b is a unitless coefficient determining the curve’s steepness.
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃0 (1 − 𝐷0 )𝑡

(B.1)

𝑃

𝑃𝑡 = (1+𝑏𝐷0 𝑡)1/𝑏

(B.2)

0

In the case of exponential decline curves, the decline rate is constant over time. For
hyperbolic and harmonic curves, the decline curve generally starts out steeper, and gets
shallower over time, based on the value of b. The coefficient b also determines whether
equation (B.2) is hyperbolic or harmonic. For hyperbolic curves, 0 < b < 1; for harmonic
curves, b = 1. Most global proved reserves are characterized as conventional, and
production from most conventional oil and gas wells is accurately described by exponential
curves or hyperbolic curves where b ≤ 0.5 (Fetkovich et al. 1996). Adelman (1990) and
Anderson et al. (2018) both used an exponential decline curve with a 10% decline rate.
While Adelman did not provide evidence for this rate, Cairns and Davis (2001) argued that
it was accurate based on their knowledge of the industry. Anderson et al. (2018) further
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confirm the credence of this assumption, saying that an exponential curve with a decline
rate of 10% is consistent with their empirical results based on Texas oil lease data.
Oil and Gas Supply Projections
In Section 2.3.5, I introduced two methods for valuing oil and gas reserves: the
practitioner method and the scenario projection method. Theoretically, the practitioner
method is best suited for valuing reserves. If an oil company were to consider selling its
oil reserves, the reserves would be valued based on the corresponding production decline
curve, not based on when the buyer or seller planned to produce them. A third method used
by oil and gas industry practitioners is a simple rule-of-thumb. Practitioners have found
that the value of proved oil or gas reserves in a reservoir is equal to approximately one third
of the market price of oil or gas, or one half of the net price (i.e., market price minus
marginal cost of production). Multiple empirical papers confirm the accuracy of the ruleof-thumb hypothesis (Miller and Upton 1985b; Adelman 1993; Adelman and Watkins
1995; Davis and Cairns 1998; Cairns and Davis 2001). The rule-of-thumb is limited in that
it can only be used to estimate the value of reserves under normal conditions, i.e., without
the prospect of climate policy and clean energy substitutes. Thus, it cannot be used to
estimate wealth losses from stranded assets. However, it can be used to evaluate the
efficacy of the practitioner and scenario projection methods.
In Table B.1, I compare the value of oil and gas reserves for the baseline scenario
using each of the three methods. As expected, the values estimated by the industry rule-ofthumb method most closely resemble the practitioner method.
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Table B.1. Value of oil and gas reserves for different methods of projecting fossil
fuel supply (2018 US$, B=Billion)
Oil
Gas
Practitioner method
$21,425 B
$9,863 B
Scenario projection method
$18,408 B
$7,763 B
Rule-of-thumb method
$20,060 B
$10,769 B
Source: Author’s calculations (data and methods described in Section 2.3).

Estimating Proved Developed vs. Undeveloped Reserves
I use two methods to estimate the distribution between proved developed and
proved undeveloped oil and gas reserves. First, I assume proved developed reserves include
reserves from wells that are in production in year one (2020) for STEPS. I then assume
production declines by 10% per year through 2040. Developed reserves are equal to the
sum of reserves produced from wells that were in production in 2020. For oil, this
constitutes 40%% of total reserves produced in STEPS, and for gas 36%. 38% constitutes
the average. The problem with this method is that many wells producing in 2020 will stop
producing before 2040.
The second method is a model of developed vs. undeveloped reserves. I assume
that wells last 21 years, production from wells declines at 10% per year, and that 1 unit of
oil/gas is produced per year. This most closely resembles production in STEPS. Each year,
new production is equivalent to the loss of old production. I consider three definition of
developed reserves: reserves that enter production within 1 year, within 1.5 years, and
within 2 years. Based on the three definitions, developed reserves constitute 35% (for 1
year), 38% (for 1.5 years), and 40% (for 2 years) of the total reserves produced over a 21year period. Given that undeveloped proved reserves take an average of three years to enter
production, the 1.5-year definition, which matches the results of the first method, seems
reasonable. Thus, for estimating stranded assets, I assume developed reserves constitute
38% of oil and gas reserves produced in STEPS.
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APPENDIX C
FURTHER DETAILS ON DATA
Mapping data onto WEO regions
I map gas and coal prices onto the WEO regions as follows: for North America and
Europe, I use the U.S. and EU prices, respectively; for Asia Pacific, I average the prices
for China and Japan; and for Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia, I average the EU and
Asia Pacific prices. The price projections for the EU, China, and Japan are very similar, so
the way in which I map the prices onto regions outside of North America does not have a
significant impact on stranded assets estimates.
The EIA provides combined data for oil and natural gas for the U.S., Canada,
Europe, former Soviet Union, Middle East, “Other Eastern Hemisphere”, and “Other
Western Hemisphere.” Statista and the Wall Street Journal provide data for oil for a subset
of oil producing countries. I map these costs onto the WEO regions by taking an average
of the countries for which data is available in each region, weighted by each country’s
production for STEPS. STEPS was the only scenario for which country-level data was
available. For example, for North America I take a weighted average of the costs for the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
Distribution by Region between Private Firms and Governments
NRGI (2020) provides data on all state-owned oil and gas firms for which data is
publicly available. To estimate the share of reserves owned by governments in each region,
I divided the total reserves produced by state-owned firms by the total reserves produced
in their respective countries for the latest years for which data was available. The exception
was Africa, for which very little data was available. For Africa, the share of government

176

reserves was determined by the shares in all of the other regions. In other words, Africa’s
government share was allowed to vary, so as to ensure that the regional shares matched
with the global share from the IEA (2020b). This method is not exact, as data was missing
for several state-owned firms. Moreover, some of the largest state-owned firms, including
Sinopec and CNPC of China, own substantial reserves in other countries. The IEA (2020b)
calls these “international national oil companies”. Thus, I had to adjust percentages upward
for other regions using my best judgement. Other sources I consulted include Jones Day
(n.d.) and EIA (2017).
To estimate the shares of coal reserves owned by governments and private firms, I
researched coal firms in the largest coal producing states. Exact percentages were not
available. Thus, I looked for evidence suggesting whether the coal industry in these
countries was mainly state-controlled or private-controlled. The most important country is
China, which accounts for nearly 80% of global coal production on its own. The most
useful sources are listed below.
-

China: IEA (2019a)

-

India: IEA (2019c)

-

Indonesia: Listiyorini (2020)

-

Russia: Vorotnikov (2013)

-

United States: EIA (2018c)

-

South Africa: Africa Mining IQ (n.d.)

-

Colombia: Strambo and Valasco (2017)
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APPENDIX D
CHAPTER 3 DATA SOURCES
This appendix includes all the references used in cleaning and supplementing the
GoFossilFree.org data, as well as detailed information on the stock price/index and
commodity price variables used in the event study.
References used for Data Cleaning
We only looked into the large entities, which included entities with limited
commitments that managed at least $90 billion in assets, and entities with full divestments
that managed at least $1 billion in assets.
Table D.1. References for Limited Divestment Commitments
Entity
References
Government Pension Fund
Carrington (2015b); Schwartz (2015a)
Global
AXA Investment Managers
Paredes-Vanheule (2017); Sharman (2017)
Allianz SE
Allianz SE (2015); Arabella (2016)
AXA SA
Clark (2015a)
Aviva
Arabella (2016); Clark (2015b)
Aegon
Aegon (2016); SEC (2016)
Lloyd’s Corporation
Moorcraft (2017)
CalPERS
CalPERS Investment Committee (2015); Kozlowski
(2015); Starkman (2015)
Nordea Asset Management
Marriage (2015); Nordea Asset Management (2015)
CalSTRS
Duran (2016); Duran (2017)
Pensionfonds Zorg en
Reuters Staff (2015a)
Welzijn (PFZW)
Bank J. Safra Sarasin
J. Safra Sarasin (2018); Weber et al. (2017)
Swiss Reinsurance Company Swiss Re (2018); Unfriend Coal (2017)
Ltd
University of California
Hirji (2015); Howard (2015b); Riley (2017)
Other Sources Used
Cowie (2014); Fossil Free USA (2016); McIlroy
(2015); Mertens (2015); Pielichata (2017); Weiner
(2018)
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Table D.2. References for Full Divestment Commitments
Entity
References
New York City pension fund Office NYC Comptroller (2018)
system
MP Pension Fund
Leaper (2018); Pielichata (2018)
Oslo Pensjonsforsikring
Bloomberg (2015); Reuters Staff (2015b)
Ireland
Gorey (2017); Osborne (2017)
District of Columbia
Bradford (2016a); (Hirji 2016)
Retirement Board
Children's Investment Fund
CIFF (2015)
Foundation (CIFF)
Amalgamated Bank
Stewart (2016)
Protestant Church HessenEKHN (2015)
Nassau (EKHN)
Medibank
Medibank (2017)
HCF
HCF Group (2016); Slezak (2017)
London Borough of
Colley (2017); Fossil Free UK (2016)
Southwark Pension Fund
Oakland
Solitei (2014); 350.org (2014)
Guardian Media Group
Carrington (2015a); Rusbridger (2015)
Syracuse University
Howard (2015a); Schwartz (2015b)
Australian Ethical
Australian Ethical (2016); Rose (2016)
Copenhagen
Neslen (2016)
Other references
Bradford (2016b); Connolly (2016); Hughes (2017);
Kommuninvest (2016)
Information on Event Study Variables
We used opening price for company stock price and coal index data, and last price
for oil and gas index and S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Free index data, all of which are publicly
accessible (see Data Availability Statement). Coal stock prices are end of week opening
prices, and coal commodity prices are weekly averages. Our data spans 30 December 2011
to 23 March 2018 (30 December 2011 is the first day for which the S&P 500 Fossil Fuel
Free Index was available).
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Table D.3. References for Event Study Variables
Variable
Reference
Dow Jones US Oil & Gas
S&P Dow Jones 2018a
Index
Dow Jones US Coal Index
Investing.com 2018
S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Free
S&P Dow Jones 2018b
Index
Royal Dutch Shell share
Yahoo Finance 2018d
price
Exxon/Mobil share price
Yahoo Finance 2018c
Cloud Peak Energy share
Yahoo Finance 2018b
price
Alliance Resource Partners
Yahoo Finance 2018a
share price
Oil price
FRED 2018
Natural gas price
EIA 2018b
Coal prices
EIA 2018a
Divestment events
See first two panels above in this appendix
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APPENDIX E
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING FUNDS DIVESTED
The 14 Largest Divestment Entities with Limited Commitment Levels
The largest 14 entities with limited commitment levels account for about 85% of
total assets under management, and thus gained fairly widespread media attention.
Researching each of these events individually (see Appendix 1 for references), we were
able to find estimates of commitment levels for nine of them.82
For the remaining five entities, we considered two methods. First—the method that
we decided to use—we looked just at the nine entities for which we had data on funds
divested. Dividing their funds divested by assets under management ($16.7 billion/$3.902
trillion), we found that their overall share of funds invested in coal prior to divestment was
about 0.43% (Gofossilfree.org 2018; Appendix 1). We then multiplied 0.43% by the assets
under management of Aegon, Lloyd’s Corporation, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, and Swiss
Reinsurance Company Ltd (results shown in column 4 of Table 3.4). For Aviva—the last
of the largest 14 entities with limited commitment levels—we multiplied assets under
management by 0.43%, and then multiplied that result by 0.2. The reason for this
adjustment in our calculations for Aviva is that Aviva did not fully divest from coal. Rather,
they put 40 coal companies on notice, threatening to divest only if those companies did not
show that they were accounting for climate change in their business models. Eight of those
companies refused to engage with Aviva, two of which Aviva said they may divest from

82

The nine entities include Government Pension Fund Global, AXA Investment Managers,
Allianz SE, AXA SA, CalPERS, Nordea Asset Management, CalSTRS, PFZW, and University of
California (see Table 3.4 for level of funds divested).
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(Aviva 2017; Cadle 2016). Therefore, we assume they will divest from the eight companies
they put on notice, which is 20% of the coal companies in which they invested.
The second method of estimation we considered consisted of multiplying each
company’s assets under management by the global coal industry’s share of total value of
the global stock markets. We were unable to find figures on the coal industry’s share of the
global bond market, so we assumed that this figure was the same share as that for the global
stock market. In 2014, the market capitalization of coal was $233 billion (Bullard 2014),
and the market capitalization of world stock markets was $63.3 trillion (World Bank 2018).
Dividing the former by the latter results in 0.37% (i.e., the coal industry makes up 0.37%
of the stock market), which is slightly less than the 0.43% we used in method one.
We chose to work with our first estimation method, in the interests of, if anything,
overstating rather than understating the level of fossil fuel divestments.
Smaller Entities with Limited Divestment Commitments
As stated in the paper, we applied method one from above to the 94 smaller entities
with limited divestment commitments.
Entities with Full Divestment Commitments
The largest two entities committed to full divestments are the New York City
pension fund system and MP Pension Fund. By researching each of these commitments we
found that they were divesting a combined $5.2 billion, or 2.5% of their $208 billion in
assets under management (see Appendix 1 for references). Because these were the only
two entities for which we had data on funds divested, we did not believe it was appropriate
to apply the 2.5% figure to the remaining 371 entities. Ansar et al. (2013) found that
educational institutions and pension funds generally hold 3-7.5% of assets under
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management in fossil fuels (includes both stocks and bonds). However, these are not the
only types of institutions divesting. Thus, to estimate funds divested of the 371 smaller
entities, we multiplied their assets under management by the global fossil fuel industry’s
share of world stock markets. In 2014, the market capitalization of the fossil fuel industry
was $4.9 trillion (Bullard 2014), and the market capitalization of global stock markets was
$63.3 trillion (World Bank 2018). Dividing the former by the latter, we found that the fossil
fuel industry’s share of global stock markets is 7.7%. Multiplying 7.7% by the assets under
management of the 371 smaller entities ($82 billion) leads to an estimate of $6.3 billion of
funds divested. This figure is, again, likely to overstate rather than understate the true level
of divestment.
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